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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

AGRICULTURAL TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION AND CONTRACT PARTICIPATION
AS A MECHANISM FOR ENHANCING SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAMS: THE CASE
OF WOMEN FARMERS IN GHANA
The dissertation consists of three studies that seek to identify school caterer and
women farmer constraints that have hindered the buy-local policy mandate of the Ghana
School Lunch program, and to explore gendered agricultural technology adoption and
contract participation strategies that could facilitate the policy mandate.
The first study documents the constraints that have minimized caterer purchases of
school food items from local farmers. The study presents an overview of the Ghana School
Lunch Program and the buy-local policy mandate issued to school caterers. Survey data
and descriptive analysis are employed to document and discuss the constraints that prevent
school caters from purchasing from local farmers as well as the constraints faced by
smallholder women farmers in supplying to school caters. The study subsequently
discusses school caterers’ compensating variation of a hypothetical policy that requires
them to firstly provide recommended portions of vegetables and protein, and secondly
include fruits in the lunch of the schoolchildren.
The second study analyses the factors underlying the probability that women
smallholder farmers - compared to male farmers - adopt less a) improved seeds, b)
fertilizer, c) herbicides and d) pesticides. The study further examines the sensitivity of
gender differences in technology adoption to crop choice, particularly maize and legume,
as well as the possible heterogeneity of technology adoption differences within rural and
peri-urban communities. The adoption of these improved technologies is modeled using
multivariate probit regressions. A gender gap is observed among legume farmers for
improved seed and pesticide adoption. Moreover, the findings indicate that female maize
farmers who have input into all cash crop production decisions are more likely to adopt
improved seeds and pesticides. Among legume farmers, the results indicate that female
farmers who are educated and have access to credit are more likely to adopt fertilizer, while
female legume farmers who have a say in what the use of income generated from cash crop
farming are more likely to adopt pesticides. These results imply that policy-makers and
development practitioners in sub-Saharan Africa should consider strategies to target and
increase educational, financial and productive assets of female farmers in order to close the
gender technology gap and increase multiple technology adoption.
The third study examines the use of farm-to-school contracts as a means to provide
access to credit for women farmers in rural and peri-urban areas and facilitate the buy-local
policy mandate. In particular, the study examines the factors influencing male and female
smallholder farmers’ minimum willingness to accept (WTA) farm-to-school-lunch
contracts for maize and cowpea beans. The minimum WTA simultaneously measures the
decision to participate as well as the minimum price at which the smallholder farmer
accepts the contract. Using sex-disaggregated data from a field experiment, a Tobit model
is applied to explain the underlying factors influencing male and female smallholder

farmer’s minimum WTA for a set of hypothetical maize and cowpea beans contracts. The
results for the pooled sample indicate that the delivery at harvest option increases farmers’
minimum willingness to accept both the maize and beans contracts. The study further
examines heterogeneity in the minimum WTA among smallholder farmers. The results in
the female specification indicate that, the advance pay option lowers the minimum WTA
for maize contracts. Additionally, women farmers who own non-farm business, compared
to a male with a non-farm business, have a lower minimum WTA for the maize and beans
contracts. The results suggest that if the government considers contractual arrangements
between school caterers and local farmers to facilitate the buy-local policy mandate, an
advance pay option to women farmers may yield lower premiums for contracted food
items.

KEYWORDS: smallholder farmers, women farmers, gender-differences, agricultural
technology adoption, willingness to participate, farm-to-school-lunch
contract
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION TO THE ESSAYS
1.1

Introduction
As a policy tool for socio-economic development, a number of developing

economies, including Ghana, have implemented homegrown school lunch programs. The
primary goal of these school lunch programs is improved nutrition for disadvantaged
schoolchildren, reliable markets for local farmers, effective local catering services and
enhanced local incomes.
The government of Ghana launched a nationwide school lunch program, a poverty
reduction and access to primary education strategy, in line with the comprehensive Africa
Agricultural Development Program (CAADP) goals on hunger, poverty and nutrition. The
school lunch program was implemented under a Home-Grown School Feeding (HGSF)
framework; such a framework requires that the school lunch is administered using food
that is locally grown by smallholder farmers. Under the HGSF, caterers are mandated to
purchase 80% of foodstuffs from local sources.

1.2

Problem Statement
This policy is designed to link caterers of school lunch programs with local farmers;

provide economic opportunities for local farmers; increase local agricultural production
and stimulate economic development, while providing nutritious meals for schoolchildren.
Studies have shown that the ‘buy local’ policy mandate has not been achieved. An
inventory of the Netherlands Development Organization in 2008 indicated that only one
out of the ten regions in Ghana had caterer purchases of more than 20% from local farmers.

1.3

The Essays
This dissertation examines factors that may have hindered the successful

implementation of the homegrown school lunch policy in Ghana, and presents empirical
studies that may potentially facilitate its implementation. The data used for the dissertation
involves a series of focus group discussions and interviews with school caterers and
smallholder farmers in rural and peri-urban areas in Eastern and Northern Ghana. Three
different data collection exercises were embarked upon in 2016, 2017 and 2018 to provide
the data for the dissertation.
The first essay, in Chapter 2, provides a background of the Ghana School Lunch
Program. The study employs qualitative research methods in documenting the constraints
that have undermined school caterer purchases from local farmers as stipulated by the ‘buylocal’ policy mandate of the Ghana School Lunch Program. The discussion is built off data
on school caterers and women smallholder farmers. The study examines and documents
the constraints that hinder school caters from purchasing from local farmers. The caterer
data revealed that the three main hurdles to purchasing from local farmers is the time and
frequency of remuneration, the amount of remuneration to the school caterers and storage
facilities. The study further discusses the constraints faced by smallholder women farmers
in supplying to school caters. Subsequently, the chapter presents a discussion on school
caterers’ compensating variation for a hypothetical policy, which requires caterers to
provide recommended portions of vegetables, protein and fruits in the lunches they prepare
and serve to schoolchildren.
The women farmer study in suggests that the two major constraints are land infertility
and access to credit. The infertility of land may be in part because of the use of traditional
11

methods of farming which rely on long fallow periods to restore lost nutrients in the soil.
In the light of improved agricultural technology, the second essay, in Chapter 3, analyses
the factors underlying the probability that women smallholder farmers - compared to male
farmers - adopt less a) improved seeds, b) fertilizer, c) herbicides and d) pesticides. The
study further examines the sensitivity of gender differences in technology adoption to crop
choice, particularly maize and legume, as well as the possible heterogeneity of technology
adoption differences within rural and peri-urban communities. The adoption of these
improved technologies is modeled using multivariate probit regressions. The results
indicate no difference in male and female maize farmers’ adoption of technology after
controlling for individual level access to and ownership assets, decision-making power,
household characteristics and plot characteristics. However, a gender gap is observed
among legume farmers for improved seed and pesticide adoption. Moreover, the findings
indicate that female maize farmers who have input into all cash crop production decisions
are more likely to adopt improved seeds and pesticides. Among legume farmers, the results
indicate that female farmers who have education and access to credit are more likely to
adopt fertilizer, while female legume farmers who have a say in the use of income
generated from cash crop farming are more likely to adopt pesticides. These results imply
that policy-makers and development practitioners in sub-Saharan Africa should consider
strategies to target and increase educational, financial and productive assets of female
farmers in order to close the gender technology gap and increase multiple technology
adoption.
With regards to credit constraints, Chapter 4 explores a hypothetical farm-to-schoollunch contract with a credit-advance option. The study examines the factors influencing

12

male and female smallholder farmers’ willingness to accept (WTA) farm-to-school-lunch
contracts for maize and cowpea beans. The WTA simultaneously measures the decision to
participate as well as the minimum price at which the smallholder farmer accepts the
contract. A conceptual model of farmers’ decision to participate in the contract is presented
and operationalized into a micro-economic framework of farmer decision-making. Using
sex-disaggregated data from the hypothetical field experiment, a Tobit model is applied to
explain the underlying factors influencing male and female smallholder farmer’s WTA a
set of hypothetical maize and cowpea beans contracts. The delivery at harvest option
increases farmers’ minimum willingness to accept both the maize and beans contracts.
Among female respondents, the advance pay option lowers the WTA for maize contracts
but not for the beans contracts. Furthermore, interactions between gender and contract
attributes indicate no statistically significant difference between male and female WTA for
the maize and beans contracts.
Chapter 5 presents a concluding analysis, which first summarizes the three essays
and then identifies policy implications of the empirical studies.

1.4

Context and Population of Study
This section discusses the methods employed to achieve the data requirements of the

dissertation. The table below presents the data types, the period collected and the chapter
in which each dataset is used in the dissertation.
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Table 1-1 Data and Sources for Study
Data
Type
Year Collected
Caterer data
Survey/ Questionnaire
2016
Women farmer data
Focus group discussions
2017
Supplementary
Key informant interviews
2018
nutrition data
Smallholder farmer
Survey/Questionnaire
2017
data

1.4.1

Chapter in Study
2
2
2
3 and 4

Caterer Data, Women Farmer Data and Supplementary Nutrition Data
The caterer data consists of in-person interviews with 30 caterers of the Ghana

School Lunch Program in the Eastern and Northern Regions of Ghana. The caterer data
were collected in 2016 by a team of faculty members from the University of Ghana and the
University for Development Studies. The dataset provides qualitative documentation of
caterer constraints and structures, which would facilitate the purchase and use of more local
food in the school lunch preparation.
The women farmer data were obtained through focus group discussions with women
farmers in Adjeikrom and Aseeseso in the Eastern Region of Ghana in 2017. The women
farmer dataset provides responses on the challenges that hinder them from supplying food
items to school caterers.
The supplementary nutrition dataset was obtained through in-person interviews with
school caterers in private and public schools in the Eastern and Greater Accra Region in
2018. This dataset elicits a measure of women caterers’ compensating variation for a
hypothetical policy mandates that requires them to include a recommended portion of
fruits, vegetables and protein in the school lunch prepared and served to school children.

14

1.4.2

Smallholder Farmer Data
The section presents, summarizes and describes the sex-disaggregated survey data

used for analysis in Chapter 4 and 5 of the dissertation. The primary data was collected
using structured questionnaires and a semi-structured pre-test interview guide. The survey
was conducted between July and August 2017 through questionnaires administered to 150
households. The target population was rural and peri-urban farm households in Northern
Ghana. Thus, three rural and three peri-urban farm communities were selected to be
included in the survey.
A pre-test of the questionnaire was conducted on a sample of 30 women farmers in
the Eastern and Northern Region of Ghana. During the pre-test, semi-structured interviews
were conducted with open-ended questions and follow-up questions after respondents had
given answers. Reconnaissance visits were carried out in some communities to help shape
impressions of the area and guide the design of the data collection instruments.
The questionnaire included a background or socio economic characteristics, sections
on farming activities, access, control and decision making on resources and access to
resources. The interview guide captured issues which centered on the constraints faced by
women farmers and the extent to which women farmers could take sole decisions such as
participating in farming contracts as well as their preferences for attributes on the farming
contract. Data collected were both quantitative and qualitative.
1.4.2.1 Sampling Framework
The objective of the study is to examine gender differences in agricultural technology
adoption as well as gender differences in the potential and motivation of smallholder
farmers to participate in farm-to-school-lunch contracts. Thus, the study requires two

15

samples; first, a representative sample of smallholder farmers who live in rural and periurban areas and second, a representative sample of women smallholder farmers. The survey
instrument was implemented in 6 communities; 3 rural and 3 peri-urban communities
within 2 districts in the Northern region of Ghana. A sample of 150 households were
randomly selected; 25 households from each of the 6 communities. Unlike other related
studies whose sampling frames are drawn from selected Farmer Based Organizations
(FBO) and fail to capture key characteristics at the community level, the sampling frame
for this research focuses on the community as a whole and thus captures a representative
sample of rural farm households. Additionally, smallholder women farmers make up only
about 5% of farmer based organizations in Ghana thus using FBO’s as a sampling frame
might exclude or bias our second sample of interest.
The communities identified for this study were Bukpamo, Garizegu and Kpene in
the Sanarigu District, and Duunyin, Pagazaa and Wamale in the Tamale District. Bukpamo
Duunyin and Pagazaa are rural communities while Garizegu, Kpene and Wamale are periurban communities. These communities are fairly representative of rural and peri-urban
communites found in the Northern Region of Ghana.
To obtain the two samples of interest - the representative sample of households and
the women farmer sample - two different sampling frames were employed.
A.

Representative sample of households

The sample of representative households makes up 60% of the total sample for the
study. A systematic random sampling technique is used to select 15 households from each
of the 6 communities. A random starting point was selected within each community, and

16

then every fifth house was selected to be interviewed as part of the sample. A simple
random sample technique was not used because even though most of the structures had
house numbers, the numbering was not in any orderly pattern.
B.

Women farmer sample

The women smallholder sample comprised 40% of the total sample. While responses
for the representative sub-sample were being collected, a list of 268 women farmers who
cultivate either maize and/or legumes and are substantially and actively involved in the
decision making of their farming activities was simultaneously collected from the
interviewees. Using this list as a sampling frame, 10 women farmer households were
randomly selected to be interviewed.
In each of the samples, responses were collected from both the primary and
secondary respondent, who were adults above the age of 18 years. The primary respondent
was typically the male head-of-household and the secondary respondent was typically the
first wife. In households where the man or woman was widowed, any other adult
significantly involved in farming activities with the smallholder farmer was interviewed.
Table 1-2 provides a visual representation of the sampling framework.
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Table 1-2 Sampling Frame for Survey Data
Communities
Bukpamo

Districts
Sanarigu

Area

Tamale

YES

Duunyin

YES

Representa
tive sample

List of
women
farmers

YES

15

50

10

25

YES

15

50

10

25

Rural

Periurban

Women
farmer
sample

Total
households
sampled

Garizegu

YES

YES

15

48

10

25

Kpene

YES

YES

15

45

10

25

15

45

10

25

15

30

10

25

90

268

60

150

Pagazaa

YES

Wamale

YES

YES
YES

TOTAL

1.4.2.2 Pre-test of Data collection Instrument
A prior version of the survey instrument was pre-tested on fifteen women farmers in
the Eastern Region and fifteen women farmers in the Northern Region. The pre-test served
three main purposes. First, it enabled the researcher to assess whether the target
respondents clearly understood the questions asked. Second, it enabled the researcher to
assess whether the questions asked elicited the responses needed from the survey for the
study. Thirdly, it enabled the researcher to assess whether interviewers could administer
the questionnaire in a timely, efficient and effective manner. After the pre-test, the survey
instrument was amended based on the insights gained.
1.4.2.3 Description of Household Survey
The survey instrument was divided into 6 main modules, A to F (Table 1). Module
A asked demographic question at the household level such as age, sex, marital status, years
of marriage, education, religion, total number of persons in the household, number of
working adults, number of adults who own farms, number of dependents, number of young
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children as well as whether any school children in the household benefited from the Ghana
school feeding program. Subsequent questions were asked about ownership of housing,
number of rooms in the dwelling place, main source of water, main source of lighting, main
source of cooking fuel, and the roofing, building and floor material of the dwelling.
Module B asked about the respondent’s role in household decision making around
production and income generation. Module B was a modified version of the Abbreviated
Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture Index (A-WEAI). The WEAI is a survey-based
index developed in 2012 by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), the
Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative, and the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) (Alkire et al., 2013). It is a monitoring and evaluation tool for the
U.S. government’s Feed the Future initiative to measure women’s empowerment and
inclusion levels in the agricultural sector, to identify key areas in which empowerment
needs to be strengthened and to track progress over time (Malapit et al., 2015). The AWEAI is a revised version of the original WEAI. The shorter and more stream-lined AWEAI version was developed as an improvement over the original WEAI following a
discussion event by stakeholders including USAID implementing partners, field teams,
researchers, and representatives from organizations that had also used the WEAI.
Module B1 asked about the main activities of food crop farming, cash crop farming,
livestock raising, non-farm economic activities, wage and salary work, major household
expenditures and minor household expenditures. This section particularly asked whether
the respondent participated in the activity, who often paid for the activity, who in the
household normally took decisions regarding the activity, how much input they had in
decision making, to what extend they felt they could make their own person decisions
19

regarding the activity and how much input they had in decisions on the use of income
generated from the activity. Module B2 asked about the respondent’s access to productive
capital. Specifically, it asked whether the responded owned any of the following, and what
quantity they owned of: agricultural land, cattle, goats, guinea fowl, chicken, knapsack
sprayer, tractor, shea-butter processor, shop, radio, TV, cell phone, bicycle and motorcycle.
The section on the farming activities of the respondent was Module C. The questions
asked include the total area of farmland (in acres) cultivated; whether the farmland is
owned, shared with a spouse, or rented; whether the respondent has taken a formal or
informal loan within the past 2 years to invest in farming activities; whether the respondent
knows anyone who has ever taken a loan; the respondent’s other financing for his/her farm
activities; whether the respondent would accept a loan if offered; one and the 3 biggest
challenges facing his/her farming activities. To get a sense of the expenditure constraints
of rural and peri-urban households and what they would most likely spend cash-at-hand
on, the survey asked respondents to list 3 agricultural and 3 non-agricultural items or
activities that they would spend on if they received an amount of GHȼ1,000 for each
category.
Module D and E asked about the maize and legume activities, respectively, of the
respondent for the past agricultural year, 2016, from planting to harvest. Module D of the
survey questionnaire first asks whether the respondent planted maize in 2016; if the
response is yes, the survey proceeds to ask how many acres of maize was planted and how
many person-days of family labor was used for land clearing, tilling, planting, weeding and
harvesting the maize crop. It further asks whether any hired labor was used for the
aforementioned farming activities, the number of person-days of hired labor used and how
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much in total was paid for the hired labor. Module D subsequently asks whether the
respondent used or applied certified seeds, fertilizer, weedicides and tractor services, and
how much was paid in total for them. The average number of bags harvested from the
maize farm, the number of bags harvested in 2016, how many bags were sold and how
much was received from the sale was also asked. Finally module D asks about problems
experienced with the 2016 maize crop, the type of storage used for the maize crop, the
performance of the 2016 maize crop compared with previous years, and the distance of the
maize farm to the nearest market, chief’s palace, district capital and to the respondent’s
house. Module E asks a similar set of questions for legumes.
The final module, Module F, incorporates a choice experiment eliciting respondent’s
willingness to participate in contract farming with school feeding programs. The module
first asked whether respondents had ever supplied food crops to caterers of a school feeding
program, what crop was supplied and the last time they had supplied crops to the school
caterer. Is also asked whether the respondent had been involved in contract farming with
an individual or agency, what crop was supplied and the duration of the contract. The
hypothetical contract for both maize and beans (legume) is then read to the respondents
and their choices are indicated. The contract would require the respondent to supply a 100
kg bag of maize or beans at an agreed period for an agreed price to school caterer.
Table 1-3 Survey Modules
Modules
A
B
C
D
E
F

Description
Demographics
Modified WEAI
Respondent farming activities
Maize farming activities (2016/2017 agricultural season)
Legume farming activities (2016/2017 agricultural season)
Hypothetical maize and beans contract
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1.5

Gender Differences
The table below presents some summary statistics for gender differences in maize

and legume farming. Maize is a staple crop in the Northern Region: male heads-ofhouseholds typically cultivate maize to feed their households while females typically
cultivate maize to supplement what is provided or to generate supplemental income. On
average, 99% of males in the sample grow maize while about 63% of women grow maize.
The 1% of males and 46% of females who do not grow maize either may cultivate different
crops or may not be farmers. Legumes are typically cultivated as a cash crop. About 45%
and 53% of males and females in the sample, respectively cultivate legumes. The t-test
indicates a statistically significant difference between male and female maize farmers but
no difference between male and female legume farmers.
Table 1-4 Gender Differences in Maize and Legume Farming

Variable
Grow maize
(1=Yes, 0=No)
Grow legume
(1=Yes, 0=No)

Full sample
(N = 298)
Std.
Mean
Dev.

Male
(N=150)
Mean

Std. Dev.

Female
(N=148)
Std.
Mean
Dev.

M-F
Mean Diff.

0. 81

0.39

0.99

0.12

0.63

0.48

0.115*

0.49

0.50

0.45

0.50

0.53

0.50

-0.08

***,**, * statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% alpha level respectively

The table below presents some summary statistics for gender differences between
maize and non-maize farmers. On average, women who do not grow maize are older, have
been married longer, are less educated and have fewer acres of agricultural land, compared
to women who cultivate maize. Additionally, women who do not cultivate maize are more
in peri-urban communities than in rural communities.
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Table 1-5 Gender Differences between Maize and Non-maize Farmers
Men
Grow maize
Do not
N=148
N=2
Mean S. D. Mean S. D.
Variable
Age
50.02 14.41 40.50 13.44
Educated
0.26 0.44 0.50 0.71
Marriage years 21.04 12.50 13.00 9.90
Ag. land owned 6.34 4.59 5.00 4.24
Access to credit 0.14 0.34 0.50 0.71
Rural
0.48 0.50 1.00 0.00

Women
Grow maize
Do not
N=93
N=55
Mean
S. D. Mean
S. D.
40.90
13.34 43.80
12.53
0.18
0.39
0.09
0.29
20.13
12.76 22.96
12.49
1.89
1.34
1.35
1.34
0.26
0.44
0.36
0.49
0.56
0.50
0.42
0.50

There is not as much differences among women who do and do not cultivate legumes
as with maize cultivation. Table 1.6 below indicates that women who do not cultivate
legumes are, on average, fairly younger and consequently have fewer years of marriage;
they are also slightly more educated, have higher access to credit but own fewer acres of
agricultural land. These women may be more engaged in non-farm employment activities
in the rural and peri-urban communities. There is, however, an even distribution of women
who do and who do not cultivate legumes in rural and peri-urban communities.
Table 1-6 Gender Differences between Legume and Non-legume Farmers
Men
Grow legume
Do not
N=68
N=82
Variable
Mean S. D. Mean S. D.
Age
47.62 14.16 51.78 14.40
Educated
0.31
0.47
0.22
0.42
Marriage years 20.22 12.28 21.52 12.69
Ag. land owned 6.82
4.74
5.91
4.41
Access to credit 0.13
0.34
0.15
0.36
Rural
0.50
0.50
0.48
0.50
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Women
Grow legume
Do not
N=79
N=69
Mean S. D.
Mean
S. D.
42.51 13.48
41.38
12.67
0.14
0.35
0.16
0.37
21.82 12.61
20.45
12.84
1.91
1.38
1.43
1.30
0.23
0.42
0.38
0.49
0.51
0.50
0.51
0.50

Male and female, maize and legume farmers in each household may have different
capacities to supply food items to school lunch programs. Particularly, among women
farmers, different characteristics may indicate their position of power in their households
and their capacity to produce and supply food items. Women do not tend to be household
heads, even if there are widowed. In such an instance, the woman eldest male son may be
regarded as head of household. However, the number of male son’s that the wife has and/or
the number of wives in the household may indicate the woman’s power in the household.
Table 1-7 below indicates the number of wives in the household, as well as male and
female children that the wife in question has. Fewer wives in the household might indicate
more power for the woman in question, while having more male sons might indicate the
woman’s ability to command labor. In the study’s sample, the average number of wives in
households where women grow maize is higher than in households where women do not
grow maize. Additionally, the average number of male children and female children of
women maize farmers is lower compared to women non-maize farmers. These
characteristics might suggest that women maize farmers may have less power compared to
women who do not cultivate maize.
Table 1-7 Differences among Women Maize and Non-maize Farmers

Variable
Mean
No. of wives
1.38
Male chn (wife1)
2.47
Female chn (wife1) 2.31

Grow maize
Do not grow maize
N=93
N=55
Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
0.62
0
3
1.25
0.55
0
3
1.75
0
9
2.98
1.60
0
7
1.43
0
7
2.35
1.40
0
6
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In Table 1-8, the average number of wives is lower among legume farmers than nonlegume farmers, which may indicate some power. Yet, the number of male children is
lower for women legume farmers than non-farmers.
Table 1-8 Differences among Women Legume and Non-legume Farmers

Variable
No. of wives
Male chn (wife1)
Female chn (wife1)

Mean
1.30
2.53
2.35

Grow legume
N=79
Std. Dev. Min Max
0.59
0
3
1.67
0
9
1.29
0
5

Do not grow legume
N=69
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
1.36
0.62
0
3
2.81
1.76
0
8
2.29
1.55
0
7

Although, the number of wives and male children for the women farmers do not
provide strong evidence of the women’s power in the household, the indicators of women’s
empowerment in the next section will shed some light on women with power who can be
targeted and contracted with supplying food items to the school lunch program.

1.6

Measures of Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture
A woman’s access to farming resources, as well as her agency in managing farm and

household affairs, are functions of her empowerment in her household and the community
at large. Empowerment is a multidimensional concept that requires appropriate measures
for diagnosis. (Akire et al., 2013; Malapit et al., 2015). The indicators of the Millennium
Development Goals, which measure gender parity and women empowerment, are
education, women’s share in paid employment, and women’s equal representation in
national parliaments. Other approaches used to measure women empowerment and gender
parity include using nationally representative data on women’s status (Smith et. al., 2003);
agency - ability to exercise choices where none existed a priori, resources, and
achievements (Kabeer, 2005); proxy measures of bargaining power such as income and
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assets (Thomas, 1994); and direct measures of empowerment such as mobility and
decision-making (Bhagowalia et al., 2012). More recently, studies have used a surveybased index designed to measure women’s empowerment across five domains in
agriculture, namely agricultural production, access to and control over productive
resources, control over the use of income, leadership in the community and time allocation
(Akire et al., 2013, Malapit et al. 2015). Data from these types of surveys are used to
construct the WEAI, a widely-recognized metric of gender parity (or lack thereof) within
households and communities (Akire et al., 2013). Here, too, we use select questions from
the WEAI survey.
Different domains and indicators of women’s empowerment are important in
different social, cultural and economic settings (Akire et al., 2013; Malapit et al., 2015).
Calculation of the WEAI in northern Ghana indicates that the resources and production
domains contribute the most to women’s disempowerment in northern Ghana. (Malapit et
al., 2015; Alkire et al., 2013). In other words, parity was lowest in terms of access to
resources and agency in production. Access to and decisions about credit is the key
indicator that contributes most to the resource domain while input into productive decisions
contributes the most to disempowerment in the production domain (Malapit et al., 2015).
Malapit et al. (2015) find that women’s empowerment is weakly associated with children’s
nutrition outcomes and significantly correlated with women’s dietary diversity in northern
Ghana. The results of the authors suggest that expanding women’s access to credit and
participation in credit decisions is associated with improved outcomes for both women and
girls in northern Ghana.
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1.6.1

Modified Data Collection of WEAI
This study uses a modified, simpler, version of the WEAI survey to collect

empowerment (or disempowerment) indicators of women in the areas of agricultural
production, resources and income. As described in Alkire et al. (2013) the WEAI is surveybased index which directly measures women’s empowerment across five domains in
agriculture using responses from self-identified primary male and female adult decisionmakers, aged 18 and over, in the same household. The women’s empowerment score
reflects the extent to which women are empowered in these five domains; and comparing
women’s and men’s empowerment scores yields the gender parity which assesses the
inequality between the achievements of women relative to the men in their households. In
the WEAI and sub-indices a woman is empowered if she achieves adequate achievements
in 80 percent of the weighted indicators or her score is equal to the male respondent in her
household.
This study collects data on the three domains that were identified by the WEAI as
contributing most to women’s disempowerment in northern Ghana: production, resources
and income.
Production: This dimension concerns sole or joint decision-making about
agricultural production activities. The indicator, input in productive decisions, is
constructed from answers regarding participation in (a) food crop farming, (b) cash crop
farming, (c) livestock raising, (d) non-farm economic activities, (e) wage and salary work,
(f) major household expenditures and (g) minor household expenditures. Respondents were
asked whether they participated in the activities, who often pays for the activity, who
normally takes the decisions, how much input they had in the decision making and to what
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extent the respondent feels they can make their own decision regarding the activity. An
individual has adequacy in this indicator if he or she participates and has at least some input
in decisions or if someone else makes the decisions but the individual feels he or she could.
The answer scale for the question regarding input in decisions is 1 = no input, 2 =
input into some decisions, and 3 = input into most or all decisions. For each activity, a subindicator was created that considers the individual adequate if he or she participates in that
activity and has at least input into some decisions related to that activity. The answer scale
for questions regarding the extent to which the individual feels he or she can participate in
decisions is 1 = not at all, 2 = small extent, 3 = medium extent, and 4 = to a high extent.
For each type of decision a sub-indicator was created that considers the respondent
adequate if he or she makes the decisions or if the respondent feels that he or she could
participate in the decision-making to at least a medium extent.
Resources: This dimension concerns ownership of or access to productive capital
such as land and assets (livestock, agricultural equipment and consumer durables). The
indicator examines whether an individual reports having sole or joint ownership of
agricultural land, livestock (cattle, goats, guinea fowl and chickens), agricultural
equipment (knapsack sprayer, tractor, shea-butter processor and a shop) and
communicative consumer durables (radio, TV, phone, bicycle and motorcycle). A person
is considered to have adequate achievements if he or she reports having sole or joint
ownership of at least one major asset.
Income: This dimension concerns sole or joint control over the use of income and
expenditures. The indicator for this dimension measures the degree of input into decisions
about the use of income generated from (1) food crops, (2) cash crops, (3) livestock
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production, (4) nonfarm activities, (5) wage and salary work as well as the extent to which
the individual feels he or she can make his or her own personal decisions regarding wage
or salary employment and major and minor household expenditures. A person is considered
adequate on this indicator if he or she has input into decisions about income generated,
conditional on participation in the activity.
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CHAPTER 2. DOCUMENTING THE SCHOOL CATERER, SMALLHOLDER FARMER
MISSING LINK
2.1

Introduction
This chapter documents constraints that have undermined that successful linkage

of local farmers with school caterers in the food system of national school lunch programs.
While the Ghana School Feeding Program aims to increase food purchase from local
smallholders, regardless of gender, this study places special emphasis on women
smallholder farmers. Women are the primary child caregivers and main actors in household
food preparation in many communities; thus, policy interventions that reduce gender
inequalities are thought to improve women and children’s nutrition (Malapit and
Quisumbing, 2015), and reduce poverty and food insecurity.

2.2

Research Questions
The research questions examined in this chapter are as follows:
1. What are the main constraints preventing caterers from sourcing food items from

local farmers?
2. What are the main constraints facing women smallholder farmers that prevent
them from participating in the school lunch programs?

2.3

Background of the Ghana School Lunch Program
In 2005, the government of Ghana launched a HGSF as a strategy to reduce poverty

and increase access to primary education. This initiative is in line with the Comprehensive
Africa Agricultural Development Program (CAADP) goals on hunger, poverty and
nutrition. The GSFP was implemented to provide one hot, nutritious meal a day for students
30

in pilot kindergarten and primary schools, covering 64,775 beneficiary pupils in the ten
regions of Ghana.
Figure 1 shows the current actors in the provision of GSFP lunches. The Ghana
School Feeding Secretariat has national, regional district and community level offices. The
GSFP national secretariat collaborates with the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social
Protection to implement the feeding program. The district secretariat recruits school
caterers, monitors their catering activities and requests payments to be released from the
Ministry to the caterers. The payments are through banks to the caterer’s account or via
mobile electronic financial systems, after they have prepared and served food to the
schoolchildren.
The three stated goals of the GSFP are to (1) reduce hunger and malnutrition, (2)
increase school enrollment, attendance, performance and retention, and (3) boost local food
production. This study focuses on the third goal. The GSFP mandates that 80% of school
food purchases (typically made by the school caterers) be direct purchases from local
farmers. Prior to the GSFP, school lunches, when provided, were based heavily on food
aid and/or imported products. The rationale of including the ‘local-purchase quota’ was to
induce the smallholder farmers to expand their farms and produce more to meet the
increased demand of food by caterers to feed school children, thereby increasing the
incomes of smallholder farmers and improving the nutritional status of both the school
children and those of the smallholder farmers. According to Sulemana (2016), the success
in linking the GSFP to local agricultural development requires active participation of
school level governance structures such as Head teachers and Parent-Teacher associations,
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school food caterers, smallholder farmers and local food traders, who are key players
involved in procurement of food under the GSFP.

School Feeding Secretariat

Financial
I tit ti

Smallholder farmer

Marketers

Caterers

School Plate

Figure 2-1 Diagrams Indicating Actors Involved in GSFP

Presently, however, the local-purchase quota is rarely met; in practice, caterers
purchase nearly all of their food items from the regional market. Caterers typically
purchase imported and/or processed items (e.g., imported white rice and canned tomatoes)
from the regional markets, thus defeating the local agricultural development objective.
According to an inventory of the GSFP by the Dutch NGO SNV (Netherlands
Development Organization) in 2008, only one out of the ten regions had caterers
purchasing more than 20% of food from local farmers. Figure 2.1 shows the present flow
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of funds in solid lines; the dashed line is the link between local smallholder farmers and
school caterers that could potentially be facilitated by the farm-to-school-lunch contracts
described herein.

GSFP Secretariat

Financial Institutions

Caterers

Regional
Marketers

Local
farmers

Figure 2-2 Flow of funds from GSFP Secretariat to Markets
2.4

Data and Sources
The documentation and discussion draws on data from three primary sources. The

first data source is a survey of 30 school caterers in the Eastern and Northern Regions of
Ghana interviewed in 2016. The caterer survey was administered by a team of faculty
members from the University of Ghana and the University for Development Studies. The
survey asked questions regarding the student enrollment in the schools the caterers
provided food to, the typical weekly menu and the sources of food procured. The survey
also asked questions about the caterers including how long they had been caterers at the
respective schools, other employment that they have, and whether they were members of
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the communities in which they prepared and served meals. The caterer survey further asked
about frequency of food purchases, availability of storage facilities, regularity of payments,
and what structures would facilitate their purchase and use more local food in their meal
preparation.
The second data source was obtained through a preliminary survey and focus group
discussions with women farmers in two communities in the Eastern Region of Ghana in
2017. The questions posed and discussed with the focus groups were aimed at finding out
challenges that hinder them from supplying food items to school caterers. To get an indepth understanding about the women’s empowerment in agriculture, the preliminary
survey asked questions about marital status, ownership and control of land, and the ability
of the woman smallholder to take sole decisions on agricultural activities on the farm plot.
The third data source was in-person interviews and case study of school caterers in
the Eastern and Greater Accra Region in 2018. This survey aimed at eliciting women
caterers’ compensating variation for hypothetical policy mandates that require them to
include a recommended portion of fruits, vegetables and protein in the meals prepared and
served to school children. Thus, the survey asked the minimum compensation school
caterers required to provide recommended servings of vegetables and protein in the lunch
of schoolchildren as well as the minimum compensation required to include a snack of
fruits for the schoolchildren.

2.5

Caterer Constraints in Buying from Local Farmers
This section documents, describes and discusses the constraints that school caterers

reported that prevent them from purchasing from local farmers as the GSFP caterer contract
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stipulates. The documentation draws on a survey of thirty caterers who were interviewed
in 2016; twenty caterers in the Eastern Region and ten caterers in the Northern Region.
2.5.1

School Profiles
Each caterer typically prepares food for and feeds schoolchildren in the two

kindergarten levels (1-2) as well as the six primary school grades (1-6). The total number
of children enrolled and fed daily in the sampled Eastern Regional schools ranged from 73
to 370 with an average of 188 schoolchildren. The average number of schoolchildren
enrolled and fed daily in the sampled Northern Regional schools was 260, with a minimum
148 and maximum 335 schoolchildren.
2.5.2

Caterer Profiles
All the caterers obtained the job by applying to the district assembly, going through

an interview process and later being offered the job. The main qualities for selecting the
caterers included knowledge about preparing balanced meals, ability to cook for a large
number of people, sense of dedication and hard work, experience, commitment and
resourcefulness. One food buyer cited his position as an executive member of the
community enabled him to secure the contract. The year of appointment of the caterers
ranged from 2008 to 2012; and the length of service ranged from 4 to 8 years. The payment
for services reported by caterers was the excess of money used to purchase and prepare
meals, that is, savings from the school-feeding budget. 50% of the caterers in the Eastern
Region reported having an alternative and/or previous job as a farmer. The remaining 50%
were into trading, petty trading, fishing, teaching or owning a drug store. In the Northern
region, none of the caterers reported being farmers but were teachers, petty traders and
food vendors. 75% of the caterers in the Eastern Region reported that they were members
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of the community within which they served as caterers to schools while none of the caterers
in the Northern Region reported being community members.
Table 2-1 Profile of Sample Caterers in Eastern and Northern Region
Characteristic
Average schoolchildren served (number)
Average length of service (years
Alternative job:
Farmer (%)
Trader (%)
Food vendor (%)
Teacher (%)
Other (%)
Community member (%)
Sample size

2.5.3

Eastern Region
187.85
4.95

Northern Region
260.2
4

50
27
9
9
5
75
20

0
30
30
20
20
0
10

Food Menu, Food Purchasing and Storage
Among the sampled caterers, a typical weekly menu included a carbohydrate

portion (rice, yam, plantain, banku, waakye) as well as a sauce/stew/soup with some protein
(beans, fish, chicken). In the Eastern Region, 65% of the sampled caterers followed a selfmade menu. The remaining cases followed a menu that was determined by the principal of
the school, or the district assembly. One caterer mentioned the time of the season
determined what was prepared and served. In the Northern Region, 80% of the caterers
reported that the district assembly determined the weekly menu, while 20% reported
following a self-made menu. However, the food items that are purchased and served each
day are determined by the caterers as well as the availability of food items. No fruit
purchases were reported in either the Eastern or Northern Region.
All the caterers in the Eastern Region and Northern reported purchasing food items
from the central market. In the Eastern Region, 50% reported that sometimes they directly
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purchase from the farmers. 10% reported that they used to, but no longer purchase from
local farmers because farmers dislike purchase on credit basis. Buying on credit in this
instance, refers to a verbal agreement between caterers and local farmers in which caterers
obtain food items from farmers with the promise of paying later when they receive
payments from the government. 10% of the caterers who were also farmers reported
supplying some food items such as maize from their own farms. In the Northern Region,
some caterers reported buying on credit from the Tamale Market. One caterer reported that
she stopped purchasing from local farmers when she was supplied poor quality food items
that perished faster and was not compensated for the loss.
Most caterers reported purchasing food items regularly. In the Eastern Region 5%
of the caterers purchased food items monthly, every six weeks and 4 times a term,
respectively; 10% purchased food items every two weeks; 15% purchased food weekly;
20% purchased food three times a term and 40% reported purchasing food twice a term. In
the Northern Region 80% reported purchasing food items once a term, 20% reported twice
a term and 10% reported they have no fixed schedule; they purchase as and when they run
out of food items and need to restock.
Among the Eastern Region caterers, 60% reported storing food items in their home,
30% reported storing the food items in a storage facility provided by the school; 5%
reported using both personal and school storage and 5% reported renting a storage facility. ,
In the Northern Region, 60% of the caterers reported an available onsite facility where they
could store food items and 30% reported no availability of on-site storage facilities. 10%
reported the available storage facility was infested with rodents; therefore, they had to
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make other arrangements such at storing the food items in the house of one of the cooks
who was a member of the community.

Table 2-2 Caterer Menu, Purchasing and Storage Characteristics
Characteristic
Weekly menu:

Eastern Region

Northern Region

65
35

20
80

100
50
10

100
0
0

15
10
5
5
5
20
40
-

20
80
10

60
30
5
5
-

30
60
10

Self-made (%)
School or district assembly decides (%)
Location of food purchases*:
Central Market (%)
Local farmer, occasionally (%)
Self (%)
^
Frequency of food purchases :
Weekly (%)
Bi-weekly (%)
Monthly (%)
Six-week intervals (%)
Four times each term (%)
Three times a term (%)
Twice a term (%)
Once a term (%)
As needed, no fixed schedule (%)
Storage
Home (%)
School storage facility (%)
Home and school storage (%)
Rent storage (%)
Other (%)
*Food purchases were sometimes made from multiple sources
^A school term spans fourteen weeks on average

2.5.4

Facilitation of Use of Local Foods
This section explores, from the perspective of the caterer, how the purchase and use

of local foods from farmers could be facilitated. The research question asked was “What
would you need to be able to buy and use more local foods?” 75% of caterers in the Eastern
Region and 90% of the caterers in the Northern Region mentioned that to facilitate the
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purchase of local foods from farmers in preparing meals the payments should be made
regularly or on time to avoid going to farmers to purchase on credit, as farmers do not want
to sell on credit. This is reflected in the comments of one cater; “Ready cash. If I have
ready cash, I can buy from the farmers in the community. They do not want to sell on credit.
So if you don’t have money, you cannot buy from them”. Another caterer reported, “I need
ready cash because the payment is not regular. The farmers have food and I am free with
them. I only buy from them when I have money. I have bought from them rice, beans,
cassava and maize, but only with cash”. Yet another reported, “If we are paid monthly, we
could afford to buy from local farmers in the communities in cash”.
The capacity of local farmers to supply the quantities needed by caterers was cited
as a hurdle to purchasing from local farmers. A caterer in the Northern Region reported
the need to be linked to farmers who would be able to supply the quantities she demands.
Another caterer in the Eastern Region suggested that, the government should educate the
farmers on how to improve production and encourage farmers to work hand in hand with
caterers. An increase in the productivity of the local farmers would help them meet the
capacity demand of the caterers at minimum cost. In the words of one caterer, “help farmers
to increase their productivity, so they can produce more and reduce the prices of their
produce”.
The third factor that was identified by the caterers as a means to facilitate
purchasing food from local farmers was easier access to credit facilities from rural banks.
One caterer mentioned that, “rural banks can give loans to help support purchases”.
Another suggested credit arrangements between the caterers, farmers and rural banks
would facilitate purchases from local farmers. SNV had once linked the caterer to a farmers
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group through a Bonzali Rural Bank loan. Under the arrangement, the bank provided loans
to each caterer, 70% of which was used to buy food from the farmers’ group and 30% was
given to the caterer to facilitate other purchases. The farmer then supplied the food items
based on price agreed upon. To ensure repayment of the loans, a caterer explained, “the
bank deducted the loan in six instalments every time I receive payment for school feeding
on my account at the bank”. The caterer reported that, “the farmers’ group price was
cheaper than I got from my supplier. This kind of arrangement will help us buy food from
the farmers in the community”.
Table 2-3 Caterer Responses to Facilitation of Purchases from Local Farmers
Themes Identified
Regular payments

Increase farmer’s capacity

Access to favorable credit

Sample Responses
“If we are paid monthly, we could afford to buy from local
farmers in the communities in cash”
“Regular payment will help us to be able to buy from the
farmers. Monthly payment will be good”
“Ready cash. If I have ready cash, I can buy from the
farmers in the community. They do not want to sell on
credit. So if you don’t have money, you cannot buy from
them”
“I need ready cash because the payment is not regular. The
farmers have food and I am free with them. I only buy from
them when I have money. I have bought from them rice,
beans, cassava and maize, but only with cash”
“help farmers to increase their productivity, so they can
produce more and reduce the prices of their produce”
“I need to be linked to farmers who have the capacity to
supply the quantities I demand”
“The government should educate the farmers on how to
improve production and encourage farmers to work hand
in hand with caterers”
“rural banks can give loans to help support purchases”
“Financial support will aid me go to the farm gate to buy
foodstuff at a cheaper price”
“government can help with acquiring of loans to help
purchasing of food items”
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2.6
2.6.1

Women Farmer Constraints in Supplying to School Caterers
Women Smallholder Focus Group – Adjeikrom
The questions presented and discussed with the focus groups were aimed at finding

out women farmers’ input in productive decisions as well as their access to productive
resources. To get an in-depth understanding about the autonomy of the woman smallholder
to take sole decisions on agricultural activities on the farm plot, we asked about marital
status; ownership and control of land; types of crops grown; decisions on what to grow
each planting season; and the general challenges facing the women farmers.
Out of the sample of 13 women holders who were part of the focus group, 4
(approximately 30% of the total sample) were married, 1 was divorced, 3 were single and
5 were widowed. The high single/divorced/widowed status among the participants
indicated an unusually high level of autonomy with regards to decision making about
farming activities. More specifically, 69% of the women farmers solely made farming
decisions. Among the 4 women who were married, 2 held independent farm plots from
their husbands while the other 2 helped on their husbands’ farms.
With regards to ownership and control of land, 5 of the participants were engaged
in share-cropping. Sharecropping is a land-sharing agreement where the owner of the land
leases out a plot (s) of land to the farmer and receives either half or one-third of the farm
produce or income generated from selling the farm produce. The owners of the land benefit
greatly from such agreements without having to do any farm work and thus are not likely
to sell the land outright. Under sharecropping agreements, the farmer solely makes decision
about what to produce, how to produce and how much to produce but must share the harvest
with the landowner. The remaining participants either owned the land, shared with their
spouse or cultivated on family land.
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Table 2-4 Profile of Women Farmers in Adjeikrom
Characteristic
Marital Status

Adjeikrom
Married (%)
Divorced (%)
Widowed (%)
Single (%)

30.8
7.7
38.5
23.1

Own (%)
Share with spouse (%)
Family-owned (%)
Sharecropping (%)
Decision making about farm activities
Sole decision-making (%)
Decision-making with spouse (%)
Decision-making with other family (%)
Sample size

7.7
7.7
46.2
38.5

Ownership of farm plot

69.2
15.4
15.4
13

For a link to be established between women farmers and school caterers, the
questions sought to find out if the women farmers grew crops that the caterers needed or if
they could grow crops to meet the food menu demands of the caterers. To find out if the
women farmers grew crops that the school caterers needed to prepare food for the
schoolchildren, we asked about the types of crops commonly grown in the Adjeikrom
village. The most commonly cultivated food crops in the village were maize, cassava,
plantain and cocoyam. Among these crops, maize and cassava are regularly purchased for
food preparation and served to the schoolchildren. When we asked why beans were not
grown by the women farmers in the village, the women farmers gave a number of reasons.
Their reasons included: “beans doesn't grow well in this area, the people in the next village
are better suited to grow the crop; beans is more difficult to cultivate than maize; we
(women farmers) need to employ ‘hired hands’ (also known as by-day-workers) to spray
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the bean crop and it's too costly for us; beans is more easily attacked by pests and diseases
and we can’t easily control the pests and diseases.”
The final focus group question asked the women farmers about the main challenges
they faced in their farming activities. The first challenge they mentioned was land
infertility; they cited that the land is not as fertile as it used to be and so when crops are
cultivated the yield is lower than expected. Their responses suggested that no agricultural
practices were performed to maintain or improve soil fertility other than slash and burning
of the original vegetation. The second challenge mentioned was the need for money to hire
labor to clear the land, help with planting and weed the farm when it's overgrown. The
women farmers mentioned that there was an abundance of young men to hire, however the
money to hire these young men was the challenge. “It costs about 20 cedis a day for each
male and you have to provide them with lunch. It costs 25 cedis each when you can't
provide the hired labor with lunch. The hired laborers work from about 8am to 12pm or
2pm and are done no matter how far they have gotten with the activity you hired them for.
The other alternative is to give them a portion of land to clear and agree on a fixed price,
say 200 cedis. They may take up to a week but the job will be done.” The women farmers
emphasized that it was getting such a large sum of money to pay up-front that was the
challenge; specifically because they pay the hired labor with some of proceeds obtained
from selling the harvested crops.
Transporting produce is one other challenge that the women farmers mentioned.
According to one woman farmer “it is very easy to market (sell) the produce once we get
it to the roadside or to the village, however it is difficult to carry the products on our heads
from the farm to the village.’’ The common practice among the women farmers, once they
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harvest their produce, is to carry the produce on their heads or hire labor to carry the
produce to the roadside or to the village where they often market their produce. Revenue
accrued in bits and pieces from the sale of the produce is also an issue. A woman farmer
commented: “it's easy to sell but the payments are in bits and pieces, not lump sum, so we
lose track of the payments received and expenditures made.” Repayment schedules offered
by microfinance institutions was the last challenge cited by the women farmers. The
microfinance institutions start demanding payment 3 weeks after they give loans to the
farmers and the repayment periods last for about 6 months. The farmers are thus unable to
invest the funds into their farms. They either have to sell their crops from the previous
harvest (if they have any remaining) or borrow from neighbors to repay.
We asked the participants of the focus group about practical solutions to mitigate
the challenges of women farmers and successfully link them to the school feeding supply
chain. The women farmers suggested that everyone (school leadership, farmers and
caterers) should be made aware that the women farmers’ farm produce is intended to be
supplied to school caterers. They recommended a mutual agreement between the women
farmers and the school caterers so that the caterers would not by-pass the farmers to go buy
from the central market. The women farmers also proposed that prices should be agreed
upon but should be flexible to reflect prevailing market prices. On the production side, they
requested for monetary assistance to purchase seedlings and to hire labor. The women
farmers were willing to consider the monetary assistance as a loan and repay within a year.
2.6.2

Women Smallholder Focus Group – Aseseeso
The second focus group at Aseseeso was also aimed at finding out the women’s

input in productive decision-making, constraints, as well as their willingness to accept a
farm-to-school lunch contract with the school cooks. The questions posed in this session
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examined land ownership, farm decision-making, crops grown, marketing, alternative jobs
and the farm-to-school contract. A sample of 11 women farmers convened for the focus
group discussion in Aseseeso. Among the sample of women farmers, 3 inherited their
farmland, 3 farmed on family-owned land, 2 had share-cropping arrangements, 1 owned
the land but shared with spouse and 2 had other arrangements. With regards to decision
making, 7 reported sole decision-making, 2 decide with spouse and 2 decide with family.
The commonly grown crops included maize, plantain, yam, cassava and vegetables. Most
of the women reported farming on subsistence and only selling if there was excess; only
one woman farmer reported marketing to school caterers.
When asked if they were willing to have participate in contractual arrangements
with school caterers, 9 out of 10 said ‘yes’ to 50% advance payment, 8 out of 10 said ‘yes’
to 25% advance payments and 7 out of 10 said ‘yes’ to no advance payment, with one
giving no response.
Table 2-5 Profile of Women Farmers in Aseeseso
Characteristic
Ownership of farm plot

Aseeseso

Own (%)
Share with spouse (%)
Family-owned (%)
Sharecropping (%)
Other (%)
Decision making about farm activities
Sole decision-making (%)
Decision-making with spouse (%)
Decision-making with other family (%)
Contract participation
50% advance-payment (% yes)
25% advance-payment (% yes)
No advance-payment (% yes)
Sample size
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9.1
54.5
18.2
18.2
63.6
18.2
18.2
72.7
63.6
54.5
11

When asked about major constraints affecting their farm activities that could affect
the farm-to-school contractual arrangements, 4 main constraints stood out. These were
fluctuating prices, post-harvest losses, pest and diseases, and unfavorable loan facilities.
The women explained that sometimes there was ‘good’ market for farm produce with good
prices, and at other times – especially during bumper harvests – prices would decline. They
were interested in the farm-to-school lunch arrangements but did not want to be stuck with
prices that was lower than on the market.
With regards to post-harvest losses, the vegetable farmers remarked that when they
harvest their vegetables and are not able to sell them within a short period, the vegetables
go bad. They expressed willingness to expand their farms to meet the food requirements of
the schools but did not want to be left with unpurchased vegetables that would go bad and
be an additional cost to them. Their comments suggested that there were no storage or
processing facilities that could increase the shelf life of the food items.
The women farmers mentioned that maize and mango pests were the main pests
that infested their farms. The pests sometimes completely consume their crops and leave
them with nothing to harvest. When asked about how they combat the pests and diseases,
they remarked that they did not have any resources (financial or technical expertise) to
eliminate the pests. They are often unable to afford pesticides to spray their farms. Thus,
when their farm plots are infested they know that they will have very little or no harvests.
This was a major concern because if they got involved in the contractual arrangements and
lost their harvests to pests, they would not have food items to supply to the school caterers.
Unfavorable loan facilities was the fourth constraint mentioned by the women
farmers. A woman farmer remarked, ‘we need money and would like to take loans, however
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the interest rates are about 30% and within 3 weeks we have to stat repaying the loans’.
Another woman farmer remarked, ‘the high interest rates and short repayment periods (4
to 6 months) prevent us from taking loans unless we are desperately in need.’ When asked
about rural banks and microfinance institutions in neighboring communities, it became
apparent that some rural banks refuse to give loans to farmers because of high risk and
uncertainty of repayment associated with farming. The banks who gave loans to farmers
did so with high interest rates and requirements to repay within the shortest possible time.
The next phase of the focus group discussion asked women farmers about potential
solutions that they envision would curtail their challenges in farming and enable them
supply food crops to the women caterers. Borehole and irrigation, financial support,
favorable loan facilities and storage facilities were the solutions proposed by the women
farmers. A woman farmer reported, ‘our vegetable farms need a constant supply of water,
but sometimes the rains do not fall as expected.’ This was an indication that even vegetable
farmers who needed regular supply of water heavily depended on rainfall to grow their
crops. The women farmers felt that if they had boreholes or irrigation facilities they would
be able to grow and supply enough crops for the school caterers.
A consensus about curtailing the challenges that women farmers face in supplying
food items to schools was financial support. A woman farmer emphasized, ‘we need money
to buy inputs and to take care of problems when they arise’. Based on consensus for the
need for financial support, a follow up question asked the women farmers what they would
use the money for if they were give a grant of GH1000 cedis. The items mentioned for the
use of the money included paying for land preparation, hiring labor and tractors, and
purchasing seedlings, pesticides and spraying machines. If however, they were not
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restricted to farming with the grant allocation, some of the women mentioned that they
would invest in their non-farm businesses or use it to pay debts.
The women farmers also suggested that favorable loan terms with rural banks and
micro finance institutions could facilitate the farm to school lunch arrangements. They
suggested at least one-year loan repayment periods would enable them to invest the money
in their farming activities; cultivate their crops, harvest, sell and have sufficient money to
reinvest and repay their loans. They also commented that lower interest rates would make
it easier to repay loans and would take some pressure off them.
Storage was another potential solution highlighted that could facilitate farm-toschool arrangements between farmers and school caterers. Due to insufficient storage
facilities, some farmers wanted to supply all their maize produce to school caterer rather
than to store and supply monthly or every 6 weeks. However, a few women farmers had
non-farm businesses as maize aggregators. These women preferred to store their maize
crop, aggregate the maize of other women farmers and supply to school caterers as and
when they needed it. Alternatively, a common storage facility could be provided that would
record and store the farm produce of the women farmers and be released to the school
caterers when they needed it.

2.7
2.7.1

Supplemental Vegetables, Protein and Fruits for Ghana School Lunch
Programs: A Welfare Analysis
Introduction
Nutrition for young schoolchildren is a critical component of growth and learning.

The food’s nutrition contributes to concentration, critical thinking and performance.
Moreover, the Ghana School Lunch Program stipulates one hot, nutritious meal for each
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child for each school day. In the previous section, the survey of food items that caterers
procure for preparing meals for schoolchildren indicates that virtually no fruits and very
little vegetables and protein are included in the meals.
Given that caterers under the GSFP are currently being paid GH₵1 per child per
day, requiring caterers to increase the portions of protein and vegetables or to include fruits
would most likely lead to a loss of welfare for the school caterers. The study seeks to
examine the increase in compensation for school caterers that will leave them at the same
level of welfare if they are required to provide recommended portions of protein,
vegetables and fruits for schoolchildren. The data was obtained by interviewing caterers
from 7 schools in the Eastern Region and 3 schools in the Greater Accra Region.
To begin the interviews, the caterers were asked whether with no additional money,
they would be able to provide recommended levels of protein and vegetables, or include
fruits as part of their meal service. The recommended protein included a whole egg, or
meat, fish or chicken that was the size of a child’s fist. Their responses indicated that the
present allocation of resources (GH₵1 per child per meal) was insufficient to cover the
recommended protein of say one egg per schoolchild. They cited that food vendors
typically sold an egg for GH₵1, chicken, meat and some varieties of fish were sold for
GH₵2 or GH₵3. The caterers also cited that fruits on the market sold cost more than the
allocated resources, thus they would not be able to cover costs of purchases and meal
preparation. They mentioned that they were currently providing the best food services they
could, given the resources, and would incur losses for the recommended portions of protein
and vegetables without additional resources.
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The study thus examines the minimum compensation required by school caterers
to include firstly fruits, and secondly additional protein and vegetables in the meals of the
schoolchildren. Compensation variation is used to measure the payment needed for these
additional menu items.
2.7.2

Compensating Variation Analysis of Supplemental Vegetables, Protein and
Fruit
Hicks (1942) defines Compensating Variation in Income as “the loss (gain)

in income that would just offset a fall (increase) in price, leaving the consumer no better
off than before.” Compensating variation (CV) may be generalized to measure the amount
of money needed to put a caterer back on their original utility, after price(s) change, change
in product quality or the introduction of new products.
In this study, rather than a direct increase in price, caterers are asked to provide a
recommended serving of vegetables and protein as a snack, and a recommended serving of
fruits. The recommended servings were a cup/bowl of fruits, a quarter plate of vegetables
and a child’s fist-size of protein. The fruits are analyzed separately from the vegetables
and protein as the fruits constitute a snack (a new addition to their contract requirements)
while the vegetables and protein constitute a part of the main meal prepared and served by
the caterers. The introduction of the recommend fruits and vegetables and protein in the
meals of schoolchildren would take caterers from an initial level of utility (well-being) to
a lower level of utility. CV in this study measures the least amount of extra income that
restores the caterer to her original utility level.
Let x be food items for preparing the carbohydrate-based meals and vp be
vegetables and protein included in the meals. Let 𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥 be the price of goods for the

carbohydrate-based meals, 𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 be the price of vegetables and protein, and c be other costs
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associated with the lunch preparation. Given that B is the budget of the caterer, the budget
constraint is
𝐵𝐵 = 𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥 𝑥𝑥 + 𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 + 𝑐𝑐

(1)

The objective of the caterer is to minimize the cost of purchasing, preparing and
serving school meals while providing sufficient calories to satisfy the schoolchildren. As
the caterer minimizes the cost of meal preparation, she is able to maximize her profit given
the budget constraint. This means that the caterer will choose a cost effective bundle that
will allow her to provide sufficient calories for the schoolchildren. Due to the high cost of
vegetables and protein, most caterers choose a bundle of food items that largely consists of
carbohydrate-based portions that are sufficient to satisfy the schoolchildren. Moreover, due
to the payment structure, caterers typically choose the cheapest ingredients, which are
neither local nor nutritious.
2.7.2.1 Increasing Vegetables and Protein to Recommended Levels
Asking caterers to increase vegetables and protein to recommended levels is
equivalent to an increase in the cost of food served to the schoolchildren by school caterers.
It is not possible to increase the quantities of vegetables and protein without a
corresponding increase in the budget allocation or a fall in the price or quantity of x. In
essence, it becomes more expensive for the caterer to provide the recommended portions
without overcompensating on the quantity and quality of x and vp used in the lunch
preparation. The CV is the minimum the caterer needs in order to accept the change in
recommend vegetable and protein portions.
2.7.2.2 Introducing Fruits as a Snack
Asking the caterers to include fruits as a snack served to the schoolchildren is
equivalent to the introduction of a new good. Let f be the fruit portion to be introduced,
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and y be the school lunch composed of recommended carbohydrate, vegetable and protein
portions. The caterer’s budget constraint now becomes
𝐵𝐵 = 𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦 𝑦𝑦 + 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓 + 𝑐𝑐

(4)

Again, it is likely that caterers would be unable to comply with an introduction of

fruits in the school lunch program without a corresponding increase in the compensation
provided them. The caterer would initially chose a bundle y that minimizes that cost of
producing the school lunch, thus her minimum willingness to accept for including fruits is
the CV for introducing fruits as part of the school lunch program.

2.7.3

Data on Caterer Compensating Variation
The mandate of the Ghana school lunch program is to provide one nutritious meal

a day for school going children. A survey of food items used in the meal preparation
indicates that portions of vegetables and protein are minimal and no fruits are included in
the meals. This section examines the effect of a hypothetical policy on recommended
portions of vegetables, proteins and fruits to the school lunch program. Caterers from 7
school in the Eastern Region and 3 schools in the Greater Accra Region were interviewed
to find out the monetary measure of compensation they would require if the hypothetical
policy is implemented.
The caterers were randomly picked from GSFP beneficiary and non-beneficiary
schools. In our sample, 50% of the caterers were from beneficiary schools. All GSFP
beneficiary schools are public schools. However, some public school are not yet
beneficiaries as the GSFP was first implemented in schools that had lower school
enrollment and attendance, with the goal to extend to all public schools. The caterers in the
public non-beneficiary schools collected daily, monthly or termly levies (as and when
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parents could pay) which was used to prepare food for the schoolchildren. Other caterers
in public non-beneficiary schools operate a canteen-like meal service, where they prepare
and serve meals to the schoolchildren based on what the kids want and how much money
they have in hand.
The interviews with the caterers in the Eastern Region and Greater Accra region
indicated that, given the payment structure, the caterers were choosing quantities of food
items that would provide sufficient calories for the schoolchildren at the minimum cost.
When asked what amount of money they would require to provide the recommended
portions of vegetables and protein, most of the caterers indicated that they would need at
least twice as much as they were currently receiving, because vegetables and protein
portions are more expensive to purchase and use in meals. Similarly, for including fruits,
the caterers reported that they would require an additional GH₵0.5 or GH₵1. The table
below gives the assumed compensating variation amounts elicited from the school caterers
in the Eastern and Greater Accra Regions.
The elicited compensating variation amounts are a close approximation to CV but
may not exactly reflect the loss in income due to price increases in food items needed to
prepare the school lunch. Moreover, these amounts were elicited directly from caterers
based on a hypothetical scenario rather than computed from direct changes in prices, as the
definition of compensating variation would suggest. Thus, one need be cautious when
interpreting the elicited amounts as compensating variation measures. Future studies may
collect data on actual prices of food items used to prepare the school lunch and increases
in prices over times, in order to compute an actual measure of CV.
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Table 2-6 Compensating Amounts of Interviewed Caterers
School

Lunch
Cost
(GH₵)

A
B
C
D
F
G
H

1
1
1
0.7
1
1
1

I
J
K

1
3
1

2.8

Recommended
Recommended
GSFP
Vegetable & Protein
Beneficiary
Fruit (GH₵)
(GH₵)
Eastern Region
1
1
Yes
1
1
No
0.5
0.5
No
1
0.5
No
1
1
Yes
0.5
0.5
No
1
1
Yes
Greater Accra Region
1.5
1
Yes
0.5
0.5
No
1
1
Yes

School
Type

Public
Private
Private
Public
Public
Public
Public
Public
Private
Public

Conclusion and Policy Recommendation
This chapter employs descriptive analysis to document constraints that have

undermined school caterer purchases of food items from local farmers as mandated by the
government of Ghana. The chapter draws on three sources of data; 1) a survey of school
caterers in the Northern and Eastern Regions of Ghana 2) a survey and focus group
discussion with women farmers in the Eastern Region of Ghana and 3) a survey of caterers
in the Eastern and Greater Accra Regions of Ghana.
The research questions seeks to identify the constraints that have minimized school
caterers from making purchases from local farmers, first from the perspective of the school
caterers, then, from the perspective of women smallholder farmers. The caterer data
revealed that the three main hurdles to purchasing from local farmers is the time and
frequency of remuneration, the amount of remuneration to the school caterers, and storage
facilities. The caterers receive payments three to six months after they have prepared and
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served meals to the schoolchildren. This requires that caterers have sufficient funds to selffinance feeding the schoolchildren for at least one academic term. Without sufficient funds,
the caterers make purchases from market women who are able to give food items ‘oncredit’ but not from local farmers who do not like, or rather, cannot afford to give out their
food crops ‘on-credit’. This might be because selling on credit basis may cause the local
farmers to forfeit their farm profits and have little or nothing to invest during the next
planting season, leaving them with no crops to sell to school caterers during harvest time.
This could inadvertently defeat the goal of ‘buying local’ for the Ghana School Feeding
Program as farmers may have little or no food crops to sell without their previous profits.
Having more regular payments, for example monthly payments to caterers, may facilitate
purchases from local farmers as required by the policy mandate of the Ghana government.
The current remuneration school caterers receive is GH1 per child per school day.
The lump sum amount is further subjected to taxes, levies and additional fees. This leaves
the caterers with a lower amount of money to spend on food items even without taking into
consideration transportation, payments to cooks they hire to assist them, or their time and
catering services rendered. Given the amount of money the caterers have available to
spend, they often optimize by choosing, for example, canned tomatoes and canned fish
over fresh tomatoes and fresh fish. The canned food items are arguably more affordable
but are imported, thus defeating the home-grown framework mandated by the government.
A slight increase in the remuneration provided to school caterers may facilitate purchases
of fresh but more costly food items from local farmers.
Most of caterers surveyed mentioned that they stored the food items in a room at
their residence or in a room provided by the school. The caterers typically store the food
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items on the floor or in shelves in these rooms. The storage facilities may or may not have
refrigerators to extend the lifespan of the food items. With such storage facilities, school
caterers may be inclined to purchase non-perishable items to avoid spoilage. The food
items provided by local farmers are not processed and easily perishable. Caterers may
again chose canned food items over fresh food items from local farmers to minimize food
losses. The government may consider investing in storage facilities for the schools or
assisting local farmers with processing their food items to extend its life span and make it
a viable option for school caterers.
Among the women farmers surveyed, the major constraints appeared to be land
infertility and access to credit. Although the women mentioned land infertility, the land
appears to be infertile because they rely on traditional methods of farming such as
dependence of fallow periods to put nutrients back in the soil and the dependence on rain
to water their farms. In the face of a growing population and climate change, these
traditional farming techniques are not as effective as they used to be because land is not
readily available for long fallow periods, nor are rains as predictable as they used to be.
The government can provide education and training for the women farmers on more
effective farming techniques with extension agents targeted at women farmers.
Concerning access to credit, the government can instruct micro-finance institutions to make
loan packages available for women farmers as well as to provide lower interest rates and
better terms of repayment for the women farmers.
The Ghana School Feeding Program is a nationwide policy meant to provide a
reliable source of nutritious for young schoolchildren. Due to budget constraints, school
caterers often provide the most cost effective meals, which is typified by a largely
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carbohydrate base, with little or no vegetables and/or protein. To increase the effectiveness
of the nutritious clause in the policy, the government can include recommended portions
of vegetables and protein. However, recommendation would not suffice without a
corresponding increase in the budget allocations of school caterers. Additionally, the
payment structure incentivizes caterers to use the cheapest ingredients, which typically is
not local or nutritious. Thus, a restructuring of the payment system to from a 6-month basis
(or more) to a monthly basis may enable caterers purchase and use more local and nutritious
food items in the school lunch.
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CHAPTER 3. GENDER DIFFERENCES IN AGRICULTURAL TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION:
THE CASE OF IMPROVED MAIZE AND LEGUME TECHNOLOGY IN NORTHERN
GHANA
3.1

Introduction
The study seeks to analyze the differences in male-female adoption of multiple

agricultural technologies. Adopting improved technologies can help increase the
productivity of smallholder farmers and ensure a constant supply of food items from farm
to school-plate, to facilitate the policy goals of the Ghana School Lunch Program. In recent
years, there has been increasing evidence of differential adoption rates of agricultural
technology adoption by male and female smallholder farmers in sub-Saharan Africa
(Peterman et al., 2014). Peterman et al., 2014 present a review microeconomic empirical
literature on gender differences in use, access, and adoption of non-land agricultural inputs
in developing countries. Their findings highlight attention to gender-disaggregated analysis
and several indicators of gender (e.g. female-owned assets) to build a more robust of work
identifying gender differences in access to agricultural inputs.
Males and females in households may make joint or independent decisions on
whether to adopt any bundle of improved agricultural technology. When female farmers
have limited decision-making power in agricultural production, they may not use improved
technology on the farms they manage (Lambrecht et al., 2016). Even when female
smallholder farmers have sufficient decision-making power, they may face more
constraints to cash and/or labor inputs, which may limit their adoption of agricultural
technologies (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2011). Thus, the study models technology adoption
taking into consideration the constraints to decision-making and access to productive
resources that women farmers face.
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Several gaps exist in the agricultural technology adoption literature. Firstly, there is
a paucity of technology adoption literature that examines gender differences among
smallholder farmers’ adoption rates and their patterns of agricultural technology adoption.
Secondly, most examine adoption at the household level (using the data on household head
or combined household assets) ignoring individual production decisions of males and
females as well as individual ownership and control over assets. Thirdly, most adoption
studies have considered adoption of single innovations in isolation, disregarding the
adoption of other agricultural technologies. These are limited in their use of univariate
analysis to assess inherently multivariate adoption decisions.
This chapter addresses the gaps in the literature by examining gender differences in
the adoption of multiple agricultural technologies, while accounting for mutual correlation
among the technologies adopted. A conceptual framework that takes into consideration
gender roles and decision-making within the farm households; access to, ownership and
control over productive resources; and how these may influence technology adoption is
presented. A multivariate probit model is used to estimate the determinants of technology
adoption.
The purpose of this chapter is to identify the factors that influence gender gaps in
technology adoption. The proposed gender-focused hypothesis in the study are that, (1)
female farmers who have lower access to productive resources may be less likely to adopt
improved agricultural technology (2) female farmers who have input into most decisions
regarding cash crop farming and decisions on the use of income generated from cash crop
farming may be more likely to adopt agricultural technology and (3) female farmers who
have positional security may be more likely to adopt improved agricultural technology.
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The chapter begins with an overview of gender differences in improved agricultural
technology adoption. The literature provides the foundation for the conceptual and
empirical framework. In section 4.3 and 4.4, the conceptual and empirical methods are
outlined. A brief description of the intra-household survey and summary statistics are
provided in section 4.5. The empirical results are presented in section 4.6.

3.2
3.2.1

Review of the Literature
Importance of Agricultural Technology Adoption
Adopting improved agricultural technology can help developing economies

stimulate growth and development through increased productivity; increased incomes and
expenditures; food security; and sustained poverty reduction (Ainembabazi et al., 2018;
Khonje, Manda, Alene, & Kassie, 2015; Mathenge, Smale & Olwande, 2014; Shiferaw,
Kassie, Jaleta & Yirga, 2014; Wossen, et al., 2017). The strong evidence for the positive
impact of adoption of modern agricultural technologies for staple crops in several African
countries may inform strategies to achieve the smallholder engagement and poverty
reduction goals of Home Grown Feeding Programs such as the Ghana School Feeding
Program. For instance, Ainembabazi et al., 2018 find that adopting agricultural
technologies in Central Africa reduced the probability of being poor by 13 percentage
points with 32% of the share of poverty reduction causally attributable to adoption of
improved crop varieties. Kotu et al. (2017) also find that using integrated agricultural
technologies rather than adopting a single technology significantly increases farm
productivity and household farm income in Ghana.
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Systematic differences among smallholder farmers influence their rates of modern
agricultural technology adoption. Relatively less poor farmers tend to adopt improved
technology more intensely compared to relatively poor farmers (Khonje et al., 2015). Thus,
a ‘one size fits all’ approach to technology adoption may not be suitable for all smallholder
farmers (Wossen et al., 2017). Nonetheless, studies have shown that relatively poor farmers
stand to beneﬁt more from adopting new crop varieties, while the relatively wealthy
farmers beneﬁt more from adopting post-harvest technologies (Ainembabazi et al., 2018).
Studies that find significant advantages of agricultural technology adoption have called for
continued public and private investments in agricultural technology development
(Mathenge et al., 2014), improved access of modern varieties of major food staples and
complimentary inputs to smallholder farmers (Shiferaw et al., 2014) and expansion of rural
financial markets and schools (Wossen et al., 2017). However, agricultural technology
research often does not take into consideration gender-specific needs, preferences, and
resources of female farmers in developing countries (Quisumbing and Pandolfelli, 2010).
Ndiritu, Kassie & Shiferaw (2014) note that designing and disseminating agricultural
technologies that recognize the gender differentials within the heterogeneous families
managing different farm plots would contribute significantly towards closing the gendertechnology gaps, yet very few studies exist that explore gender differences in technology
adoption. Few studies may have focused on women farmers especially in sub-Saharan
Africa because women generally cultivate crops on small plots of land and often farm to
generate supplemental food and income, in addition to what the male breadwinners
provide. Recent research in developing economies have identified women smallholder
farmers as potential mediums to facilitate global food security and poverty reduction. This
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study contributes to the adoption literature by examining the underlying factors that
influence gender differentials in improved technology adoption. Knowing the source of
these technology adoption differences is important for informing for policy interventions
aimed at increasing technology adoption to improve productivity and ensure food security
within developing economies.
3.2.2

Constraints to Agricultural Technology Adoption by Women
A key challenge to accelerated technology adoption is the unequal access to, and use

of new technologies by male and female smallholder farmers in developing economies
(Ndiritu et al., 2014). Most of the agricultural adoption literature has emphasized greenrevolution technologies, soil and water conservation technologies and the factors which
broadly influence adoption of these technologies. A paucity exists on gender differences in
agricultural technology adoption; the few exceptions include Doss and Morris (2001),
Ndiritu et al. (2014) and Theriault, Smale & Haider (2017). Three themes that stand out in
the existing gender and technology adoption literature are: (1) Gender in itself does not
influence agricultural technology adoption but rather differences in women access to
complimentary inputs affect technology adoption, (2) household structures and bargaining
within households affect women’s ability to adopt technology and (3) cultural norms
influence women’s technology adoption.
Understanding whether men and women have different technology preferences when
faced with similar constraints, or whether men and women face different constraints that
cause them to adopt agricultural technologies at different rates can help provide research
strategies that facilitate equitable adoption of improved technology in developing countries
(Doss and Morris, 2001). Doss and Morris (2001) investigate the factors that influence
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different gender adoption rates of improved maize varieties and chemical fertilizers in
Ghana. The authors find that different technology adoption rates of improved maize and
fertilizer is not dependent on the gender of the smallholder farmer, rather the differences
in women’s access to and ownership of land, access to labor, education and extension
contacts account for the gap. The conclusion of their study suggests that ensuring better
access to land, labor and extension services for women farmers may result in more
equitable adoption of improved technologies.
Similarly, Ndiritu et al. (2014) use sex-disaggregated survey data to test for
systematic gender differences in the adoption of multiple sustainable technologies in
Kenya. These authors find mixed results for gender differences in multiple technology
adoption patterns; some technologies have gender differences in the rates of adoption while
other technologies have no gender differences. They find that compared to male plot
managers, women managers are less likely to adopt minimum tillage and organic manure
for soil fertility management, which may suggest some socio-economic inequalities and
constraints for women farmers. However, they find no gender differences in the adoption
of improved seed varieties, maize-legume rotations, maize-legume intercrop and chemical
fertilizer. Theriault et al. (2017) examine gender differences in adoption rates, likelihood
and determinants of sustainable technologies that enhance yields, protect crops and restore
soils. They find that adoption rates remain higher for men compared to women for the
yield-enhancing, yield-protecting and soil-restoring technologies. The authors find that
females are less likely to adopt either the yield-enhancing or the soil-restoring technologies
but no gender differentials in the probability of adopting yield-protecting technologies.
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They conclude that the gender of the farmer and the sociocultural farming context
combined with the economic attributes of technology affect adoption.
Women farmers’ disempowerment in productive assets may be a contributing factor
to lower observed adoption of improved technologies. The number or value of women’s
assets in sub-Saharan Africa rarely reaches half that of men and even in situations when
men and women jointly own assets, men tend to have stronger rights than women (Johnson
et al., 2016). Women in rural sub-Saharan Africa often have lower levels of education,
smaller plots and fewer productive assets compared to their male counter parts (Doss &
Morris, 2001; Johnson et al., 2016; Ndiritu et al., 2014). Johnson et al. (2016) examine
eight projects in Africa and South Asia within which the use, control and ownership of
assets affect how men and women benefit from agricultural interventions. Some of the
projects directly increased women’s assets and took steps to ensure women maintained
control of the asset (by putting women’s name on the title, supporting women to reclaim
lost assets and influencing gender norms about asset ownership). The authors find that
agricultural interventions that target the distribution of productive assets such as livestock
and machinery to women lead to greater empowerment of women and can facilitate uptake
of agricultural technologies (Johnson et al., 2016).
Access to productive assets such as land and tenure security has been examined in
the development literature as an asset that contributes to smallholder farmers’ technology
adoption and productivity. Santos et al., (2014) evaluate the impact of a land-allocation
and registration program on perceptions of tenure security, use of credit for agricultural
production, investments in agricultural production and women’s participation in decisionmaking in India. Under the program, the government purchased tracts of land and provided
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micro-plots to landless rural families who could use it to build a homestead, cultivate
vegetable gardens, plant fruit and wood trees or raise livestock. The land-allocation and
registration program targeted poor populations and promoted the inclusion of women’s
names on the land titles. The authors find that for the allotted plots women report
significantly higher levels of tenure security, were more likely to access credit for
agriculture and to invest in agricultural improvements, and were more likely to participate
in food and agricultural decisions. More specifically, women were 8% less likely to report
being concerned about having to vacate their allotted land and 18% more likely to report
retaining access and control over the allotted plot. Beneficiary households reported being
12% more likely to report taking out a loan from a formal bank and 88% more likely to use
a loan for agricultural purposes. Additionally, the households with the allocated plots were
more likely to invest in agriculture. In particular, these households were 11% more likely
to use fertilize or pesticides; 11% more likely to use seedlings, seeds or stems; and 7%
more likely to rent agricultural equipment compared to non-beneficiary households.
Women’s lower ownership and control of productive assets may also explain their
lower investments in agricultural technology. Santos et al. (2014) note that when women’s
names were included on the titles of allotted land, there was a significant increase in
women’s involvement in food and agriculture decision making. Including women’s names
on the titles significantly increased their perception of tenure security by about 10%.
Women with land documents under their name have a greater say in decisions on how to
use the land, what to grow on it and whether to sell the produce from that plot. Moreover,
women are 14%, 15%, and 13% more likely to participate in decisions about taking loans,
purchasing productive assets, and food purchasing and consumption, respectively, when
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their names are on land titles.

Not only does tenure security increase agricultural

technology adoption, the size of land further increases the use of fertilizer, pesticides and
seeds, seedlings or stems by beneficiary households (Santos et al., 2014).
3.2.3

Determinants of Agricultural Technology Adoption
Khonje et al. (2015) examine significant differences in the characteristics of adopters

and non-adopters of improved agricultural technologies in Zambia. The authors find that
education of the household head, household size, distance to extension office, capital
assets, access to information about improved technology, market information and group
membership were significant in explaining adoption of improved maize. Similarly, Ndititu
et al. (2014) and Theriault et al. (2017) find that credit constrained households are less
likely to adopt improved seeds and suggest that improving the effectiveness of rural
financial institutions can speed up the adoption of these technologies.
Ndititu et al. (2014) find that older farmers are less likely to adopt improved seeds
and chemical fertilizer. Conversely, Theriault et al. (2017) find that age of plot manager
positively influences the probability of adopting a soil-restoring strategy set for both males
and females. Moreover, the authors find that marital status influences the probability of
adopting the yield-enhancing set for both males and females but only the soil-restoring set
for males.
Plot characteristics such as size, and location from residence influence the adoption
of intensification strategy sets (Theriault et al., 2017). These authors find that larger plot
size have a higher probability of adopting modern technologies for both male and female
plot managers. Plots that are far from the residence, for both males and females, have a
lower probability of adoption due to larger requirements of time, labor, and energy in
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transport. Female plot managers in households that have secure rights on a greater share of
their plots are more likely to adopt modern technologies as they may feel less threatened
to lose their land.
3.2.4

Methodology Used for Agricultural Technology Adoption Studies
A number of different methodologies have been used to examine determinants of

agricultural technology adoption. Doss et al., (2001) use a two-stage probit approach to
investigate gender differences in improved maize and chemical fertilizer adoption in
Ghana. The authors model the decision to adopt maize adoption, fertilizer or both. Since
the decision to adopt the improved technologies are linked, the authors model a first stage
of fertilizer or improved maize adoption. In the second stage, the predicted values for
improved maize and fertilizer are included as independent variables. Lambrecht et al.
(2014) use a three-step approach of farmer’s awareness, tryout and sustained adoption to
model the decision to adopt agricultural technology. Additionally, the authors use
univariate probit models, Heckman selection probit models and bivariate probit models to
explain and control for selection bias and possible endogeneity bias.
The smallholder farmer’s decision to adopt one technology may be dependent on
other technologies she may have adopted or may desire to adopt as a complement or
substitute to deal with agricultural production constraints such as low productivity or
weeds. The nature of interrelationships that exists among different agricultural technology
inputs may influence farmers’ joint or individual use of improved technology. Univariate
methods examining only one technology may exclude vital economic information about
interdependent and simultaneous adoption decisions (Dorfman, 1996). Identifying the
nature of these interrelationships may inform whether farmers adopt technologies in
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piecemeal or bundles; and would help policy makers define strategies for promoting
technology adoption (Teklewold et al., 2013).
A number of studies have explored farmers’ adoption of multiple sustainable
intensification technologies (Ndiritu et al., 2014; Teklewold, Kassie & Shiferaw, 2013;
Theriault et al., 2017). Ndiritu et al., 2014 use multivariate probit models to examine
differential technology adoption patterns of male-female plot managers across diverse
farming systems in Kenya. The authors extend the study of the gender-technology adoption
gap beyond a single input such as fertilizer to include multiple sustainable intensification
of production such as maize-legume intercropping, maize-legume rotation, manure
application and minimum tillage. Their approach is an improvement over previous studies
that analyzed adoption of a single agricultural technology. In a related study, Theriault et
al. (2017) use multivariate probit models to test for gender differentials in adoption rates,
the likelihood of adoption and the determinants of adoption in Burkina Faso. The authors
model the decision to adopt technology within a complex household in the face of
imperfect or missing markets. The authors explore the use of numerous inputs grouped in
terms of strategies (yield-enhancing, yield-protecting, soil restoring sets), and their
interrelationships, while controlling for major cereal crops (sorghum, maize, millet) in
Burkina Faso. Teklewold et al. (2013) also use multivariate and ordered probit models to
analyze the probability and level of adopting multiple technologies. The authors find strong
complementarities and substitutability between multiple technologies, providing support
for the analysis of multiple technology in this study.
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3.3

Conceptual Technology Adoption Model
The conceptual model of this study closely follows the Gender, Assets and

Agricultural (GAAP) framework developed by Meinzen-Dick et al. (2011), which shows
gendered links between assets, livelihood strategies and well-being. Similar to the GAAP
framework, each component of conceptual model in Figure 4.1 is gendered to indicate that
men and women living in the same household often have some joint and some separate
productive assets, production activities and technology adoption strategies. The legend in
Figure 4.1 reflects the gendered conceptual framework.
The first element of the conceptual framework is the context (Figure 4.1). The
physical, social and institutional context with which technology is implemented can predict
whether women will adopt it as successfully as men (Doss et al., 2001). The context of this
study is the socio-economic and cultural underpinnings of rural and peri-urban farm
households in Northern Ghana. Households in Northern Ghana typically contain a husband,
one or more wives, some children, parents and some married and unmarried siblings. A
male adult is typically the head of household and breadwinner while the primary female
adult is the caregiver. In these households, the male would be expected to farm to meet the
dietary needs of the family while the female would be expected to farm to provide
supplementary ingredients. The male and female’s farm responsibilities often overlap and
they may share a common plot or farm on separate plots. Very few female-headed
households exist and are mostly formed upon widowhood. The ownership decision-making
and management of different plots often vary within each household. The males and
females within each household make some joint and some independent plot level decisions.
Thus, the unitary model that characterizes the household as a single production and
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consumption unit does not adequately represent the realities of households in Northern
Ghana.
The next item after the context in Figure 4.1 is assets. Access to and control over
productive assets is a key determinant of individual agency. Assets may be in the form of
natural resource capital such as land; physical resource such as agricultural equipment,
consumer durables, vehicles and transportation, communication infrastructure (phone, TV,
radio); human capital such as education and literacy; and financial capital such as savings,
credit and inflows (remittances). Within each household some assets may be owned by
men, some may be held by women and others may be jointly owned (as indicated by the
shading in the legend of Figure 4.1).
Intra-household decision-making power indicates agency and may provide insights
into technology adoption patterns of males and females within a household. The extent to
which males and females in a household can contribute to production decision-making
jointly or independently make decisions may inform the likelihood and extent to which
they adopt improved agricultural technology. For example, a woman may desire to use
herbicide on her plot to reduce weed infestation, however if she has little or no input into
decision-making she may resort to using her own labor to uproot weeds. Additionally if
she has little say on income decision-making she may be less inclined to invest, adopt or
even use improved agricultural technology. Thus, a woman’s involvement in decisionmaking indicates agency and empowerment and is likely to influence her technology
adoption decisions.
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Context: Socio-economic/cultural norms of rural farm households in
Northern Ghana
Assets

Consumption

Production
decision-making

Technology
adoption

Production

Income decisionmaking

Women

Legend:
Joint

Well-being

Savings/
Investment

Men

Figure 3-1 Conceptual Framework of Gendered Technology adoption
Improved seed varieties may be characterized by high yielding ability, increased
resistance to diseases and insect pests, enhanced drought tolerance and/or improved grain
quality. The improved seed varieties are also relatively inexpensive and require little
technical expertise to adopt. Fertilizers, herbicides and pesticides 1 on the other hand are
relatively more expensive and require a higher level of technical expertise to be able follow
correct application rates, optimal application schedules and efficient application methods.
In making the adoption decision, the benefits of adopting multiple agricultural technologies

1

The use of pests in this study is in relation to insect pests and diseases, but excludes weeds. The use of
pesticides here thus refers to insecticides and fungicides (for management of insects and diseases).
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may exceed the benefits from adopting only one due to interactions between the
technologies. Thus, the decision to adopt one agricultural technology can be expected to
affect the decision to adopt the other.
Following Ndiritu et al. (2014) this study models the adoption patterns for a
combination of improved agricultural technologies adopted by male and female
smallholder farmers in Ghana. Smallholder farmers consider a set of possible technologies
and choose a particular agricultural technology bundle that maximizes their expected utility
(Dorfamn, 1996; Kassie et al., 2013; Teklewold et al., 2013). The smallholder farmer may
choose to adopt multiple agricultural technologies as complements or substitutes to meet
their production constraints of weeds, pests, diseases or low productivity. The adoption
decision is multivariate, as there exists potential correlations among the individual
agricultural technology choices. Moreover, the same unobserved characteristics of the
smallholder farmer may influence the adoption of any given set of agricultural
technologies. The decision to adopt an agricultural technology may also be conditional on
the adoption of a complementary or substitutable technology. Ignoring the interdependence
of adoption decisions may lead to biased, inefficient estimates and misleading results
(Greene, 2008).

3.4

Research Questions
The objective of this essay is to examine the underlying factors that may facilitate or

impede the probability and level of the different technology adoption decisions by women
and men smallholder farmers. The research question asks whether the empowerment of
women smallholder farmers, with regards to access to productive assets and agricultural
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decision making, influences their technology adoption decisions. The hypothesis are as
follows:
H1a: Smallholder farmers who have lower access to productive resources including
education, credit, land, radios, bicycles and TVs are less likely to adopt improved
agricultural technology.
H1b: Female farmers who have lower access to productive resources including
education, credit, land, radios, bicycles and TVs are less likely to adopt improved
agricultural technology.
H2a: Smallholder farmers who have input into most decisions regarding cash crop
farming and decisions on the use of income generated from cash crop farming are more
likely to adopt agricultural technology.
H2b: Female farmers who have input into most decisions regarding cash crop
farming and decisions on the use of income generated from cash crop farming are more
likely to adopt agricultural technology.
H3: Female farmers who have positional security are more likely to adopt improved
agricultural technology.
Women might be making sub-optimal technology adoption decisions based on their
position of importance in the family, which gives them a sense of security. The measure of
security is indexed by the number of male head’s wives and number of woman’s sons. In
a household where the male household head has only one wife, the woman is likely to feel
more secure compared to a household with four or more wives. Moreover, male children
are considered an honor and an asset in rural farm households, thus the number of sons a
woman has might give her some sense of security. The security index may give an
indication of how powerful a woman feels in the household and may thus reflect in her
technology adoption decisions.
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3.5

Empirical Model of Technology Adoption
This study uses a multivariate model to estimate differences in men and women’s

adoption of technology. Consistent with the theory of decision-making within a complex
household, the empirical model recognizes that the individual male or female farmer’s
decision to adopt agricultural technology is conditioned on individual and household
characteristics. Moreover, differences in input use could result from plot-specific variable
features of each farmer’s agricultural land; thus, the model also accounts for plot
characteristics.
The multivariate probit model (MVP) is appropriate for modeling a multivariate
adoption decision in the presence of interdependence among the technologies to be adopted
(Ndiritu et al., 2014; Teklewold et al., 2013) because it recognizes the correlation in the
error terms of individual adoption equations. A single-equation model of technology
adoption would assume that a farmer’s adoption of one agricultural technology is unrelated
to the likelihood of adopting another. The MVP simultaneously models the influence of a
set of explanatory variables on each of the different technology options and is more
efficient than univariate probit methods analyzing each agricultural technology separately.
The general multivariate probit model takes the form,
∗
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘
= 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘′ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

(3.1)

∗
Where is 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
denotes the latent dependent variable, 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 denotes the explanatory

variables and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , the multivariate normally distributed stochastic terms.
For our purposes, we express it as:
∗
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘
= 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

𝑖𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛𝑛 , 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑘𝑘 = 𝑆𝑆, 𝐹𝐹, 𝑊𝑊, 𝑃𝑃
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(3.2)

where, 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a set of observable individual characteristics, 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is observed household

characteristics, 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 includes plot characteristics and k denotes the particular technology
adopted. 𝛼𝛼, 𝛽𝛽 and 𝛾𝛾 each represent estimates and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the normally distributed error term

independent of 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 . For each male or female smallholder farmer (i) in the
∗
sample, we observe a binary adoption variable 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
for each of the four agricultural

∗
denotes the latent dependent variable, which can be represented by the
technologies. 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

expected utility derived from the adoption of improved seeds (S), fertilizer (F), herbicides
(H) and pesticides (P). Although perceived benefits derived from the technology set are
∗
unobservable (𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
), the decision to adopt is observable (𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) and is expressed as:
∗
>0
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1 if 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

= 0 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒

(3.3)

The decision to adopt 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a limited dependent variable, which takes a value of 1 if

the farmer (i) makes the observable decision of adopting any of the improved technology
sets and 0 otherwise. As specified 𝛼𝛼, 𝛽𝛽 and 𝛾𝛾 are unknown parameters to be estimated by
the probability model:

Prob(𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1|𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) = 𝐹𝐹( 𝜶𝜶𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜷𝜷𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜸𝜸𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )

(3.4)

where F( ) is the probability distribution function. The multivariate regression models
the relationship between the decision to adopt improved seeds (𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ), fertilizer (𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ),

herbicides (𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) and pesticides (𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ); and a set of predictor variables 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 . The
system of equations in the multivariate model is expressed as:
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝛼𝛼11 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽21 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾31 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

∗
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
= 𝛼𝛼12 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽22 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾32 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
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∗
= 𝛼𝛼13 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽23 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾33 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

∗
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
= 𝛼𝛼14 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽24 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾34 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

(3.5)

′
The error term 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
= [ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ] has E(𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) = 0 and Var(𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) = Σ. The error

terms associated with the different responses on the same sample may have different
variances and may be correlated.

The multivariate probit model is estimated by the simulated maximum likelihood
estimation method (Cappellari & Jenkins, 2003). For each observation, a likelihood
contribution is calculated for each replication, and the simulated likelihood contribution is
the average of the values derived from all the replications. The simulated likelihood
function for the sample as a whole is then maximized using maximum likelihood methods.
The most common simulation method for evaluating multivariate normal distribution
functions is the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) smooth recursive conditioning
simulator. The GHK uses the fact that a multivariate normal distribution function can be
expressed as the product of sequentially conditioned univariate normal distribution
functions, which can easily and accurately be evaluated (Cappellari & Jenkins, 2003).
3.5.1

Empirical Estimation
The explanatory variables are drawn from the literature review and the conceptual

methods discussed in previous sections. The analysis begins with a basic regression of
technology adoption on gender. In the empirical literature, it is common practice either to
simply include a gender dummy as an explanatory variable to account for potential gender
differences in technology adoption. The ‘naïve’ model (equation 3.6) assumes that the
technology adoption decision is solely a function of the gender dummy (𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹 ). In equation

3.6, the gender dummy may capture the gender-specific roles conferred by socio-cultural
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norms on households in the Northern region of Ghana rather than the biological sex of each
smallholder farmer. Based on observed socio-cultural norms, which dictate that women as
caregivers should focus on home-care activities, one might expect the parameter estimate
𝛼𝛼𝐹𝐹 to be negative.

The lower likelihood for women farmers to adopt agricultural

technology might be because their primary role is generate supplemental food or income,

rather than to provide enough to feed their family. Dropping the technology (k) subscript
for brevity, we have,
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼𝐹𝐹 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖

(3.6)

In the ‘naïve’ model above, we omit relevant explanatory variables and assume that
only the gender of a farmer can explain their likelihood of adopting agricultural technology.
This would lead to omitted variable bias and 𝛼𝛼𝐹𝐹 will be overestimated. In equation 3.7

below, we include individual characteristics, assets and decision-making power for two
reasons: to observe the effect of individual characteristics on technology adoption and to
observe any changes in the coefficient on the gender dummy, which may arise from
including relevant explanatory variables.
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼𝐹𝐹 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼1 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼2 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2 + 𝛼𝛼3 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼4 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 +
𝛼𝛼5 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼6 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼7 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼8 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼9 𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖 +
𝛼𝛼10 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼11 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼12 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 +
𝛼𝛼13 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖

(3.7)

In equation 3.7 above, the individual characteristics and assets include age,
education, and years of marriage for each smallholder farmer; whether the farmer had
access to credit over the past two years, ownership of assets, and the quantity owned of
agricultural land, radios, TVs, phones and bicycles. Equation 3.7 also includes variables
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measuring decision-making power in cash crop production over the past agricultural year.
The dummy variable ‘all input decision’ captures whether each male or female had input
into most or all decisions regarding cash crop production. The variable ‘high extent
decision’ captures whether each farmer feels they can make personal decisions regarding
cash crop production at a high level and variable ‘all income decision’ measures whether
each farmer contributes to most or all decision making regarding use of income generated
from cash crops.
We progressively include household characteristics to the technology adoption
model, after including individual characteristics, assets and decision-making power
(equation 3.8). This controls for household observables which might affect technology
adoption and allows household characteristics to influence the gender dummy’s effect on
technology adoption. The model is expressed as follows.
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼𝐹𝐹 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽3 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 +

𝛽𝛽7 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖

(3.8)

Equation 3.8 includes household size, the number of male and female adults actively
involved in farming, the number of rooms in the households dwelling, a dummy for the
type of roofing material in the household’s dwelling, a dummy for whether the household
lives in a rural area and a dummy for whether the household is Muslim.
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼𝐹𝐹 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾1 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾2 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑖𝑖 +
𝛾𝛾3 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖
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(3.9)

The plot level characteristics included in the equation (3.9) above are number of acres
of maize/beans cultivated, distance of maize/beans farm from residence; and distance of
maize/beans farm from nearest market.
In the above models, it is possible to test for gender differences with only the
inclusion of a gender dummy. However, the drawback is the implicit assumption that
gender has a similar impact holding all individual characteristics, decision making power,
and household and plot characteristics constant. The second commonly used approach to
test for gender differences is to estimate the model separately for men and women. The
drawback here is that one cannot test whether the differences observed are significant or
not. In this study, further tests on gender differences are based on estimations which
include, in addition to the explanatory variables, further dummies constructed by
interacting the relevant explanatory variables with a gender dummy variable.
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼𝐹𝐹 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 ∗
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖

(3.10)

Instead of two separate models, there is a combined model for both the sample of
male and female smallholder farmers. with a test of gender differences in asset ownership,
for example. A properly formulated unified model that permits different intercepts and
slopes in the two groups produces the same fit to the data as separate regressions. For
women model (3.10) becomes,
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼𝐹𝐹 (1) + 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 ∗ 1) + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 ∗ 1) + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 ∗ 1) + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖
= (𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼𝐹𝐹 ) + (𝛼𝛼 + 𝛿𝛿)𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + (𝛽𝛽 +𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 + (𝛾𝛾 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖

And for men,
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(3.11)

𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼𝐹𝐹 (0) + 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 ∗ 0) + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 ∗ 0) + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 ∗ 0) + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖
= 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖

(3.12)

In equation (3.12) 𝛼𝛼𝐹𝐹 gives the difference in intercept between male and female

groups and 𝛿𝛿, 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 gives the differences in slopes between the two groups.
3.6
3.6.1

Data and Summary Statistics
Description of Household Survey
This study uses sex-disaggregated survey data to test for gender differences in

improved technology adoption. The survey instrument was implemented in 6 communities;
3 rural and 3 peri-urban communities within 2 districts in the Northern region of Ghana. A
total sample of 150 households were randomly selected. In each household, responses were
elicited from both the primary and secondary respondent, who were adults above the age
of 18 years. The primary respondent was typically the male head-of-household and the
secondary respondent was typically the first wife. In households where the man or woman
was widowed, any other adult significantly involved in farming activities with the
smallholder farmer was interviewed. The survey yielded 298 individual responses.
3.6.2

Descriptive Statistics
3.6.2.1 Dependent Variables
This section presents the descriptive statistics of the dependent variables. Out of the

sample of 298 smallholder farmers interviewed in Northern Ghana, 81% grow maize and
49% grow legumes. Maize is a staple in the Northern Region of Ghana, thus almost all
male farmers cultivate maize; 99% of males grow maize while 63% of females grow maize.
Female farmers tend to cultivate legumes to generate supplemental income, thus we
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observe that 53% of women farmers cultivate legumes while 45% of males engage in
legume production.
3.6.2.1.1 Maize Farmers’ Technology Adoption
Among the sample maize farmers, 17% use improved seeds and pesticides, while
76% and 89% use fertilizer and herbicides, respectively (Table 3.1). Taking a look at
gender differences we find that 17% of male maize farmers use improved seeds and
pesticides while 18% of female maize farmers use these same technologies. Herbicides
appear to be the most commonly adopted technology by maize farmers; 89% of male and
female maize farmers use herbicides on their maize plots. There is however, no statistically
significant difference between male and female use of improved seed, herbicides and
pesticides. For fertilizer, 81% of male maize farmers are adopters while 68% of female
farmers apply it to their maize farms. We find a statistically significant difference between
male and female adoption of fertilizer on maize farms.
Table 3-1 Technology Adoption for Sample of Maize Farmers on Maize Plots

Variable
Improved seed
(1=Yes, 0=No)
Fertilizer
(1=Yes, 0=No)
Herbicide
(1=Yes, 0=No)
Pesticide
(1=Yes, 0=No)

Full sample
(N = 241)
Std.
Mean
Dev.

Male
(N=148)
Std.
Mean
Dev.

Female
(N=93)
Std.
Mean
Dev.

Mean
Diff.

0.174

0.380

0.169

0.376

0.183

0.389

-0.014

0.759

0.428

0.811

0.393

0.677

0.470

0.133**

0.892

0.311

0.892

0.312

0.892

0.311

-0.0006

0.174

0.380

0.169

0.376

0.183

0.389

-0.014

** statistically significant at the 5% alpha level
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M-F

Table 3.2 presents correlations between the inputs adopted by smallholder maize
farmers. The correlations measure the strength and direction of the linear relationship. We
find positive correlation among all the possible technology adoption sets for maize farmers.
The strongest correlations appear to be for fertilizer and herbicides/pesticides and the
weakest correlation is between herbicides and improved seeds. The positive correlations
might suggest that maize farmers consider these inputs as complements.
Table 3-2 Technology Adoption Correlations for Sample of Maize Farmers on Maize
Plots
Improved seed
Fertilizer
Herbicide
Pesticide

Improved seed
1
0.156
0.054
0.077

Fertilizer

Herbicide

Pesticide

1
0.1797
0.1819

1
0.125

1

3.6.2.1.2 Legume Farmers’ Technology Adoption
Among the sample of legume farmers 22% use improved seeds, 8% use fertilizer,
76% use herbicides and 41% use pesticides. Herbicides appear to the most adopted
agricultural technology among legume farmers, with fertilizer being the least adopted. On
average, a higher percentage of male legume farmers use improved seeds (29%) and
pesticides (56%) compared to female legume farmers (17% and 28%, respectively).
Conversely, on average, a higher percentage of female legume farmers adopt fertilizer (8%)
and herbicides (76%) compared to male legume farmers (7% and 74%, respectively). Table
3.3 indicates statistically significant differences between male and female legume farmers’
adoption of improved seeds and pesticides.
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Table 3-3 Technology Adoption for Sample of Legume Farmers on Legume Plots

Variable
Improved seed
(1=Yes, 0=No)
Fertilizer
(1=Yes, 0=No)
Herbicide
(1=Yes, 0=No)
Pesticide
(1=Yes, 0=No)

Full sample
(N = 147)
Std.
Mean
Dev.

Male
(N=68)
Std.
Mean
Dev.

Female
(N=79)
Std.
Mean
Dev.

M-F

0.218

0.414

0.279

0.452

0.165

0.373

0.115*

0.075

0.264

0.074

0.263

0.076

0.267

-0.002

0.755

0.431

0.750

0.436

0.759

0.430

-0.009

0.408

0.493

0.559

0.500

0.278

0.451

0.28***

Mean Diff.

***,**, * statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% alpha level respectively

Correlations between the technology adoption sets for legume farmers are presented
in Table 3.4 below. We observe a positive correlation for improved seed with fertilizer and
improved seed with herbicide, but a negative correlation for improved seed with herbicide.
This might suggest that legume farmers who adopt improved seeds may also adopt fertilizer
and pesticide but not herbicide. In other words, for legume farmers, fertilizer and pesticide
may be complementary inputs to improved seeds. We also observe positive correlations
between fertilizer with herbicide and fertilizer with pesticide adoption. This may suggest
that legume farmers who adopt fertilizer may also adopt herbicide and pesticide. Finally,
we observe a negative correlation between pesticide and herbicide, suggesting that legume
farmers who adopt one may not adopt the other as they may view the inputs as substitutes.
In other words, legume farmers may choose to either control for pests or for weeds but not
both.
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Table 3-4 Technology Adoption Correlations for Legume Farmers on Legume Plots
Improved seed
Fertilizer
Herbicide
Pesticide

Improved seed
1
0.226
-0.045
0.266

Fertilizer

Herbicide

Pesticide

1
0.042
0.079

1
-0.042

1

3.6.2.2 Independent Variables
The choice of independent variables included in the empirical analysis are based on
the theoretical and empirical literature on adoption of agricultural technology in developing
countries. Table 3.5 presents plot level descriptive statistics of maize and legume farmers
by gender. We observe, on average, a lower acreage of cultivated maize (less than half) for
females. The legume farm acres cultivated for male and female, on average, is almost equal
in size. On average, the yield (bags harvested) on male legume farms is higher while the
total sale of legume crops is slightly higher for female farmers.
Table 3-5 Plot Level Characteristics of Maize and Legume Farmers
Variable

Male
Mean
Std. Dev.

Female
Mean
Std. Dev.

Maize
Acres of farmland cultivated (acres)
Previous year harvest (bags)
Previous year sale (bags)
Distance to market (miles)

3.36
11.00
3.37
6.75

2.33
10.14
6.18
3.82

1.42
4.66
1.96
6.61

0.84
3.66
2.57
4.00

Distance to house (miles)

2.93

3.82

2.76

3.19

Acres of farmland cultivated (acres)

1.42

0.92

1.23

0.44

Previous year harvest

3.27

4.28

2.74

2.34

Previous year sale (bags)
Distance to market (miles)
Distance to house (miles)

1.67
5.86
2.21

2.94
2.78
2.54

1.79
6.01
2.25

1.89
2.88
1.68

Legumes

Table 3.6 below presents the demographic characteristics and assets of the sample
smallholder farmers in the Northern Region of Ghana. On average, the women smallholder
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farmers are younger than the male farmers. This is not unexpected as the survey
interviewed men and their wives and men tend to marry women who are younger than they
are. The descriptive statistics further indicate that fewer smallholder women farmers have
received any education and they own less land, radios, TVs, phones or bicycles compared
to the male farmers. On average, the women farmers own more phones compared to radios,
TVs or bicycles while male farmers own more bicycles (and phones) compared to radio’s
and TV. One surprising observation is that, on average, more women farmers have had
access to credit to finance their farm activities compared to men. This might be because of
the recent prevalence in women’s local, informal financial associations that encourage
collectively saving and rotating which women farmer receives the collective savings.
Table 3-6 Demographic Characteristics and Asset of Male and Female Farmers

Variable
Age (year)
Ever attended school (No=0, Yes=1)
Marriage (years)
Credit access (No=0, Yes=1)
Farm land owned (acres)
Radio owned (number)
TV owned (number)
Phone owned (number)
Bicycle owned (number)

Mean
49.89
0.26
20.93
0.14
6.33
0.56
0.39
0.85
0.87

Male
Std. Dev.
14.39
0.44
12.48
0.35
4.57
0.55
0.49
0.41
0.62

Female
Mean
Std. Dev.
41.98
13.08
0.15
0.36
21.18
12.69
0.30
0.46
1.69
1.36
0.18
0.38
0.06
0.24
0.46
0.50
0.04
0.20

As discussed in the conceptual framework section, households jointly or
independently make agricultural production decisions. The extent to which an individual
contributes to these decisions might indicate agency or bargaining power. Respondents
were asked about their participation and the extent of their input in agricultural decisions
over the past 12 months. Figure 3.2 and 3.3 depicts how much input male and female
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farmers reported that they have in cash crop production decisions, and into input of the use
of income generated from cash crops respectively. A high frequency of males report that
they have input into most or all cash crop production decisions, while just about half of
female farmers report likewise. A dummy variable was generated to indicate male and
female respondents who reported input into most or all decisions regarding cash crop
production.

Female

50
Do not

None

Small

Medium

High

Do not

0

Frequency

100

150

Male

None

Small

Extent of personal decision in cash crop production
Graphs by gender

Figure 3-2 Extent of Personal Decision into Cash Crop Production
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Medium

High

Female

50
None

Few

Some

None

0

Frequency

100

150

Male

Most or all

Few

Some

Most or all

Input into use of income generated from cash crop production
Graphs by gender

Figure 3-3 Input into Use of Income Generated from Cash Crop Production

Table 3.7 presents some household level descriptive statistics of the sampled
smallholder farmers. The average number of people in each of the farm households ranges
from two to thirty. Larger households typically have more labor available for farm
activities. Agricultural inputs like fertilizer or pesticides may not always be available in
small quantities. One might expect that larger households would imply available labor to
help purchase inputs, help transport them to the farm and help apply the technology on the
farm. On average, the farm households have three male adults and two female adults
actively engaged in farm activities. One would expect that more male adults would be
associated with a higher likelihood of adoption while more females might be associated
with a lower likelihood of technology adoption.
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Households have an average of six rooms (excluding bathrooms and corridors) in
their dwelling with an average of four rooms for sleeping. The sleeping rooms often double
as storage room for crops cultivated in households without traditional storage facilities. For
maize and beans, the farmers often store them in bags and place them in their rooms. The
more rooms available to a household might indicate wealth and thus a higher likelihood to
adopt agricultural technology.
Households in the northern region typically have polygamous marriages and multiple
children by each wife. However, within our sample, male farmers had an average of one
wife and four children. On average, the women have three male children and two female
children. The fewer the number of wives a man has, the more authority the wife is likely
to have. Additionally, the more male children a woman has, the more likely she is to receive
favor from her spouse. We construct a new variable, positional security for the female
subsample. A woman is considered to have positional security if the number of wives in
the household is one or less and the woman has at least one male child.
The sampling framework selected an equal number of respondents from rural and
peri-urban communities. Rural households may be poorer than peri-urban households and
thus less likely to adopt improved agricultural technology. The northern region is
predominantly Muslim, as expected 94% of the households are practicing Muslims.
Muslim households in the Northern Region tend to be polygamous, larger, wealthier and
thus may be more likely to adopt improved agricultural technology.
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Table 3-7 Household Characteristics
Variable
Household size (number)
Male adults in farming (number)
Female adults in farming (number)
Total rooms in dwelling (number)
Total rooms for sleeping (number)
Husband's wives (number)
Wife's male children (number)
Rural (No=0, Yes=1)
Religion:
Christian
Muslim

Mean
11.04
2.92
2.56
6.41
4.35
1.33
2.68
0.50

Std. Dev.
5.49
2.14
2.14
3.61
2.42
0.60
1.72
0.50

Min
2
0
0
2
1
0
0
0

Max
30
11
11
20
15
3
9
1

0.05
0.94

0.21
0.24

0
0

1
1

In rural and peri-urban communities, some household are more endowed than other
households and may thus be able to adopt improved technologies more easily. However,
an ‘income’ variable would not adequately capture the wealth of these farm households.
Assets capture wealth to an extent but living conditions may also shed light on how wealthy
a farm household might be. Table 3.8 presents household roofing material used in the rural
and peri-urban communities interviewed. In general, wealthier farm households may tend
to use aluminum as roofing material. On the other hand, relatively poor households tend to
use thatch as roofing material. Approximately, 35% of households in the sample use
aluminum roofing. Not surprisingly, a greater proportion of these relatively wealthy
households live in peri-urban communities.
Table 3-8 Household Roofing Materials
Roofing material
Thatch
Both
Aluminium

Rural (%)
54.7
16.2
29.1

Peri-urban (%)
22.7
37.3
40.0
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Total (%)
38.6
26.9
34.6

3.7

Empirical Results and Discussion
The results are presented in the subsequent sections. The likelihood ratio test leads

us to reject the null hypothesis of independent error terms overall and across the adoption
of improved seed, fertilizer, herbicides and pesticides (Prob > chi2 = 0.0000). This
indicates correlation between the use of agricultural technology adoption options and
supports the choice of the multivariate probit model for this data. Thus, the multivariate
probit is preferred statistically to the univariate probit regressions, indicating that the
probability of adopting one agricultural technology is interdependent on the decision of
whether or not to adopt another agricultural technology.
The regression coefficients can be interpreted in terms of sign but not as marginal
effects. Estimating marginal effects and their standard errors in multivariate probit models
is extremely tedious and can be computationally unworkable (Greene, 2012; Theriault et
al., 2017). For that matter, published papers that use the multivariate probit model often
interpret only the signs of the coefficients (Ndiritu et al., 2014; Teklewold, et al., 2013).
This study follows that approach.
3.7.1

Agricultural Technology Adoption by Maize Farmers
The key coefficient of interest in relation to the objective of the study is how the

gender affects maize farmers’ adoption of agricultural technology controlling for other
individual assets and decision-making power, household characteristics and farm
characteristics. Table 3.9 presents the results for the estimation of the factors influencing
smallholder maize farmers’ adoption of improved seeds. Under the ‘naïve’ model (1), we
observe that being male or female does not affect the likelihood of adopting of improved
seeds. Model 2 accounts for individual level characteristics, asset ownership and decision
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making power; model 3 accounts for household level characteristics; and model 4 accounts
for plot level characteristics. In all the specifications of the models for improved seed
adoption, we find no statistically significant difference between male and female adoption
of improved maize seeds. This result might be due to the lower adoption rates of improved
seeds presented in the descriptive statistics section, which indicated that, on average, only
about 18% of maize farmers adopt improved seeds. Most smallholder farmers tend to save
some of the harvested maize and plant that during the successive planting season.
In addition to the key gender coefficients, the study hypothesized that having access
to or owning fewer productive resources might make farmers less likely to adopt improved
technology. In models 2, 3 and 4, consistent with our hypothesis, we find that ceteris
paribus, on average, owning one additional mobile phone or radio increases the likelihood
of adopting improved maize seeds. Surprisingly, the results reveal that all things equal,
smallholders who own one additional bicycle are, on average, less likely to adopt improved
maize seeds. Consistent with theory and expectations, smallholders who have access to
financial resources are more likely to adopt improved maize seeds. In model 3 and 4,
farmers who have been able to access credit (a loan) within the past two years are more
likely to adopt improved maize seeds.
The household coefficients are consistent with theory, which suggest that wealthier
households are more likely to adopt agricultural technology. In model 3 and 4, the results
indicate that households with only thatch roofs are less likely to adopt maize seeds
compared to households that have both thatch and aluminum or only aluminum roofs.
Quite unexpectedly, the results indicate that, on average, households living in rural
communities are more likely to adopt improved maize seeds compared to households living
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in peri-urban areas. This result might be a reflection of agricultural support programs, for
example subsidized improved seeds that are targeted towards rural communities.
Model 5 presents the results of interacting the gender variable with access to and
ownership of assets as well as decision-making power. Consistent with the study’s
hypothesis, the results indicate that female maize farmers who have input into most or all
decisions concerning cash crop production are more likely to adopt improved maize seeds.
In Model 5, the signs on some of the variables flip. This may be due to the large
number of predictor variables and interaction terms included in the regression analysis as
well as the complicated nature of the multivariate model. The large number predictors and
interactions may be resulting in multicollinearity. A remedy would be to identify and
include those interactions that most likely influence the response. Several variations of the
model, with fewer interactions, corrected the change in the sign of the affected variables.
These variations are however, not included here.
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Table 3-9 Maize Farmers’ Adoption of Improved Seed
VARIABLES
Female
Age
Age squared
Educated (No=1)
Years of marriage_
Credit access
Agricultural land owned
Radio
TV
Phone
Bicycle
All input decision
High decision
All income decision
Household size
Household farming male

Model 1
0.0755
(0.193)

Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
0.132
0.142
0.174
-0.786
(0.345)
(0.366)
(0.380)
(0.820)
-0.0462
-0.0298
-0.0312
-0.0604
(0.0518)
(0.0550)
(0.0557)
(0.0626)
0.000480
0.000344
0.000349
0.000619
(0.000497) (0.000521) (0.000532) (0.000593)
-0.347
-0.483
-0.476
0.512
(0.280)
(0.298)
(0.310)
(0.359)
0.0234
0.0240
0.0235
0.0205
(0.0168)
(0.0192)
(0.0202)
(0.0218)
0.354
0.524*
0.540*
0.298
(0.269)
(0.285)
(0.288)
(0.464)
0.0363
0.0318
-0.00163
-0.0110
(0.0286)
(0.0323)
(0.0437)
(0.0482)
0.528**
0.484**
0.447*
0.479
(0.214)
(0.225)
(0.228)
(0.309)
0.180
0.154
0.175
0.0926
(0.262)
(0.276)
(0.284)
(0.312)
0.657**
0.676**
0.676**
0.313
(0.258)
(0.265)
(0.267)
(0.455)
-0.603**
-0.554**
-0.536**
(0.264)
(0.268)
(0.271)
0.0516
0.0860
0.132
0.290
(0.358)
(0.377)
(0.380)
(0.812)
-0.453
-0.489
-0.454
-0.439
(0.433)
(0.452)
(0.451)
(0.669)
0.00379
-0.0285
-0.120
0.904
(0.457)
(0.483)
(0.488)
(1.129)
-0.00857
-0.0147
-0.0302
(0.0317)
(0.0324)
(0.0360)
-0.0635
-0.0509
-0.0617
(0.0887)
(0.0898)
(0.0981)

Household farming
female

-0.0550
(0.0893)
0.00341
(0.0312)
-0.699**
(0.308)
0.524**

Rooms
Thatch roof
Rural
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-0.0364
(0.0911)
0.00401
(0.0314)
-0.779**
(0.318)
0.657**

-0.0153
(0.0993)
0.00353
(0.0336)
-0.917***
(0.336)
0.765***

Table 3-9 (continued) Maize Farmers’ Adoption of Improved Seed
VARIABLES

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3
(0.242)
4.427
(122.3)

Model 4
(0.259)
4.382
(125.5)
0.0884
(0.0869)
-0.0363
(0.0384)
0.0545
(0.0396)

-0.962***
(0.122)
241

-0.718
(1.251)
241

-4.843
(122.4)
241

-4.780
(125.6)
241

Muslim
Maize acres
Maize_distance_mkt
Maize_distance_house
Positional_security
Female*education
Female*agland
Female*credit
Female*radio1
Female*phone1
Female*tv
Female*allinput
Female*highextent
Female*allincome
Constant
Observations

Model 5
(0.275)
5.115
(231.6)
0.0801
(0.0887)
-0.0508
(0.0394)
0.0581
(0.0392)
-0.522
(0.421)
-0.295
(0.618)
0.261
(0.160)
0.192
(0.650)
0.249
(0.574)
0.709
(0.638)
0.189
(0.749)
-0.0154
(0.941)
-0.281
(0.967)
0.904
(1.129)
-4.556
(231.6)
241

Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3.10 presents the multivariate model with the specifications of fertilizer
adoption. The initial results indicates a statistically significant difference between male and
female adoption of fertilizer. In our ‘naïve’ specification (model 1), female farmers are less
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likely to adopt fertilizer compared to male farmers. This difference may not be attributable
to the biological ‘sex’ of the farmer but to the socio-cultural gender norms prevalent in the
Northern Region of Ghana. Models 2, 3 and 4 account for individual characteristics, assets
and decision-making power and household and plot characteristics, respectively. We
observe that after accounting for relevant explanatory variables, the coefficient for female
is no longer statistically significant indicating no difference between males and females
when it comes to fertilizer adoption.
Consistent with our hypothesis, the results find that smallholder farmers with access
to financial and human resources (education) are more likely to adopt fertilizer. In models
2, 3 and 4, the results indicate that maize farmers who had access to credit within the past
two years were more likely to adopt fertilizer on their maize plots. Additionally,
smallholder farmers with no formal or informal education are less likely to adopt fertilizer.
For smallholder farmers to adopt fertilizer, they might need a basic level of understanding
of the fertilizer application processes, the doses to be applied, the times of application and
other complementary agricultural processes association with adopting fertilizer.
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Table 3-10 Maize Farmers’ Fertilizer Adoption
VARIABLES
Female
Age
Age2
Attended school
(No=1)
Marriage_years
Credit access
Agland_own_qty
Radio_own_qty
TV_own_qty
Phone_own_qty
Bicycle_own_qty
All_input_decision
High_extent_decision
All_income_decision

Model 1
-0.44**
(0.178)

Model 2
-0.248
(0.331)
0.0409
(0.0475)
-0.000390
(0.00046)

Model 3
-0.216
(0.337)
0.0458
(0.0483)
-0.000398
(0.00046)

Model 4
-0.141
(0.347)
0.0504
(0.0493)
-0.000431
(0.00047)

Model 5
-0.699
(0.717)
0.0521
(0.0527)
-0.000462
(0.00050)

-1.041***
(0.313)
0.0120
(0.0149)
0.692**
(0.292)
-0.00784
(0.0283)
0.186
(0.216)
0.0615
(0.266)
-0.221
(0.222)
0.0163
(0.207)
0.0568
(0.354)
0.327
(0.416)
0.177
(0.441)

-1.056***
(0.320)
0.00449
(0.0164)
0.649**
(0.297)
-0.00587
(0.0310)
0.275
(0.226)
0.0449
(0.268)
-0.315
(0.236)
-0.0185
(0.212)
-0.0295
(0.351)
0.445
(0.416)
0.0795
(0.439)
-0.0108
(0.0234)
0.0825
(0.0691)
-0.0197
(0.0811)
0.0413
(0.0338)
-0.0738
(0.283)

-1.031***
(0.327)
0.000703
(0.0169)
0.670**
(0.299)
-0.0169
(0.0358)
0.260
(0.233)
0.0603
(0.269)
-0.311
(0.240)
-0.00657
(0.216)
0.00921
(0.353)
0.460
(0.420)
0.0273
(0.442)
-0.0184
(0.0246)
0.0875
(0.0697)
0.00891
(0.0868)
0.0406
(0.0340)
-0.0859
(0.286)

0.869**
(0.424)
-0.00106
(0.0173)
0.951*
(0.537)
-0.0144
(0.0384)
0.265
(0.286)
0.0310
(0.302)
-0.377
(0.390)

Hh_size
Hhfarming_male
HHfarming_female
Rooms
Thatch_roof

96

-

0.214
(0.652)
0.173
(0.616)
-0.269
(0.723)
-0.0214
(0.0256)
0.0877
(0.0711)
0.0219
(0.0898)
0.0517
(0.0360)
-0.104
(0.290)

Table 3-10 (continued) Maize Farmers’ Fertilizer Adoption
VARIABLES
Rural

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3
-0.320
(0.224)
0.164
(0.471)

Model 4
-0.321
(0.235)
0.139
(0.473)
0.0581
(0.0846)
-0.0374
(0.0369)
0.0154
(0.0412)

0.890***
(0.119)
241

0.0676
(1.136)
241

-0.142
(1.261)
241

-0.106
(1.300)
241

Muslim
Maize_acres
Maize_distance_mkt
Maize_distance_house
Positional_security
Female*education
Female*agland
Female*credit
Female*radio1
Female*phone1
Female*tv
Female*allinput
Female*highextent
Female*allincome
Constant
Observations

Model 5
-0.296
(0.244)
0.212
(0.493)
0.0655
(0.0872)
-0.0408
(0.0372)
0.00910
(0.0400)
0.130
(0.321)
0.290
(0.621)
0.0343
(0.150)
-0.510
(0.677)
-0.0390
(0.555)
-0.0734
(0.529)
0.357
(0.805)
-0.219
(0.786)
0.531
(0.870)
0.379
(0.945)
-0.848
(1.479)
241

Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3.11 presents the results for factors influencing herbicide adoption among
smallholder farmers. The results indicate no statistical difference in the coefficients for
male and female maize farmers in all 4 specifications when it comes to herbicide adoption.
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Models 3 and 4 suggest that Muslim households are more likely to adopt herbicides,
consistent with the study’s hypothesis.
In the specification that accounts for female ownership of assets and decisionmaking, we find surprising results. The results suggest that females who have access to
credit and who have at least one radio are less likely to adopt herbicides. This result might
suggest that when female maize farmers have access to credit and information, they may
tend to invest in other non-agricultural and off-farm activities, which may have higher
returns.
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Table 3-11 Maize Farmers’ Herbicide Adoption
VARIABLES
Female
Age
Age2
Attended school (No=1)
Marriage_years
Credit access
Agland_own_qty
Radio_own_qty
TV_own_qty
Phone_own_qty
Bicycle_own_qty
All_input_decision
High_extent_decision
All_income_decision
Hh_size
Hhfarming_male
HHfarming_female
Rooms
Thatch_roof
Rural

Model 1
-0.0546
(0.219)

Model 5
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
0.496
0.409
0.443
0.510
(0.397)
(0.417)
(0.437)
(0.951)
0.0478
0.0703
0.0755
0.0929
(0.0547)
(0.0580)
(0.0589)
(0.0644)
-0.000393 -0.000516 -0.000598 -0.000653
(0.00052) (0.00055) (0.00056) (0.00061)
-0.196
-0.293
-0.329
0.375
(0.326)
(0.353)
(0.362)
(0.471)
-0.00997
-0.0162
-0.0146
-0.0306
(0.0182)
(0.0212)
(0.0217)
(0.0225)
-0.0125
0.0236
0.0669
0.938
(0.300)
(0.322)
(0.326)
(0.585)
0.0671
0.0755
0.0479
0.0164
(0.0459)
(0.0539)
(0.0593)
(0.0565)
-0.0996
-0.197
-0.191
0.115
(0.246)
(0.268)
(0.275)
(0.355)
0.287
0.359
0.393
0.202
(0.328)
(0.358)
(0.370)
(0.394)
0.117
0.0473
0.00715
-0.360
(0.265)
(0.286)
(0.290)
(0.467)
-0.0838
-0.160
-0.168
(0.231)
(0.235)
(0.231)
0.607
0.559
0.529
0.0310
(0.423)
(0.441)
(0.444)
(0.852)
0.520
0.505
0.471
0.986
(0.495)
(0.518)
(0.533)
(0.874)
-0.816
-0.802
-0.799
-0.643
(0.507)
(0.539)
(0.550)
(0.945)
0.0128
0.00784
0.0129
(0.0314)
(0.0338)
(0.0380)
-0.0841
-0.0715
-0.0389
(0.0831)
(0.0837)
(0.0950)
0.0896
0.0741
0.138
(0.111)
(0.114)
(0.133)
-0.0171
-0.00895
-0.0253
(0.0365)
(0.0380)
(0.0417)
-0.0835
-0.0402
0.105
(0.355)
(0.363)
(0.392)
-0.0602
-0.0301
-0.128
(0.275)
(0.278)
(0.295)
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Table 3-11 (continued) Maize Farmers’ Herbicide Adoption
VARIABLES
Muslim

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3
0.997**
(0.469)

Model 4
1.007**
(0.473)
0.108
(0.129)
0.0307
(0.0498)
0.00803
(0.0528)

1.259***
(0.139)
241

-0.353
(1.334)
241

-1.573
(1.528)
241

-1.993
(1.617)
241

Maize_acres
Maize_distance_mkt
Maize_distance_house
Positional_security
Female*education
Female*agland
Female*credit
Female*radio1
Female*phone1
Female*tv
Female*allinput
Female*highextent
Female*allincome
Constant
Observations

Model 5
1.177**
(0.513)
0.176
(0.132)
0.0132
(0.0582)
0.0277
(0.0724)
-0.403
(0.464)
-0.640
(0.726)
0.375
(0.248)
-2.136**
(0.855)
-1.473**
(0.667)
0.936
(0.688)
5.581
(376.2)
1.584
(1.112)
-1.164
(1.347)
0.260
(1.390)
-3.274*
(1.928)
241

Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3.12 below presents the results for pesticide adoption among smallholder
maize farmers. We account for individual, household characteristics and plot
characteristics, respectively, in models 2, 3 and 4.

The gender coefficient in all

specifications of the pesticide adoption model is not statistically significant. In model 2,
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the results suggest that households with no education are less likely to adopt pesticides, but
this result is not present in model 3 and 4. In models 2, 3 and 4, consistent with the study’s
hypothesis, we find that small farmers with less access to human, financial and productive
assets are less likely to adopt pesticides. In particular, ceteris paribus smallholder farmers
with no education are less likely to adopt pesticides. All things equal, smallholder farmers
who have been able to access a loan within the past two years are more likely to adopt
pesticides. On average, farmers with one additional bicycle are more likely to adopt
pesticides. Quite surprisingly, farmers with one additional radio are, on average, less likely
to adopt pesticides.
The study further hypothesized that smallholder farmers who highly participate in
decision making about cash crop farming are more likely to adopt agricultural technology.
All things equal, farmers who reported that they had input into most or all decisions
regarding cash crop production in the past agricultural year are more likely to adopt
pesticides, compared to farmers who had none, little or some input in cash crop decision
making. Quite unexpectedly, the results indicate that farmers who reported that they felt
they could take personal decisions about cash crop farming to a high extent are less likely
to adopt pesticides, compared to farmers felt they could not take any personal decisions or
could take personal decisions to a small or medium extent.
The results indicate that some household characteristics influence pesticide adoption.
On average, households with one additional female involved in farming activities are more
likely to adopt pesticides. Ceteris paribus, on average, consistent with the study’s
hypothesis rural households less likely are less likely to adopt pesticides.
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Model 5 presents the results of interacting the gender variable with access to and
ownership of assets as well as decision-making power. Consistent with the study’s
hypothesis, the results indicate that female maize farmers who have input into most or all
decisions concerning cash crop production are more likely to adopt pesticides.
Table 3-12 Maize Farmers’ Pesticide Adoption
VARIABLES
Female
Age
Age2
Attended school (No=1)
Marriage_years
Credit access
Agland_own_qty
Radio_own_qty
TV_own_qty
Phone_own_qty
Bicycle_own_qty
All_input_decision
High_extent_decision
All_income_decision

Model 1
0.0749
(0.194)

Model 2
0.146
(0.360)
0.0157
(0.0531)
-0.000248
(0.00051)
-0.611**
(0.283)
0.0206
(0.0172)
0.906***
(0.252)
-0.0104
(0.0327)
-0.515**
(0.241)
-0.391
(0.285)
-0.0687
(0.234)
0.655***
(0.213)
0.869**
(0.420)
-0.704
(0.504)
-0.427
(0.494)

Hh_size
Hhfarming_male
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Model 3
0.110
(0.386)
0.0199
(0.0549)
-0.000316
(0.00054)
-0.418
(0.304)
0.0242
(0.0192)
0.847***
(0.269)
0.00274
(0.0363)
-0.587**
(0.252)
-0.324
(0.291)
-0.101
(0.256)
0.632***
(0.220)
0.818*
(0.450)
-1.000*
(0.561)
-0.171
(0.523)
-0.00321
(0.0274)
-0.0694
(0.0806)

Model 4
0.139
(0.391)
0.0142
(0.0554)
-0.000216
(0.00055)
-0.388
(0.307)
0.0200
(0.0198)
0.860***
(0.271)
0.00963
(0.0467)
-0.655**
(0.262)
-0.332
(0.297)
-0.0946
(0.257)
0.647***
(0.222)
0.832*
(0.445)
-0.904*
(0.549)
-0.261
(0.522)
-0.00520
(0.0275)
-0.0651
(0.0807)

Model 5
-1.200
(0.787)
0.0205
(0.0648)
-0.000368
(0.00064)
0.0552
(0.375)
0.0316
(0.0196)
0.847**
(0.369)
0.00533
(0.0491)
-0.701**
(0.306)
0.0120
(0.318)
-0.325
(0.388)
-

-0.712
(0.692)
-0.497
(0.665)
0.560
(0.680)
-0.0212
(0.0276)
-0.114
(0.0897)

Table 3-12 (continued) Maize Farmers’ Pesticide Adoption
VARIABLES
HHfarming_female

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3
0.160*
(0.0840)
0.0223
(0.0323)
0.422
(0.310)
-0.889***
(0.259)
0.343
(0.610)

Model 4
0.176**
(0.0845)
0.0234
(0.0324)
0.342
(0.315)
-0.858***
(0.265)
0.329
(0.624)
-0.0191
(0.0923)
-0.0455
(0.0376)
0.0520
(0.0384)

-0.966***
(0.122)
241

-1.137
(1.272)
241

-1.920
(1.384)
241

-1.656
(1.418)
241

Rooms
Thatch_roof
Rural
Muslim
Maize_acres
Maize_distance_mkt
Maize_distance_house
Positional_security
Female*education
Female*agland
Female*credit
Female*radio1
Female*phone1
Female*tv
Female*allinput
Female*highextent
Female*allincome
Constant
Observations

Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Model 5
0.285***
(0.0929)
0.0294
(0.0343)
0.349
(0.325)
-0.972***
(0.284)
0.419
(0.603)
-0.00341
(0.0966)
-0.0240
(0.0376)
0.0415
(0.0346)
-0.488
(0.388)
0.665
(0.622)
0.157
(0.181)
0.0301
(0.590)
0.692
(0.694)
0.469
(0.582)
-5.819
(231.0)
2.020**
(0.891)
0.235
(1.120)
-1.688
(1.199)
-1.359
(1.623)
241

3.7.2

Agricultural Technology Adoption by Legume Farmers
Again, the key coefficient of interest in relation to the objective of the study is how

the gender variable would affect legume farmers’ adoption of agricultural technology
controlling for necessary covariates. Table 3.13 presents the results of the estimation of the
factors influencing smallholder legume farmers’ adoption of improved seeds. In the ‘naïve’
model and the model controlling for individual characteristics, the gender coefficient is not
statistically significant. However, in model 3 and 4, which control for household and plot
level characteristics, the results indicate that women farmers are less likely to adopt
improved seeds compared to male farmers.
The table shows conflicting results for the hypothesis that farmers with access to
resources may be more likely adopt improved seeds. In models 2, 3 and 4, legume farmers
who have been able to access a loan within the past two years for farm activities are more
likely to adopt improved seeds. In model 3, the results suggests that on average, legume
farmers who have one additional bicycle are less likely to adopt improved seeds. However,
this result is not present in model 2 or model 4. In model 2, households who reported
participating in cash crop production decisions to a high extent are more likely to adopt
improved seeds, compared to households who reported a small or medium extent of
participation. This result is not present in models 3 and 4, which account for household and
plot level characteristics.
Again, the table presents unexpected results on the factors affecting improved seed
adoption. On average, ceteris paribus, households with one additional male actively
involved in farming activities are more likely to adopt improved seeds. Households with
an additional room in their dwelling place are less likely to adopt improve seeds. Rural
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households are also less likely to adopt improved seeds. Moreover, consistent with the
study’s hypothesis, legume farmers with more acres of land are more likely to adopt
improved seeds.
Table 3-13 Legume Farmers’ Improved Seed Adoption
VARIABLES
Female
Age
Age2
Attended school (No=1)
Marriage_years
Credit access
Agland_own_qty
Radio_own_qty
TV_own_qty
Phone_own_qty
Bicycle_own_qty
All_input_decision
High_extent_decision
All_income_decision
Hh_size
Hhfarming_male
HHfarming_female

Model 1
-0.361
(0.234)

Model 4
Model 5
Model 2
Model 3
-0.606
-1.392**
-1.369**
-1.446
(0.420)
(0.541)
(0.555)
(0.917)
0.0645
0.0431
0.0109
0.0297
(0.0771)
(0.0891)
(0.0915)
(0.0820)
-0.000822 -0.000677 -0.000410 -0.000539
(0.000762) (0.000852) (0.000870) (0.000792)
-0.408
-0.247
-0.326
0.403
(0.366)
(0.475)
(0.485)
(0.489)
0.0278
0.0355
0.0404
0.0300
(0.0233)
(0.0321)
(0.0337)
(0.0296)
0.710**
0.625*
0.669*
0.435
(0.305)
(0.357)
(0.359)
(0.519)
0.0494
0.0409
0.0271
(0.0394)
(0.0478)
(0.0489)
0.0633
0.0434
-0.0673
0.0749
(0.274)
(0.326)
(0.338)
(0.347)
-0.456
-0.141
-0.260
-0.522
(0.454)
(0.554)
(0.566)
(0.467)
-0.0540
0.0572
-0.00219
0.0660
(0.296)
(0.350)
(0.362)
(0.555)
-0.276
-0.730*
-0.506
(0.264)
(0.398)
(0.401)
-0.594
-0.758
-0.691
0.782
(0.481)
(0.593)
(0.603)
(1.379)
1.117*
1.025
0.823
0.276
(0.580)
(0.699)
(0.720)
(0.958)
-0.471
-0.906
-0.842
-1.883
(0.559)
(0.708)
(0.717)
(1.435)
0.0569
0.0531
0.0426
(0.0390)
(0.0410)
(0.0337)
0.246**
0.280**
0.235**
(0.111)
(0.119)
(0.0957)
-0.120
-0.150
-0.150
(0.134)
(0.142)
(0.111)
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Table 3-13 (continued) Legume Farmers’ Improved Seed Adoption
VARIABLES
Rooms

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3
-0.165**
(0.0716)
-0.469
(0.412)
-0.657**
(0.335)

Model 4
-0.167**
(0.0753)
-0.596
(0.427)
-0.714**
(0.353)
0.390*
(0.223)

-0.592***
(0.163)
147

-2.102
(1.831)
147

-0.252
(2.313)
147

0.257
(2.368)
147

Thatch_roof
Rural
Legume_acres
Positional_security
Female*educ
Female*credit
Female*radio1
Female*phone1
Female*tv
Female*allinput
Female*highextent
Female*allincome
Constant
Observations

Model 5
-0.0846
(0.0632)
-0.506
(0.346)
-0.544
(0.360)
1.043***
(0.164)
0.374
(0.425)
-0.173
(0.884)
0.255
(0.673)
-0.0499
(0.617)
-0.0167
(0.715)
-3.255
(947.5)
-1.889
(1.524)
1.234
(1.290)
1.264
(1.624)
-2.166
(2.080)
298

Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3.14 presents the multivariate model with the specifications of fertilizer
adoption for legume farmers. In all four specifications the results indicates no difference
between male and female adoption of fertilizer. Model 3 even suggests that ceteris paribus,
households with one additional female actively involved in farming are less likely to adopt
fertilizer. However, the hypothesis that access to financial resources makes farmers more
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likely to adopt fertilizer is supported in model 3 and 4. In particular, legume farmers who
have been able to access a loan in the past two years for farming activities are more likely
to adopt fertilizer.
Model 5 includes interactions between the gender variables with access to productive
resources and decision-making power. Consistent with the study’s hypothesis, the results
indicate that female legume farmers with education and access to credit are more likely to
adopt fertilizer.
Table 3-14 Legume Farmers’ Fertilizer Adoption
VARIABLES
Female
Age
Age2
Attended school (No=1)
Marriage_years
Credit access
Agland_own_qty
Radio_own_qty
TV_own_qty
Phone_own_qty
Bicycle_own_qty
All_input_decision
High_extent_decision

Model 1
0.0803
(0.308)

Model 2
0.318
(0.608)
0.0974
(0.108)
-0.000881
(0.00107)
-0.454
(0.476)
0.00858
(0.0342)
0.664
(0.406)
0.0472
(0.0531)
-0.386
(0.419)
-0.138
(0.635)
-0.176
(0.412)
0.236
(0.359)
0.0221
(0.669)
0.707
(0.721)
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Model 3
0.285
(0.653)
0.101
(0.130)
-0.00101
(0.00128)
-0.753
(0.634)
0.0217
(0.0356)
0.996**
(0.445)
0.0437
(0.0615)
-0.457
(0.535)
0.0649
(0.699)
-0.331
(0.535)
0.693
(0.469)
0.00970
(0.837)
0.919
(0.723)

Model 4 Model 5
0.355
1.754
(0.620)
(86.29)
0.113
0.139
(0.126)
(0.133)
-0.00111 -0.00135
(0.00124) (0.00131)
-0.686
-0.0312
(0.658)
(0.674)
0.0147
0.0219
(0.0362) (0.0414)
0.995**
-0.191
(0.442)
(0.707)
0.0289
(0.0610)
-0.428
-0.165
(0.542)
(0.516)
-0.0774
0.471
(0.691)
(0.627)
-0.221
3.825
(0.501)
(86.27)
0.580
(0.374)
0.109
1.051
(0.739)
(3.049)
0.763
1.578
(0.693)
(1.878)

Table 3-14 (continued) Legume Farmers’ Fertilizer Adoption
VARIABLES
All_income_decision

Model 1

Model 2
-0.660
(0.747)

Model 3
-1.156
(0.926)
0.0158
(0.0655)
0.0334
(0.151)
-0.429*
(0.248)
0.00945
(0.0517)
-0.962
(0.585)
0.582
(0.497)
-

Model 4
-1.113
(0.887)
0.00236
(0.0638)
0.0603
(0.158)
-0.333
(0.253)
0.0333
(0.0523)
-0.841
(0.570)
0.542
(0.493)
0.302
(0.255)

-1.479***
(0.227)
147

-4.207
(2.569)
147

-3.244
(3.129)
147

-4.138
(3.083)
147

Hh_size
Hhfarming_male
HHfarming_female
Rooms
Thatch_roof
Rural
Legume_acres
Positional_security
Female*educ
Female*credit
Female*radio1
Female*phone1
Female*tv
Female*allinput
Female*highextent
Female*allincome
Constant
Observations

Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Model 5
-4.118
(3.212)
-0.0732
(0.0450)
-0.0655
(0.184)
-0.345
(0.240)
0.142**
(0.0603)
-0.791
(0.554)
-0.315
(0.503)
0.719***
(0.253)
0.323
(0.589)
1.936*
(1.094)
1.922*
(1.057)
-0.733
(1.061)
-5.543
(86.27)
-4.228
(270.7)
-0.863
(3.381)
-1.941
(2.749)
5.506
(3.576)
-7.916
(86.32)
298

Table 3.15 presents the results for factors influencing herbicide adoption among
smallholder legume farmers. The results indicate no statistical difference between males
and females in all specifications when it comes to herbicide adoption.
The table further presents unexpected results about the factors that influence legume
farmers’ adoption of herbicides. In models 2, 3, and 4, legume farmers who have been
married longer are less likely to adopt herbicides. Similarly, legume farmers who own more
acres of agricultural land are less likely to adopt herbicides. In models 3 and 4, legume
farmers who own one additional radio are less likely to adopt herbicides but the legume
farmers who own one additional television set are more likely to adopt herbicides.
Additionally households with one additional male actively involved in farming are less
likely to adopt herbicides while rural households are more likely to adopt herbicides.
In model 5, which includes interactions between female with access to productive
capital and decision-making power, the results indicate that female legume farmers who
own at least one radio are less likely to adopt herbicides.
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Table 3-15 Legume Farmers’ Herbicide Adoption
VARIABLES
Female
Age
Age2
Attended school (No=1)
Marriage_years
Credit access
Agland_own_qty
Radio_own_qty
TV_own_qty
Phone_own_qty
Bicycle_own_qty
All_input_decision
High_extent_decision
All_income_decision
Hh_size
Hhfarming_male
HHfarming_female
Rooms
Thatch_roof

Model 1
0.0478
(0.228)

Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
-0.448
-0.133
-0.163
1.396
(0.427)
(0.528)
(0.534)
(0.883)
0.0581
0.100
0.0901
0.0208
(0.0708)
(0.0815)
(0.0853)
(0.0624)
-0.000244 -0.000492 -0.000386 -6.85e-05
(0.000686) (0.000774) (0.000811) (0.000616)
-0.400
-0.820
-0.817
0.729*
(0.381)
(0.513)
(0.517)
(0.406)
-0.0546** -0.0628*
-0.0650*
-0.0207
(0.0237)
(0.0331)
(0.0333)
(0.0203)
0.532
0.672
0.685
0.616
(0.361)
(0.437)
(0.435)
(0.478)
-0.0861** -0.0891*
-0.0949*
(0.0382)
(0.0479)
(0.0516)
-0.248
-0.854**
-0.855**
0.0673
(0.278)
(0.357)
(0.368)
(0.311)
0.562
0.875*
0.974*
0.213
(0.441)
(0.524)
(0.529)
(0.359)
-0.299
-0.208
-0.205
-0.694*
(0.280)
(0.334)
(0.337)
(0.410)
-0.198
0.0209
-0.0312
(0.234)
(0.277)
(0.280)
-0.512
-0.227
-0.217
-0.540
(0.405)
(0.464)
(0.464)
(2.031)
0.308
0.0414
0.145
2.430
(0.527)
(0.671)
(0.692)
(2.045)
0.0579
0.863
0.786
-0.546
(0.527)
(0.607)
(0.627)
(1.518)
-0.00501
-0.00595
-0.0276
(0.0369)
(0.0372)
(0.0267)
-0.406*** -0.396*** -0.177**
(0.118)
(0.121)
(0.0841)
0.130
0.129
-0.0109
(0.131)
(0.131)
(0.0877)
-0.0482
-0.0479
0.0223
(0.0438)
(0.0438)
(0.0333)
0.289
0.280
0.0103
(0.384)
(0.389)
(0.282)
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Table 3-15 (continued) Legume Farmers’ Herbicide Adoption
VARIABLES
Rural

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3
0.889***
(0.341)

Model 4
0.897***
(0.344)
0.0203
(0.236)

0.306
(1.972)
147

0.567
(2.089)
147

Legume_acres
Positional_security
Female*educ
Female*credit
Female*radio1
Female*phone1
Female*tv
Female*allinput
Female*highextent
Female*allincome
Constant
Observations

0.669***
(0.166)
147

1.046
(1.655)
147

Model 5
0.508**
(0.239)
1.711***
(0.210)
0.169
(0.292)
-0.320
(0.623)
-0.356
(0.615)
-1.289**
(0.540)
0.387
(0.520)
-0.180
(0.917)
0.211
(2.066)
-2.530
(2.110)
0.850
(1.617)
-2.733
(1.708)
298

Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3.16 presents the results for pesticide adoption among smallholder legume
farmers. We account for individual, household characteristics and plot characteristics,
respectively, in models 2, 3 and 4. The gender coefficients in all four specifications of the
pesticide adoption models are statistically significant. The results indicate that after
accounting for individual, household and plot level characteristics, female legume farmers
are less likely to adopt pesticides compared to male legume farmers.
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Additionally, the results are consistent with the hypothesis that farmers who have
access to financial resources are more likely to adopt agricultural technology. For all three
specifications, the results indicate that legume farmers who have been able to access a loan
for their farming activities within the past two year are more likely to adopt pesticides. The
results further suggest that households with one additional male actively involved in
farming are more likely to adopt pesticides. A surprising result in the specification that
accounts for plot level characteristics indicates that having more acres of legume crop
decreases the likelihood of adopting pesticides.
In model 5, which includes interactions between female with access to productive
capital and decision-making power, the results indicate that female legume farmers who
have a say in what the use of income generated from cash crop farming are more likely to
adopt pesticides. However, inconsistent with the study’s hypothesis, female legume
farmers who have input into most or all decisions regarding cash crop farming are less
likely to adopt pesticides.
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Table 3-16 Legume Farmers’ Pesticide Adoption
VARIABLES
Female
Age
Age2
Attended school (No=1)
Marriage_years
Credit access
Agland_own_qty
Radio_own_qty
TV_own_qty
Phone_own_qty
Bicycle_own_qty
All_input_decision
High_extent_decision
All_income_decision
Hh_size
Hhfarming_male
HHfarming_female
Rooms
Thatch_roof

Model 1
-0.738***
(0.214)

Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
-0.926** -1.228*** -1.205***
0.0946
(0.390)
(0.420)
(0.426)
(0.701)
-0.0719
-0.0665
-0.0523
-0.0732
(0.0633)
(0.0667)
(0.0684)
(0.0505)
0.000504
0.000462
0.000331
0.000581
(0.000618) (0.000651) (0.000663) (0.000480)
0.193
0.368
0.411
0.00253
(0.330)
(0.363)
(0.372)
(0.331)
0.0201
0.0118
0.00862
0.0173
(0.0197)
(0.0215)
(0.0215)
(0.0169)
0.525*
0.504*
0.576*
0.384
(0.288)
(0.305)
(0.306)
(0.383)
-0.00405
-0.0302
-0.0112
(0.0339)
(0.0375)
(0.0399)
-0.0474
0.0132
0.169
0.00341
(0.250)
(0.262)
(0.277)
(0.250)
-0.0294
-0.0607
-0.101
-0.526*
(0.370)
(0.390)
(0.397)
(0.294)
0.178
0.0675
0.114
0.348
(0.249)
(0.278)
(0.274)
(0.361)
0.137
0.103
0.0294
(0.210)
(0.238)
(0.228)
-0.244
-0.343
-0.474
1.325
(0.391)
(0.419)
(0.421)
(0.911)
-0.435
-0.321
-0.127
0.618
(0.493)
(0.519)
(0.542)
(0.874)
0.613
0.300
0.240
-1.379
(0.505)
(0.543)
(0.559)
(0.993)
-0.00269
0.00158
-0.0110
(0.0322)
(0.0332)
(0.0236)
0.149*
0.142*
0.127**
(0.0808)
(0.0814)
(0.0602)
0.0682
0.0757
-0.00232
(0.0988)
(0.0994)
(0.0710)
-0.0183
-0.0172
0.0231
(0.0365)
(0.0367)
(0.0319)
0.142
0.337
-0.106
(0.346)
(0.358)
(0.249)
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Table 3-16 (continued) Legume Farmers’ Pesticide Adoption
VARIABLES
Rural

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3
-0.339
(0.241)

Model 4
-0.337
(0.243)
-0.371**
(0.186)

1.643
(1.675)
147

1.460
(1.734)
147

Legume_acres
Positional_security
Female*educ
Female*credit
Female*radio1
Female*phone1
Female*tv
Female*allinput
Female*highextent
Female*allincome
Constant
Observations

0.155
(0.153)
147

1.594
(1.504)
147

Model 5
-0.344*
(0.209)
0.738***
(0.122)
0.0761
(0.292)
-0.735
(0.641)
-0.0210
(0.509)
-0.560
(0.473)
-0.194
(0.463)
0.622
(0.764)
-1.843*
(0.993)
-1.313
(1.018)
2.290**
(1.091)
-0.359
(1.349)
298

Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

3.8

Summary and Conclusion
Gender differences in agricultural technology matter because gendered ownership,

access to and control over productive resources, and gendered decision-making in rural and
peri-urban farm households can translate into increased productivity, poverty reduction,
higher food security and improved nutritional outcomes, and thus facilitate achievement of
development objectives through such programs as the Ghana School Lunch Program and
the Millennium Development Goals. However, there remains a dearth of research related
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to gender adoption of agricultural technology, especially adoption of interdependent
technologies in sub-Saharan Africa.
This study contributes to the emerging literature on gender gaps in technology
adoption as well as the effects of access to productive resources, decision-making power,
and household and plot characteristics on the adoption of multiple agricultural
technologies. The study investigates differential adoption rates and factors affecting
adoption of agricultural technology by male and female maize and legume farmers in the
Northern Region of Ghana. We use gender-disaggregated data from rural and peri-urban
communities in Northern Ghana. Maize production in Northern Ghana appears to be male
dominated as ninety-nine percent of males in the sample grow maize while about sixtythree percent of females cultivate the maize crop. The reverse is observed for legume
cultivation: more than fifty percent of females cultivate legumes while less than fifty
percent of male cultivate legumes. Legumes might not necessarily be a woman’s crop but
more women tend to cultivate legumes to generate supplemental income.
A key difference to note in maize versus cowpea cultivation is that cowpea is a
legume and so converts atmospheric nitrogen into a usable form for the legume plant.
Legumes generally require less fertilizer (especially nitrogen), compared with maize. There
would thus be differences between the crops in regards to fertility needs and pest
management. The descriptive results suggest that adoption rates among maize farmers are
highest for herbicide and fertilizer (a more than seventy percent rate of adoption). The rate
of adoption of herbicides is almost equal among male and female maize farmers but a
higher rate of fertilizer adoption exists among male maize farmers compared to female
maize farmers. Among legume farmers, the highest adoption rates for agricultural
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technology exists for herbicides and pesticides. Male legume farmers have higher adoption
rates for pesticides while female legume farmers have a higher adoption rate for herbicides.
The results from the multivariate probit estimation indicate no gender gap among
male and female maize farmers with regards to the likelihood of improved seed adoption.
These findings are consistent with some previous studies regarding gender differences in
fertilizer use (Doss and Morris, 2001; Ndiritu et al., 2014; Theriault et al., 2017). Consistent
with our hypothesis, access to or ownership of assets such as phones, radios and credit
increases the likelihood of improved seed adoption among maize farmers. Moreover,
female maize farmers who have input into most or all decisions concerning cash crop
production are more likely to adopt improved maize seeds.
The multivariate results further suggest that fertilizer adoption rates are statistically
significantly higher among male maize farmers than among female farmers in the genderonly model. However, after controlling for the male and female maize farmer’s access to
and ownership of assets, decision-making power, household and plot characteristics, the
fertilizer gender gap is no longer significant. Financial and human capital are necessary
factors for fertilizer adoption. Consistent with the study’s hypothesis, male and female
maize farmers with access to credit and education are more likely to adopt fertilizer.
Similar to the gender results for improved seeds, the multivariate model indicates no
gender differences in the likelihood of herbicides among male and female maize farmers.
The results that males and females in Muslim households are more likely to adopt
herbicides is consistent with the hypothesis of the study; Muslim households in the North
tend to be polygamous, larger and wealthier, explaining the higher likelihood of adoption.
The result that female maize farmers who have access to credit and female maize farmers
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who have at least one radio are less likely to adopt herbicide is unexpected. This may
however be an indication that female maize farmers with access to credit and information
may diversify into other productive on-farm or off-farm ventures in order to generate
higher incomes.
The multivariate results for pesticide adoption indicate no gender differences in the
likelihood of adoption among male and female maize farmers. Consistent with the study’s
hypothesis on access to resources, we find that male and female maize farmers who have
access to credit and who have one additional bicycle are more likely to adopt pesticides
while farmers without education are less likely to adopt pesticides. Consistent with the
study’s hypothesis on decision-making the results indicate that farmers who had input into
most or all decisions regarding cash crop farming in the past agricultural year have a higher
likelihood of adopting pesticides. However, unexpectedly, the results suggest that maize
farmers who can make decisions to a high extent about cash crop farming are less likely to
adopt pesticides. This might be an indication that the ability to make decisions without
expertise (education) or access to resources may constrain farmers from adopting
agricultural technology. This might also indicate that they choose alternative technologies
given their constraints. The results further indicates, consistent with our hypothesis, that
female maize farmers with input into most or all decisions regarding cash crop production
are more likely to adopt pesticides.
We now look at factors affecting the likelihood of agricultural technology adoption
among smallholder legume farmers. After controlling for individual level assets and
decision-making as well as household and plot characteristics, the multivariate results
indicate a significant gender gap in the likelihood of adopting improved seeds. The
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multivariate model present conflicting results for the hypothesis on access to productive
assets; male and female legume farmers who have had access to credit in the past two years
are more likely to adopt improved seed. However, smallholder farmers with one additional
bicycles are less likely to adopt improved seeds.
The results indicate that there is no gender gap in the likelihood of fertilizer adoption
among legume farmers. Consistent with the hypothesis on access to productive resources,
the results show that legume farmers who have been able to access credit within the past
two years are more likely to adopt fertilizer. Moreover, consistent with the study’s
hypothesis, the results indicate that female legume farmers with education and access to
credit are more likely to adopt fertilizer.
Similar to the gender results for fertilizer adoption among legume farmers, the results
indicate no gender gap in the likelihood of herbicide adoption. The multivariate model
presents unexpected and conflicting results for the hypothesis related to individual access
to assets and plot characteristics. The results indicate legume farmers who own one
additional radio are less likely to adopt herbicides but the legume farmers who own one
additional television set are more likely to adopt herbicides. Moreover, legume farmers
who own more acres of agricultural land are less likely to adopt herbicides. Additionally,
female legume farmers who own at least one radio are less likely to adopt herbicides.
Similar to the gender results for improved seed adoption among legume farmers, the
results indicate a gender gap in the likelihood of pesticide adoption. The results indicate
that after accounting for individual assets and decision-making power, and household and
plot level characteristics, female legume farmers are less likely to adopt pesticides
compared to male legume farmers. Consistent with the study’s hypothesis on access to
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productive assets, the results indicate that legume farmers who have access to financial
resources are more likely to adopt pesticides. The multivariate model provides conflicting
results for the hypothesis related to gendered decision making. Female legume farmers who
have a say in what the use of income generated from cash crop farming are more likely to
adopt pesticides, however, female legume farmers who have input into most or all decisions
regarding cash crop farming are less likely to adopt pesticides.
In summary, the study examines the gender gaps in technology adoption as well as
the factors influencing or limiting the adoption of multiple improved agricultural
technology. The key coefficient of interest in relation to the objective of the study is how
the gender variable would affect maize and legume farmers’ adoption of agricultural
technology controlling for relevant covariates. Among maize farmers the results indicates
a gender gap for fertilizer adoption when individual level, household level and plot level
characteristics are not considered. When we account for asset ownership, decision-making
power, household and plot characteristics, the gender gap for fertilizer adoption is no longer
significant. Among legume farmers, a gender gap is observed for improved seed adoption
and pesticide adoption after controlling for individual, household and plot characteristics.
Our results are somewhat consistent with Ndiritu et al. (2014) and Doss and Morris
(2001) who find no gender differences in technology adoption rates of improved maize and
fertilizer. They attribute differences in agricultural technology adoption not on the gender
of the smallholder farmer, rather the differences in women’s access to and ownership of
land. The measure for positional security, which is constructed as a female in a
monogamous household with at least one son, has no effect on agricultural technology
adoption. The study further explores whether gendered access to productive assets and
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gendered decision-making power affect the likelihood that female farmers adopt
agricultural technology. The results indicate that female maize farmers who have input into
all cash crop production decisions are more likely to adopt improved seeds and pesticides.
The result that female maize farmers who have access to credit and female maize farmers
who have at least one radio are less likely to adopt herbicide is unexpected and not
consistent with the study’s hypothesis. Among legume farmers, the results indicate that
female farmers who have education and access to credit are more likely to adopt fertilizer.
However, female farmers with at least one radio are less likely to adopt herbicides. Quite
surprisingly, female legume farmers who have a say in what the use of income generated
from cash crop farming are more likely to adopt pesticides, while female legume farmers
who have input into most or all decisions regarding cash crop farming are less likely to
adopt pesticides.
We conclude that governments and non-governmental organizations that want to
encourage adoption of agricultural technology among rural and peri-urban households
must design and implement agricultural policies that recognize gender differences within
heterogeneous families. From a policy standpoint, this study contributes to the debate on
best-practices that can facilitate closing gender-technology gaps. Improving and ensuring
equitable access to productive resources that differ between men and women, particularly
to credit, education and radios, may facilitate a higher uptake of agricultural technology by
female maize and legume farmers. Direct targeting of female farmers within rural and periurban farm households to receive input subsidies could help close the gender technology
gaps observed within the various agricultural technologies.
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The correlation among the improved technologies examined confirms the policy
importance of designing mechanisms that encourage farmers to adopt flexible
combinations of the improved technologies in order to take advantage of the benefits from
agronomic and economic complementarities. For example, a bundle of improved
technology can include varying proportions of improved seed, fertilizer, herbicide and
pesticide to meet the small farm needs of rural and peri-urban farmers. Agricultural
technology bundles that fit the farmer’s farm size might be more easily adopted rather than
large bags of each agricultural technology, which the farmer may find too expensive or too
extraneous to purchase. The combinations of the bundles can also take the current patterns
of farmer technology adoption into consideration. Moreover, the variations in technology
adoption confirms that smallholder farmers maybe more likely to adopt flexible
agricultural technology bundles given their land, labor and credit constraints. For example,
a farmer who is cash constrained but not labor constrained may choose to adopt a bundle
of improved seed, fertilizer and pesticide, then use available labor for weeding.
Future studies can examine the factors that affect smallholder farmers’ adoption of
various combinations of sustainable agricultural technology with mechanized agriculture
as well as the factors influencing the number of these agricultural technologies adopted.
Additional research is needed to examine the productivity, risk and welfare implications of
adopting individual as well as combinations of agricultural technology to inform
agricultural policies in sub-Saharan Africa.
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3.9

Policy Recommendation
To help increase female farmers’ adoption of improved agricultural technologies, the

following policy recommendations are proposed. The recommendations can also be
utilized within the framework of the Ghana School Feeding Program.
3.9.1

Access to Credit for Women Farmers
The results suggest that access to credit increases technology adoption, particularly

for legume farmers. Although no gender differences were identified among legume
farmers, the literature review suggests lower access to credit by women farmers. To address
the problem of access to credit by women farmers, the government can encourage the
Agricultural Development Bank and Rural Banks in Ghana to make credit facilities
available to women farmers at lower interest rates. Current interest rates of more than fifty
percent charged by rural banks to farmers, because the farmers lack collateral and have no
monthly stream of income paid through the banking system, deters local farmers from
taking loans although they have much need for credit.
3.9.2

Access to Agricultural Inputs for Women Farmers
Government can liaise with micro businesses in rural and peri-urban communities to

subsidize radios, phones, and other agricultural productive assets such as backpack
sprayers to women farmers. Additionally, government can liaise with agro-chemical sellers
in rural and peri-urban areas to subsidize and target women farmers with improved
agricultural inputs such as improved seeds, fertilizer, pesticides and herbicides. These agroproducts should be marketed in smaller packages with the option for bundling different
inputs.
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3.9.3

Customized Education, Training and Targeted Extension Services
The government can liaise with local development agencies and schools in rural and

peri-urban communities to establish training programs with flexible timing to meet the
schedules of the majority of women farmers. The training programs can be organized
monthly within the community center or in a classroom of the local school. These training
programs can focus on providing agricultural education for the women farmers on best
agricultural practices and agricultural technology adoption. These sessions could serve as
a platform for the women farmers to share information on what works best for them in
dealing with the agricultural problems they face on their farms. Such training programs
will serve to close the gap generated by the lack of women extension agents allocated to
rural and peri-urban areas in Northern Ghana.
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CHAPTER 4. GENDER DIFFERENCES IN SMALLHOLDER FARMERS’ MINIMUM
WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT FARM-TO-SCHOOL-LUNCH CONTRACTS
4.1

Introduction and Background
Access to credit is essential for growth and expansion in small-scale enterprises and

for subsistence farmers. Moreover, ensuring that women farmers have access to financial
resources is a key factor of successful rural development strategies (Fletschner & Kenney,
2014). Without access to adequate capital for investments, women farmers tend to operate
their farms at sub-optimal levels. Thus, in the context of school lunch programs, they may
not be able to expand their farms to be able to provide adequate food items to school
caterers and the local market.
Asiedu et al. et al. (2013) examine the importance of the gender of a firm owner as a
determinant of firms’ access to finance in developing countries. In particular, they
investigate whether women-owned firms are more financially constrained than maleowned. Their results suggest that female-owned firms are more likely to be financially
constrained than male-owned firms in sub-Saharan Africa, with no evidence of a gender
gap in other developing regions. Similarly, Akudugu et al. (2009) examine women farmers’
access to credit from rural banks in Ghana. The authors examine the nature of credit supply
by rural banks to agricultural and non-agricultural sectors as well as the proportion of credit
that went to women over a ten-year period 1998 to 2002. Their results indicated increasing
credit supply in favor of the non-agricultural sector. Additionally, the distribution of credit
appeared to favor men over women.
This chapter examines credit access strategies that can promote the successful
linkage of local farmers with school caterers. In particular, the study examines whether the
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use of farming contracts can facilitate the engagement of local farmers in the food system
of national school lunch programs. While the mandate of the Ghana School Lunch Program
aims to increase foodstuff purchases from local smallholders, regardless of gender, this
study places special emphasis on women smallholders as their access to credit has been
shown to result in higher investments in human capital with a stronger impact on children’s
health, nutrition and education with important long-term implications for families and
societies (Fletschner & Kenney, 2014).
This chapter uses hypothetical contract scenarios to investigate the role that farm-toschool lunch contract attributes can have on male and female farmers’ participation
decisions. The voluntary nature of contract schemes means that the decision of farmers to
participate is central to achieving policy objectives. Contract farming can provide new
marketing opportunities for smallholder farmers in developing economies, however,
relatively little research exists about smallholder farmer’s preferences for contracts and for
specific attributes within a contract design (Ochieng et al., 2017). Smallholder farmers’
willingness to participate in contract farming is influenced by the utility they derive from
the contract attributes (Abebe et al., 2013). Thus, a better understanding and adjusting of
contract attributes to meet smallholder farmers’ preferences and constraints can help make
contract schemes viable, sustainable and beneficial to smallholder farmers (Ochieng et al.,
2017).
Very few studies have examined the factors that encourage or limit smallholder
farmers’ participation in contract farming, or gender differences in smallholder farmers’
willingness to participate in contracts. While a number of studies have focused on
smallholder contracts with supermarkets (Michelson, 2013), processing, export and
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agribusiness firms, no known study has examined contracts within the context of school
lunch programs and how they may provide access to credit and can be harnessed to link
smallholder farmers to school lunch programs. At the time of the survey (August 2017),
virtually no formal contracts existed between schools and smallholder farmers in the survey
regions.
The main objective of the study is to examine the factors influencing male and female
smallholder farmers’ willingness to accept (WTA) farm-to-school-lunch contracts for
maize and cowpea beans. The WTA simultaneously measures the decision to participate
as well as the minimum price at which the smallholder farmer accepts the contract. The
study hypothesizes that farmers’ WTA is not only influenced by farmer and farm
characteristics, but also by the attributes of the contract. This is tested by examining
farmers’ minimum willingness to accept with hypothetical variations in the contract design.
In particular the study uses a Tobit model to examine whether an ‘advance pay’ option and
the ‘time of delivery and payment’ differentially influences WTA for male and female
smallholder farmers.
Responses to stated preference valuation studies are often associated with
hypothetical bias (Loomis, 2014). Loomis (2014) defines hypothetical bias as the
difference between what a person indicates in a survey or interview that they would
pay/accept and what they would actually pay/accept. With hypothetical bias, individuals
tend to overstate their economic valuation of a good by a factor of two or three (Loomis,
2011; Murphy et al., 2005). Murphy et al. (2005), for example, conducted a meta-analysis
of hypothetical bias in 28 stated preference valuation studies that report money willingness-
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to-pay and found a median value of the ratio of hypothetical to actual value of 1.35, from
83 observations.
Ex ante survey design strategies and ex poste calibration techniques can be used to
minimize or eliminate hypothetical bias (Loomis, 2014). Carson and Groves (2007) suggest
including three features in a survey in order for a hypothetical experiment to be truth
revealing. Following Carson and Groves (2007), this study includes three ex ante features
of minimizing the hypothetical bias by increasing the level of realism in the experiment.
First, the survey must be consequential to the respondent, in that, it must have some
potential effect on their future utility such as increased probability of the good being
supplied. To this effect, the study oversamples smallholder farmers cultivate maize and/or
legume. Maize and legume farmers make decisions growing and selling maize and legumes
each agricultural season, thus the farm-to-school lunch experiment would be potentially
incentive-compatible with them.
As another feature of consequential survey designs, the questionnaire mentions the
Ghana School Lunch Program and asks in a prior section of the survey whether any
children in the respondents’ household benefits from the free lunch program and whether
the respondent has ever supplied food items to caterers of the lunch program. Being aware
of the school lunch program and existing arrangements between school caterers and some
local farmers potentially results in responses being closer to actual valuation. Mentioning
the school lunch program further evokes a sense of realism in the hypothetical experiment.
Thirdly, binary, dichotomous or trichotomous choice question formats are potentially
demand revealing, as against a valuation question in which the respondent chooses one
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from among several product profiles (Loomis et al., 1999; Loomis, 2014). Loomis et al.
(1999) find that the trichotomous choice question formats produce a statistically significant
lower mean WTP. The experiment thus, includes a trichotomous choice situation, which
allows the respondent to opt for the contract at three differing sequential bid amounts.
The chapter is organized as follows. In section 4.2 a conceptual model is presented
to put the factors influencing the participation decision in a coherent framework. A
utility model is adapted to understand the economic theory behind participation decisions.
In section 4.3, a number of basic hypotheses about farm and farmer characteristics
influencing participation is derived on the basis of the literature. It is hypothesized
that farmers’ decision behavior or WTA is not only based on profit maximization, but
is also influenced by a range of contract design attributes and socio-economic variables,
particularly access to credit. A description of the field experiment and descriptive statistics
are presented in section 4.4. Section 4.5 presents empirical evidence from a hypothetical
contract experiment. To test the hypothesis, a Tobit model is used to determine the
underlying factors explaining farmers’ WTA the farm-to-school-lunch contract. The study
concludes with a discussion of the results section 4.6.

4.2
4.2.1

Modelling Smallholder Farmers’ Minimum WTA
Conceptual Model
The conceptual model for analyzing male and female farmers’ decision making

towards farm-to-school-lunch contracts is presented in Figure 4.1. The model incorporates
multiple factors that may affect farmer’s decision to participate and minimum WTA. The
frame is adapted from a model described by Vanslembrouck et al. (2002) to analyze
farmers’ participation in agri-environmental schemes. We hypothesize that farmers’ WTA
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is influenced by both contract attributes and decision maker characteristics of each male or
female farmer. The sex-disaggregated decision maker characteristics can be split further
into farmer characteristics; access to and ownership of assets; and farm characteristics.

Contract
attributes

Sex-disaggregated
farmer
characteristics

Household
characteristics

WTA farm-toschool-lunch
contract
Figure 4-1 Conceptual Model of Contract Participation

The study presents two models to examine the willingness to accept a farm-toschool-lunch contract by smallholder farmers. The two models are the Cash-in-advance
model and the Delivery-and-savings model. The models are based on the assumption
that the utility a male (𝑈𝑈 𝑚𝑚 ) or female (𝑈𝑈𝑓𝑓 ) farmer is maximizing depends both on
the production of private goods (𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝 ) and contract goods (𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐 ) resulting in farm income

(𝜋𝜋). The models further assume that the smallholder farmers make production decisions

subject to binding budget constraints. As subsistence farmers, the private goods (𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝 ) are

either used for private consumption, sold to neighbors, sold to aggregators who come
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directly to the rural areas, or sold on the central market. The contract goods (𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐 ) are the

maize/legume production required by the farm-to-school-lunch contract.
4.2.1.1 Cash-in-Advance Model

In the cash-in-advance model, the male or female smallholder farmer is faced with
producing the private goods (𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝 ) and the contract goods (𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐 ) subject to cash constraints.

Production decisions are generally made before the commencement of the agricultural

season; however, the smallholder farmer may be faced with an agricultural shock such as
a drought or pest infestation. The cash-advance model spans thus from land-preparation
until harvest time, to cover cash requirements for production decisions. The cash constraint
facing the smallholder farmer is in the form of money needed to rent land if they do not
own their farmland, to till the land before planting, to control weeds during the planting
season and to secure other production inputs.
The optimization problem for the male and female farmers is to choose a cash-inadvance option (or not) that maximizes the utility from producing the contract and private
goods.
A smallholder farmer may not prefer a cash-in-advance option if she is engaged in
off-farm employment activities, has large assets, which can easily be liquidated or has
existing credit arrangements. These alternative activities would suggest that the individual
is not cash constrained. On the other hand, a smallholder farmer with little or no assets or
no access to credit may favor the cash-in-advance option.
4.2.1.2 Delivery-and-Storage Model
Smallholder farmers’ delivery decisions about harvested food crops usually extends
over a period not longer than one year and may be divided into unequal periods, starting
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from harvest and continuing till the next planting season. The delivery-and-storage model
for this study is a two-period model. The first period spans the time during and right after
harvest time. In the first period, the smallholder farmer may choose to supply the contracted
quantity of food crops right after harvesting her crops. The second period spans from about
a month after harvest until the next planting season. In the second period, the smallholder
farmers is faced with the decision of whether to sell the crops immediately to obtain income
needed to meet household needs or to store the crop, delay sales and receive a higher price
further away from harvest during the leaner season.
The optimization problem for the smallholder farmer is to choose to a delivery date
at harvest (or later) that maximizes the utility from producing and supplying the contract
and private goods.
Smallholder farmers who have adequate storage facilities or a large number of rooms
in their dwelling, which can be used for storage, may prefer to store the food crops until a
later date for sale. Moreover, smallholder farmers who are wealthier and can afford to take
risk may not value the delivery-at-harvest option.

4.3

Research Questions
The research question asks about the factors influencing smallholder farmers’

minimum WTA when deciding to participate in a farm-to-school-lunch contract. The
minimum WTA simultaneously measures the decision to participate as well as the
minimum price at which the smallholder farmer accepts the contract. The study examines
the decision to participate in a farm-to-school lunch contract based on contract design
attributes and farmer characteristics. In particular, the study hypothesizes that:
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H1a: Advance payment options make smallholder farmers more likely to participate in
the farm-to-school contract at a lower minimum WTA.
H1b: Advance payment options make female farmers compared to male farmers more
likely to participate in the farm-to-school contract at a lower minimum WTA.
H2a: Delivery-at-harvest options make smallholder farmers more likely to participate
in the farm-to-school-lunch contract at a lower minimum WTA.
H2b: Delivery-at-harvest options male female farmers compared to male farmers more
likely to participate in the farm-to-school-lunch contract lower minimum WTA.
H3a: Smallholder farmers who have fewer assets (land, credit access, non-farm
business) are more likely to participate at a higher minimum WTA.
H3b: Female farmers compared to male farmers who have fewer assets (land, credit
access, non-farm business) are more likely to participate at a higher minimum WTA.

4.4
4.4.1

Description of Experiment and Descriptive Statistics
Willingness-to-Accept Experiment
The respondents are presented with four hypothetical contracts for maize and beans.

Table 4.1 is a sample maize contract orally administered to the respondents by enumerators.
In the first contract, the respondent would receive no advance payment but receives full
payment when the bag of maize or beans is delivered at harvest. In the second contract,
there would be no advance payment to the smallholder farmer. They would store the crop,
deliver it to the caterer right before the next planting season and receive full payment at
delivery of the bag of maize or beans. The third and fourth contracts offer half payment for
the crop at the start of the contract and the remaining half payment at the time of delivery
of the crop. The third contact requires delivery at harvest time while the fourth segment
requires storage of the crop for delivery right before the next planting season.
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Table 4-1 Sample Survey Maize Contract
Contract

Advance

Type

Payment

Delivery Times

Price (GH¢)
(ask sequentially)

Contract 1.A

0%

At harvest

60

80

100

Contract 2.A

0%

Before next planting

80

100

120

Contract 3.A

50%

At harvest

60

80

100

Contract 4.A

50%

Before next planting

80

100

120

If no what
price will you
accept?

No to ALL
contracts

The times of delivery and payment were varied to reflect the times that smallholders
sell their crops. Based on the findings of the pre-test instrument, some smallholder farmers
sell their crops immediately at harvest if they are cash-constrained, while others store the
crop and sell when they have large expenditures such as school fees or investments for the
next planting season.
The prices were sequentially asked for each contract. Depending on the response to
the first amount, two subsequent prices were offered to the respondent. A higher amount
was offered to respondents who refused the first amount. An alternate price was asked of
the respondent who refused all three prices given and a ‘no’ was recorded for farmers who
were unwilling to participate in the contract. For example, with Contract 1.A, the
respondent would first be asked whether he/she would enter the contract if he/she were
paid a price of 60 GH. If so, a ‘yes’ was recorded for 60GH, and—implicitly—80GH and
100GH as well. If the respondent refused at 60GH, he/she would be asked the same
question, but at 80GH, and so on. Thus, a minimum willingness to accept was observed on
the four contracts for each respondent. Thus, each contract is designed as a triple-bounded
dichotomous choice. The advantages of such a design have been shown in past studies
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(Kanninen, 1993; Langford, Bateman & Langford, 1996; Bateman, Langford, Jones &
Kerr, 2001).

Figure 4-2 The Structure of the Contract Game Used in the Survey

4.4.2

Dependent Variable: WTA
The outcome variable for the study is the minimum price at which the smallholder

farmers are willing to accept the farm-to-school lunch contract. This is denoted as
minimum WTA (willingness-to-accept) in the rest of the chapter. Figures 4.3 and 4.4 below
illustrate the minimum WTA for maize and beans, respectively, by gender. The red line in
the figures denote the lower bound of prices offered to the smallholder farmers for the
maize and beans contracts. A minimum price of GHȼ 60 per 100kg bag was offered for
maize and if the initial price was rejected a higher price of GHȼ 80 and then GHȼ 100 were
offered. Similarly, a minimum price of GHȼ 280 per 100kg bag of beans was offered and
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increased sequentially if the farmer refused the initial amount. Smallholders who rejected
the prices offered were subsequently asked at what price they would accept the farm-toschool contract. WTA below the minimum price offered was not observed. However, some
farmers may have been willing to accept a lower price if, for example, they have two or
three children benefitting from the GSFP. For that matter, the dependent variable,
minimum WTA, is left-censored (censored-from-below).

Female
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0

10

Percent

30

40

Male

60 100 140 180 220 260 300 340 380

60 100 140 180 220 260 300 340 380

WTA Farm-to-school-lunch Contract
Graphs by female

Figure 4-3 Minimum WTA for Maize Contract by Gender

135

Female

20
0

10

Percent

30

40

Male

280 320 360 400 440 480 520 560 600

280 320 360 400 440 480 520 560 600

WTA Farm-to-school-lunch Contract
Graphs by gender

Figure 4-4 Minimum WTA for Beans Contract by Gender

Table 4.2 below presents minimum WTA by contract type by gender. The table
indicates that for the maize contract, on average, females have a higher minimum WTA
while for the beans contract, males have a higher minimum WTA.
Table 4-2 Minimum WTA by contract by gender
Variable
Maize Contract:
min WTA
Male min WTA
Female min WTA
Beans Contract:
min WTA
Male min WTA
Female min WTA

Observations

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

1157
575
582

93.28
92.49
94.07

21.62
19.95
23.15

60
60
60

400
200
400

1157
575
582

346.24
348.02
344.48

44.66
42.06
47.07

280
280
280

600
400
600
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4.4.3

Independent Variables
4.4.3.1 Contract Attributes
The contract attributes include whether there is an (1) advance payment option or

none and (2) the time of delivery is at harvest time or after harvest but before the next
planting season. In table 4.3 below, we observe that on average, the respondents prefer a
slightly higher price for contracts with no advance payment compared to contracts that
have some advance payment. In other words, respondents are willing to accept a lower
price for contracts that would give them part payment before they cultivate and supply the
bag of maize or beans.
The average price that respondents are willing to accept for receiving payment for
the bag of maize at the start of the next planting season is about GHȼ20 more that the price
they are willing to accept for payments received right at harvest time. Similarly, the average
price the farmers are willing to accept at harvest for beans is GHȼ50 less than at the next
planting season. This might be because farmers who sell their farm produce during the next
planning season arbitrage (they store the produce and sell at a higher price later in the
agricultural season). Moreover, the smallholder farmers sell the produce at a time when
money is needed to pay school fees or hospital bills for a sick family member. Thus storing
the farm produce serves as a form of savings for the smallholder farmers.
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Table 4-3 Contract Attributes and Average WTA
Variable
Observations
Maize Contract:
579
Advance pay (No = 0)
578
Advance pay (Yes = 1)
578
Delivery (Harvest = 0)
579
Delivery (Next planting = 1)
Beans Contract:
579
Advance pay (No = 0)
578
Advance pay (Yes = 1)
578
Delivery (Harvest = 0)
579
Delivery (Next planting = 1)

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

93.83
92.73
83.15
103.40

22.73
20.46
20.91
17.13

60
60
60
80

400
120
400
200

346.67
345.81
321.19
371.24

42.23
47.01
39.67
34.14

280
280
280
330

600
600
600
600

4.4.3.2 Individual Farmer Characteristics
Table 4.4 presents individual level characteristics of the sampled smallholder farmers
by gender. On average 26% of males have received some level of education while 15% of
women. A farmer who has received some level of education might be more willing to
participate compared to a farmer with no education at all. However, a woman farmer who
is educated beyond high school level might be less likely to participate as she may have
other non-farm income generating activities. Whether a woman participates in wage work
and earns income might also be linked to the decision to participate in the farm to school
lunch contract. Women engaged in some non-farm economic activity such as trading or
shea-butter processing may be earning higher incomes than they would earn from an
agricultural activity and may have less time available to invest in farm work. Thus, women
engaged in non-farm economic activities may be less willing to participate in the contract
or have a higher WTA. A greater percentage of women have taken a loan in the past two
years and own a non-farm business compared to men.
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4.4.3.2.1 Productive Assets
A greater percentage of men own land and other productive assets such knapsack
sprayers, radios and phones. Individual level characteristics such as access to, ownership
of, or control over assets could influence smallholder farmers’ WTA. Land ownership in
rural and peri-urban areas of developing countries may not indicate legal rights, as the land
is not formally titled and owned by individuals but owned by Chiefs who allot the land as
they deem fit. Following Peterman et al. (2014), the study defines the ownership/use of
inputs as the application of that resource in a productive activity at the individual or
household level, whether the input was obtained through family inheritance, purchase, or
barter.
4.4.3.2.2 Decision-Making Power
The question of who typically makes decisions; the ability to make personal
decisions regarding food crop farming and cash crop farming; how much input is
contributed to decision making; and the extent of input on the use of income generated
from food crops and cash crops may influence farmers’ WTA. Additionally woman
smallholder farmers who actively participate in cash crop farming, partake in production
decisions largely and have some input into the use of income generated from farming may
be more likely to participate in the contract. Almost all the sampled men grow maize (on
an average of 3 acres of land) while about 60% of women grow maize (on an average of
1.4 acres of land). On average, about 90% of male have higher input into decisions
regarding cash crop and food crop production as well as high input into the use of income
generated from these activities. On the other hand, an average of 50% of females have high
input into these decision-making processes.
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Table 4-4 Individual Level Characteristics
Variable
Mean
Age (years)
49.63
Ever attended school (No=0,Yes=1)
0.26
Credit access (No=0,Yes=1)
0.14
Non-farm business (No=0,Yes=1)
0.65
Agricultural land (acres)
6.21
Knapsack (number)
0.48
Radio (number)
0.56
Phone (number)
0.85
Bicycle (number)
0.86
Grow maize (No=0,Yes=1)
0.99
Maize acres (acres)
3.32
Maize farm distance to house (miles)
2.95
Grow legume (No=0,Yes=1)
0.46
Legume acres (acres)
1.43
Legume farm distance to house (miles)
2.23
High food crop input (No=0,Yes=1)
0.88
High food crop extent (No=0,Yes=1)
0.94
High food crop income decision (No=0,Yes=1) 0.94
High cash crop input (No=0,Yes=1)
0.83
High cash crop extent (No=0,Yes=1)
0.86
High cash crop income decision (No=0,Yes=1) 0.86

Male
Std. Dev.
14.23
0.44
0.35
0.48
4.48
0.71
0.55
0.41
0.63
0.08
2.33
3.88
0.50
0.92
2.56
0.32
0.24
0.23
0.37
0.35
0.35

Female
Mean Std. Dev.
41.78
12.96
0.15
0.36
0.30
0.46
0.77
0.42
1.71
1.36
0.04
0.35
0.18
0.38
0.46
0.50
0.04
0.20
0.64
0.48
1.41
0.85
2.77
3.18
0.54
0.50
1.24
0.44
2.26
1.68
0.50
0.50
0.48
0.50
0.55
0.50
0.48
0.50
0.49
0.50
0.51
0.50

4.4.3.3 Household Level Characteristics
Summary statistics of household level characteristics are in presented in Table 4.5
below. The average household size was 11 members. Each households had an average of
3.2 schoolchildren benefitting from an existing free school lunch program in their
communities, with an average of 1.6 male and female schoolchildren, respectively. Having
at least one child in the household who benefits from the school lunch program could
influence the smallholder farmers’ decision to participate in the farm to school lunch
contract, making them more likely to participate.
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Table 4-5 Household Level Variables
Variable
Household size (number)
Kids benefitting from GSFP (number)
Male kids in GSFP (number)
Female kids in GSFP (number)
Rural

4.5
4.5.1

Mean
11.06
3.20
1.60
1.61
0.49

Std. Dev.
5.51
2.71
1.56
1.65
0.50

Min
2
0
0
0
0

Max
30
16
8
10
1

Tobit Model of Farm-to-School-Lunch Participation
Introduction
The objective of this section is to model and estimate the price for which smallholder

farmers are willing to participate in a farm-to-school-lunch contract conditional upon
contract attributes as well as specific farm and farmer characteristics. Two reasons motivate
the choice and design of the outcome variable, which is the minimum willingness to accept.
The first is to identify an optimal price for the successful implementation of farm-toschool-lunch contracts. The current compensation paid to a school caterer to feed
schoolchildren per day is GHȼ1 per schoolchild per meal. This must include cost of
foodstuff purchases, preparation, transportation and serving of the food to the
schoolchildren by the caterer. On one hand, a contract price that is too low will deter
smallholder farmers from participating. On the other hand, a contract price that is too high
will make it infeasible for caterer to purchase from local farmers or for the government to
sustain the feeding program. Secondly, it reflects the realistic bidding process that
smallholder farmers face when marketing their farm produce.
The study employs a Tobit model, also called a censored regression model devised
by Tobin (1958), for the analysis of the price for which smallholder farmers are willing to
participate in a farm-to-school-lunch contract. The tobit model is designed to estimate
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linear relationships between variables when there is either left-censoring (from below) or
right-censoring (from above) in the dependent variable. Censoring from above takes place
when cases with a value at or above some threshold, all take on the value of that threshold
so that the true value might be equal to the threshold, but it might also be higher. In the
case of censoring from below, values that fall at or below some threshold are censored.
Thus for a censored Y, we observe all the X but know the true value of Y for a restricted
range of observations. In our case, data are censored from below because we observe the
minimum price of 60 and 280 GH cedis for bag of maize and beans, respectively, in the
questionnaire. However, there may be some farmers who are willing to accept an even
lower price. The data are not censored from above because even though there was an upper
bound on the price levels, the option was given for farmers who did not accept the prices
in the questionnaire to state the prices at which they would be willing to participate in the
farm-to-lunch contract.
For this study, the Tobit model is used rather than the ordered logit/probit model
although the study’s dependent variable is somewhat ordered and categorical. The ordered
logit/probit is best used to estimate relationships between an ordinal dependent variable
and a set of independent variables. In this study, the minimum WTA dependent variable
for maize, for example, has ordered categories at GHȼ60, 80, 100 and 120. The ordered
logit/probit model however assumes that the actual values are irrelevant, except that larger
values correspond to higher outcomes. The study is interested in estimating minimum
willingness to accept prices, thus the actual values are of importance and hence the choice
of the Tobit model.
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4.5.2

Tobit Model Specification
Specifically, we adopt the Tobit model to examine the attributes of a farm-to-lunch

contract and farmer characteristics that explains the maize and beans contract price level
accepted by smallholder farmers. The Tobit model has an underlying latent variable, y*, of
which y is the realized observation. The latent dependent variable 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ , which is only
partially observed, may be expressed as follows:
𝒚𝒚∗𝒊𝒊 = 𝒙𝒙′𝒊𝒊 𝛃𝛃 + 𝝁𝝁𝒊𝒊

(4.1)

where 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 ~𝑁𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜎 2 ), 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 is a vector of exogenous and fully observed regressors and β

is a vector of coefficients to be estimated. The maize and beans equations are estimated
separately, thus the maize regression is expressed as:
𝒚𝒚∗𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 = 𝒙𝒙′𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 𝛃𝛃 + 𝝁𝝁𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊

(4.2)

𝒚𝒚∗𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 = 𝒙𝒙′𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 𝛃𝛃 + 𝝁𝝁𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊

(4.3)

And for beans:

From (5.10) we observe
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ if 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ ≥ 𝑦𝑦0

= 𝑦𝑦0 if 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ < 𝑦𝑦0

(4.4)

where 𝑦𝑦0 is the minimum price.

The Tobit model is a combination of two models, the probit model which determines
whether y = 0 or y > 0 and a truncated regression model for y>0. The coefficients from
Tobit estimation are used to determine both changes in the probability of being above the
limit and changes in the value of the dependent variable if it is already above the limit
(McDonald and Moffitt, 1980). Maximum likelihood estimation is used to estimate the
regression coefficients (β) and the standard errors (𝜇𝜇), given 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 ~𝑁𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜎 2 ) and
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𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ | 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ~𝑁𝑁(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 β, 𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢2 ). The goal of maximum likelihood is to find the set of parameters that

would have generated the observed sample most often, if the parameters are true of the
population. Maximum likelihood is applicable in both the discrete and continuous case.
The censoring indicator is 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 = 1 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ ≥ 𝑦𝑦0 otherwise 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 = 0.
The likelihood is:

𝐿𝐿(β, 𝜎𝜎) = ∏𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 Pr(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ < 𝑦𝑦0 )1−𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 {Pr(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ < 𝑦𝑦0 )𝑓𝑓((𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ |𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ ≥ 𝑦𝑦0 )}𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖

(4.5)

The probability of an observation being censored for the maize or beans contract is
𝑥𝑥′𝑖𝑖 β+𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖

Pr(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ < 𝑦𝑦0 ) = Pr �

𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢

𝑦𝑦

𝑦𝑦0 −𝑥𝑥′𝑖𝑖 β

< 𝜎𝜎0 � = Φ �
𝑢𝑢

𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢

�

(4.6)

where Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function.
𝑦𝑦∗ −𝑥𝑥′𝑖𝑖 β
1
∅� 𝑖𝑖
�
𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢
𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢

𝑓𝑓(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ | 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ ≥ 𝑦𝑦0 ) =

(4.7)

𝑦𝑦 −𝑥𝑥′𝑖𝑖 β
1−Φ� 0
�
𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢

where ∅(. ) is the standard normal density.

Substituting (5.15) and (5.15) into (5.14), the likelihood function can be written as
𝑦𝑦0 −𝑥𝑥′𝑖𝑖 β

𝐿𝐿(β, 𝜎𝜎) = ∏0 Φ �

𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢

𝑦𝑦0 −𝑥𝑥′𝑖𝑖 β

� ∏1 �1 − Φ �

𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢

𝑦𝑦∗ −𝑥𝑥′𝑖𝑖 β
1
∅� 𝑖𝑖
�
𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢
𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢
1
𝑦𝑦 −𝑥𝑥′𝑖𝑖 β
1−Φ� 0
�
𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢

�� ∏

(4.8)

In (5.17) the first two products provide an estimate on whether the smallholder is
willing to participate in the farm-to-lunch contract (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ ≥ 𝑦𝑦0 ). The additional information

on 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ provides a more efficient estimate of β/𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢 .and an estimate of 𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢 .
4.5.3

Empirical Specification

In a sample of N respondents with 𝑖𝑖 farm-to-school-lunch contract options, the

minimum willingness to accept (WTA) of respondent 𝑛𝑛 for contract 𝑖𝑖 is expressed as a
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function of contract attributes (A), individual farmer characteristics(X) and household
characteristics (H).
𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛽𝛽𝑨𝑨𝑛𝑛 + 𝛾𝛾𝑿𝑿𝑛𝑛 + 𝛿𝛿𝑯𝑯𝑛𝑛 + ε𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛

(4.9)

𝐴𝐴1 = advance payment =1; otherwise = 0
𝐴𝐴2 = delivery harvest = 1; otherwise = 0

𝑋𝑋1 = female =1; otherwise = 0

𝑋𝑋2 = age of smallholder farmer (years)
𝑋𝑋3 = educated = 1; otherwise = 0

𝑋𝑋4 = if smallholder farmer has had access to credit in the past two years =1;

otherwise=0

𝑋𝑋5 = if smallholder farmer has non-farm business =1; otherwise = 0

𝑋𝑋6 = agricultural land jointly or individually owned by smallholder farmer (acres)
𝑋𝑋7 = if smallholder farmer cultivates maize/legume, yes = 1; no = 0

𝑋𝑋8 = acres of maize/legume cultivated by smallholder farmer (acres)

𝑋𝑋9 = if smallholder can make personal decisions about cash/food crop to a high

extent=1; otherwise=0

𝐻𝐻1 = household size (persons)

𝐻𝐻2 = number of children in household benefitting from the GSFP (persons)

𝐻𝐻3 = rural = 1; otherwise = 0

In further specifications, the model is extended with sets of interaction variables to

learn more about minimum WTA heterogeneity among farmers. To examine the possible
effect of gender differences with contracts attributes and individual characteristics on
minimum WTA, we estimate the following model:
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𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛽𝛽𝑨𝑨𝑛𝑛 + 𝜏𝜏𝑫𝑫𝑓𝑓 + 𝜌𝜌(𝐷𝐷𝑓𝑓 × 𝑨𝑨𝑛𝑛 ) + 𝛾𝛾𝑿𝑿𝑛𝑛 + 𝜑𝜑(𝐷𝐷𝑓𝑓 × 𝑿𝑿𝑛𝑛 ) + 𝛿𝛿𝑯𝑯𝑛𝑛 + ε𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛

(4.10)

where 𝐷𝐷𝑓𝑓 is a dummy variable for female=1; otherwise= 0 and X represents a vector

farmer characteristics (as indicated above) excluding gender.

The study also analyzes the potential role of contract attributes with individual
characteristics on WTA. Access to, ownership of, and control over assets as well as
decision-making power may influence respondents’ WTA. This is analyzed with the
following model:
𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛽𝛽𝑨𝑨𝑛𝑛 + 𝛾𝛾𝑿𝑿𝑛𝑛 + 𝜔𝜔(𝑨𝑨𝑛𝑛 × 𝑿𝑿𝑛𝑛 ) + 𝛿𝛿𝑯𝑯𝑛𝑛 + ε𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛

(4.11)

where 𝑿𝑿 is a vector of respondents assets including education, access to credit,

ownership of non-farm business, acres of land owned by the respondent as well as decisionmaking power (as indicated in equation 4.9 above).

4.6

Empirical Results and Discussion
The results for smallholder farmers’ minimum WTA for maize and beans are

presented in in the subsequent sub-sections. The p-value of 0.000 for the Tobit variations
indicates that the Tobit models are suitable for the analysis of minimum WTA.
The coefficients represent the changes in the mean of the latent minimum WTA
dependent variable. WTA values are expressed in Ghanaian cedis (GHȼ) and can be
interpreted as the minimum price farmers are willing to accept in order to participate in the
farm-to-school lunch contract.
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4.6.1

Minimum WTA for Maize Contract
Table 4.6 presents the results of the minimum WTA analysis for the maize contract.

The pooled model has 156 left-censored observations and 1001 uncensored observations;
the male-sample model has 80 left-censored observations and 495 uncensored
observations; and the female-sample model has 76 left-censored observations and 506
uncensored observations.
The study hypothesized that the advance payment option would lower the minimum
WTA value of smallholder farmers. In the pooled and male-sample maize contract
estimations, the results indicate that all things being equal, having advance pay option
compared to no advance pay option has no statistically significant effect on minimum
WTA, on average. However, in the female-only sample, the results indicate that, ceteris
paribus, having an advance pay option lowers minimum WTA by GHȼ3.
The study further hypothesized that delivery at harvest compared to later, would
lower the minimum WTA value of smallholder farmers. Contrary to the study’s hypothesis,
the results in Table 4.6 indicate that respondents have a higher minimum WTA for maize
contracts that stipulate delivery harvest compared to delivery later. The pooled-, male- and
female-sample results respectively indicate, on average, a GHȼ23.39, GHȼ22.86 and
GHȼ23.73 higher minimum WTA for delivery at harvest option compared to delivery later.
The coefficient on gender in the pooled model indicates that, ceteris paribus, on
average, females have a GHȼ4.5 higher minimum WTA for the maize contract, compared
to males.
The study hypothesized that smallholder farmers with fewer assets are more likely
to have a higher minimum WTA for the farm-to-school-lunch contract. The results in Table
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4.6 indicate that have access to credit lowered minimum WTA in the pooled and female
sub-sample by GHȼ7 on average. Contrary to the study’s hypothesis, the results indicate
that having a non-farm business increased minimum WTA for the maize contract. The
increase in minimum WTA was on average GHȼ10.8, GHȼ16.8 and GHȼ5.5 respectively
in the pooled-, male- and female samples.
Males who grow maize have on average, a GHȼ18.5 lower minimum WTA
compared to males who do not grow maize. However, ceteris paribus, females who
cultivate maize have a GHȼ6.7 higher minimum WTA compared to females who do not
cultivate maize, on average.
For all the estimated models, smallholder farmers in rural communities on average
have a higher minimum WTA compared to smallholder farmers in peri-urban communities,
ceteris paribus.
Table 4-6 Minimum WTA for Maize Contract
VARIABLES
Advance pay
Delivery at harvest

(1) Basic
-1.651
(1.008)
23.39***
(0.975)

Female
Age
Educated
Access to credit
Nonfarm business
Agricultural land
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Tobit Model
(2) Pooled
(3) Male
-1.553
-0.0287
(1.011)
(1.037)
23.39***
22.86***
(0.979)
(1.323)
4.856*
(2.674)
0.0799
0.170*
(0.0756)
(0.0963)
3.891*
3.627
(2.152)
(2.956)
-7.088***
-4.176
(2.328)
(2.836)
10.75***
16.78***
(1.969)
(2.376)
0.199
-0.00708
(0.320)
(0.367)

(4) Female
-3.124*
(1.751)
23.73***
(1.455)
0.0329
(0.110)
2.082
(3.457)
-7.640**
(3.712)
5.454*
(3.043)
0.507
(1.242)

Table 4-6 (continued) Minimum WTA for Maize Contract
VARIABLES
Grow maize

(1) Basic

Maize acres
High food crop decision making
Household size
Kids in school lunch program
Rural
Constant
Sigma
Observations

80.83***
(1.309)
21.52***
(2.525)
1,157

(2) Pooled
0.941
(3.221)
-0.299
(0.595)
4.045
(2.621)
-0.503**
(0.221)
0.338
(0.417)
10.91***
(1.617)
63.18***
(6.000)
19.85***
(2.672)
1,157

(3) Male
-18.54***
(5.791)
-0.0223
(0.603)
-3.775
(5.053)
-0.617**
(0.252)
0.582
(0.570)
13.08***
(2.083)
80.74***
(6.267)
16.01***
(0.933)
575

(4) Female
6.683*
(4.009)
-3.271*
(1.869)
6.646**
(3.104)
-0.473
(0.327)
0.455
(0.625)
6.397**
(2.605)
73.65***
(7.519)
22.37***
(4.578)
582

Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by ID)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

4.6.1.1 Gender Interactions in Maize Contract
In further specifications, the model is extended with sets of interaction variables to
learn more about minimum WTA heterogeneity among smallholder farmers. To examine
the possible effect of gender differences with contracts attributes and individual
characteristics on minimum WTA, the female variable is interacted with contract attributes
and individual characteristics.
Table 4.7 presents the results of the gender interactions. The results indicate that,
ceteris paribus, a female with a non-farm business has a GHȼ11.1 lower minimum WTA
for maize the contract on average, compared to a male with a non-farm business.
Ceteris paribus, compared to a male who cultivates maize, a female who cultivates
maize has a higher minimum WTA for the maize contract by GHȼ26.5 on average.
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Additionally, a female who can make personal decisions regarding food crop production
has a GHȼ10.8 higher minimum WTA for the maize contract, ceteris paribus, compared to
a male who can make personal decisions concerning food crop production.
Table 4-7 Maize Contract with Gender Interactions
VARIABLES
Female
Advance pay
Delivery at harvest
Age
Educated
Access to credit
Nonfarm business
Agricultural land
Grow maize
Maize acres
High food crop decision making
Interacting female with:
Advance pay
Delivery at harvest
Age
Educated
Access to credit
Nonfarm business
Agricultural land
Grow maize
Maize acres
High cash food decision making
Household size
Kids in school lunch program
Rural
Constant
Sigma
Observations
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Coefficients
-9.447
-0.112
23.58***
0.186*
4.097
-4.851
17.02***
0.0642
-21.45***
-0.171
-3.663

Clustered Robust SE
(9.625)
(1.070)
(1.455)
(0.101)
(3.081)
(3.015)
(2.499)
(0.352)
(5.904)
(0.636)
(5.118)

-2.844
-0.393
-0.159
-2.060
-2.966
-11.05***
0.167
26.48***
-2.276
10.75*
-0.553**
0.498
10.10***
82.91***
19.57***
1,157

(1.923)
(2.139)
(0.148)
(4.649)
(4.625)
(3.865)
(1.251)
(7.076)
(1.818)
(5.981)
(0.218)
(0.432)
(1.666)
(6.562)
(2.686)

4.6.1.2 Interactions with Contract Attributes
The study also analyzes the potential role of contract attributes with individual
characteristics on WTA. Access to, ownership of, and control over assets as well as
decision-making power may influence respondents’ WTA.
Table 4.8 below presents the results of the advance pay contract attribute interactions.
The results suggest that, ceteris paribus, a smallholder farmer who opts for the advance pay
and delivery at harvest contract attribute will have, on average, a higher minimum WTA
for the maize contract by GHȼ 7.2, compared to a smallholder farmer who opts advance
pay but not delivery at harvest.
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Table 4-8 Maize Contract with Advance Pay Interactions
VARIABLES
Advance pay
Delivery at harvest
Female
Age
Educated
Access to credit
Nonfarm business
Agricultural land
Grow crop
Crop acres
High crop decision making
Interacting advance pay with:

Coefficients
-6.466
19.77***
6.373**
0.0570
4.523**
-6.795**
10.28***
0.328
-0.920
-0.509
5.843*

Clustered Robust SE
(6.187)
(1.312)
(2.828)
(0.0793)
(2.294)
(2.736)
(2.036)
(0.329)
(4.312)
(0.646)
(3.144)

7.234***
-3.069
0.0467
-1.252
-0.608
0.930
-0.258
3.727
0.428
-3.654
-0.505**
0.339
10.88***
65.66***
19.72***
1,157

(1.746)
(2.449)
(0.0660)
(1.934)
(2.253)
(1.875)
(0.370)
(4.013)
(0.548)
(2.875)
(0.221)
(0.417)
(1.619)
(6.854)
(2.619)

Delivery
Female
Age
Educated
Access to credit
Nonfarm business
Agricultural land
Grow crop
Crop acres
High crop decision making
Household size
Kids in school lunch program
Rural
Constant
Sigma
Observations

Table 4.9 below presents the results of the delivery contract attribute interactions.
The results suggest that, ceteris paribus, a smallholder who opts for the delivery at harvest
option and has access to credit will have a higher minimum WTA for the maize contract
by GHȼ5.6, on average, compared to a smallholder farmer who opts for delivery at harvest
but has no access to credit.
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Table 4-9 Maize Contract with Delivery Interactions
VARIABLES
Delivery at harvest
Advance pay
Female
Age
Educated
Access to credit
Nonfarm business
Agricultural land
Grow crop
Crop acres
High crop decision making
Interacting delivery with:
Advance pay
Female
Age
Educated
Access to credit
Nonfarm business
Agricultural land
Grow crop
Crop acres
High crop decision making
Household size
Kids in school lunch program
Rural
Constant
Sigma
Observations

4.6.2

Coefficients
13.92**
-5.302***
3.560
0.148
5.165*
-9.990***
9.083***
-0.0436
-1.637
-0.444
3.215

Clustered Robust SE
(6.554)
(1.704)
(3.536)
(0.0953)
(2.771)
(3.515)
(2.651)
(0.393)
(4.759)
(0.820)
(3.640)

7.257***
2.409
-0.130
-2.505
5.563*
3.213
0.470
4.957
0.272
1.533
-0.506**
0.342
10.89***
68.14***
19.63***
1,157

(1.759)
(2.880)
(0.0805)
(2.812)
(3.194)
(2.159)
(0.336)
(3.924)
(0.669)
(2.944)
(0.221)
(0.417)
(1.616)
(8.050)
(2.653)

Minimum WTA for Beans Contract
The minimum WTA estimates for the beans contract are presented in Table 4.10

below. The pooled model has 229 left-censored observations and 928 uncensored
observations; the male-sample model has 101 left-censored observations and 474
uncensored observations; and the female-sample model has 128 left-censored observations
and 454 uncensored observations.
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The study hypothesized that the advance payment option would lower the minimum
WTA value of smallholder farmers. Contrary to the study’s hypothesis, the results in Table
4.10 indicate no statistically significant change in minimum WTA for the beans contracts
that have advance pay option compared to the beans contract with no advance pay. This
result is reflected in all three specifications: the pooled, male and female samples.
The study further hypothesized that delivery at harvest compared to delivery later,
would lower the minimum WTA value of smallholder farmers. The results suggest that,
rather than lower minimum WTA, ceteris paribus, the delivery at harvest compared to
delivery later, increases minimum WTA for the beans contract. On average, the increase
in minimum WTA for the beans contract is GHȼ60.0, GHȼ55.0 and GHȼ65.1 in the pooled,
male and female model specifications respectively.
Concerning access to assets and ownership of assets, the results suggest that, ceteris
paribus, accesses to credit lowers minimum WTA for the beans contract while owning a
non-farm business increases minimum WTA for the contract. On average, access to credit
reduced minimum WTA in the pooled and male specifications by GHȼ16.8 and GHȼ18.5
respectively, but no statistically significant difference was observed in the female
specification. On average, the increase in minimum WTA for smallholders with a non-farm
business was GHȼ26.8, GHȼ 31.3 and GHȼ13.0 in the respective specifications.
In all three specification, ceteris paribus, smallholder farmers who grow legumes
have a higher minimum WTA on average, compared to individual who do not grow
legumes. The increase in minimum WTA for the beans contract on average is GHȼ22.2,
GHȼ15.9 and GHȼ72.8 respectively in the pooled, male and female model specifications.
However, cultivating one additional acre of legumes lowers minimum WTA for the beans
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contract by GHȼ9.3 and GHȼ43.7 in the pooled and female specifications respectively but
not in the male specification.
Table 4-10 Minimum WTA for Beans Contract
VARIABLES
Advance pay
Delivery at harvest

(1) Basic
-2.425
(1.662)
60.48***
(2.487)

Female
Age
Educated
Access to credit
Nonfarm business
Agricultural land
Grow legume
Legume acres
High cash crop decision making
Household size
Kids in school lunch program
Rural
Constant
Sigma
Observations

312.0***
(2.980)
44.40***
(2.610)
1,157

Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by ID)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Model
(2) Pooled
(3) Male
-2.194
-1.174
(1.635)
(2.289)
59.97***
55.04***
(2.488)
(2.942)
-7.300
(5.443)
-0.0879
0.0567
(0.143)
(0.155)
-0.689
0.204
(4.405)
(4.852)
-16.75*** -18.45***
(4.806)
(6.948)
26.76***
31.29***
(4.500)
(5.810)
-0.771*
-0.460
(0.454)
(0.419)
28.22***
15.90**
(6.995)
(6.720)
-9.326**
-1.475
(4.607)
(4.226)
10.95**
11.05
(5.007)
(8.103)
-0.525
-0.752
(0.477)
(0.565)
1.115
0.779
(0.834)
(0.983)
1.354
-2.390
(3.979)
(4.819)
294.2***
290.8***
(9.868)
(11.97)
39.42***
33.63***
(2.743)
(1.300)
1,157
575

(4) Female
-3.257
(2.304)
65.09***
(4.108)
0.00320
(0.229)
6.377
(8.342)
-9.275
(7.476)
13.04*
(6.643)
-2.488
(2.315)
72.80***
(12.07)
-43.66***
(8.592)
13.36*
(6.863)
-0.750
(0.773)
1.968
(1.224)
0.493
(5.793)
288.1***
(14.27)
42.71***
(5.148)
582

4.6.2.1 Gender Interactions in Beans Contract
Table 4.11 below presents the results of the gender interactions. The results indicate
that, ceteris paribus, a female who owns a non-farm business has a lower minimum WTA
of GHȼ16.4 for the beans contract, compared to a male who owns a non-farm business, on
average.
A female who cultivates legumes, ceteris paribus, compared to a male who cultivates
legumes, would have higher minimum WTA of GHȼ50.5 on average. Additionally, a
female who cultivates one additional acre of legumes, ceteris paribus, compared to a male
who cultivates one additional acre of legumes, has a lower minimum WTA of GHȼ39.4 for
the beans contract on average.
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Table 4-11 Beans Contract with Gender Interactions
VARIABLES
Female
Advance pay
Delivery at harvest
Age
Educated
Access to credit
Nonfarm business
Agricultural land
Grow legume
Legume acres
High cash crop decision making
Interacting female with:
Advance pay
Delivery at harvest
Age
Educated
Access to credit
Nonfarm business
Agricultural land
Grow legume
Legume acres
High cash crop decision making
Household size
Kids in school lunch program
Rural
Constant
Sigma
Observations

Coefficients
15.43
-1.373
56.58***
0.0289
0.221
-18.60**
31.14***
-0.587
17.07***
-1.257
17.44*

Clustered Robust SE
(18.62)
(2.368)
(3.139)
(0.158)
(4.782)
(7.338)
(6.213)
(0.397)
(6.555)
(3.737)
(10.06)

-1.617
6.727
-0.0428
6.719
11.01
-16.42*
-2.315
50.46***
-39.42***
-12.52
-0.515
1.151
-0.331
279.3***
38.62***
1,157

(3.297)
(4.384)
(0.277)
(9.749)
(10.31)
(9.055)
(2.308)
(14.33)
(9.606)
(12.01)
(0.483)
(0.801)
(3.705)
(13.36)
(2.901)
1,157

4.6.2.2 Interactions with Contract Attributes
Table 4.12 below presents the results of the advance pay contract attribute
interactions. The results indicate that a smallholder farmer who opts for advance pay and
opts for delivery at harvest has a higher minimum WTA for the beans contract of GHȼ7.8
on average, compared to one who opts for no advance pay.
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The results further suggest that a smallholder farmer who is one year older and opts
for the advance pay contract attribute has a GHȼ0.2 higher minimum WTA for the beans
contract, compared to a smallholder who is one year older but does not opt for the advance
pay attribute. Additionally, owning one additional acre of land and opting for the advance
pay lowers the minimum WTA for the beans contract by GHȼ1.2, compared to owning one
additional acre of land but not opting for the advance pay attribute.
Table 4-12 Beans Contract with Advance Pay Interactions
VARIABLES
Advance pay
Delivery at harvest
Female
Age
Educated
Access to credit
Nonfarm business
Agricultural land
Grow crop
Crop acres
High crop decision making
Interacting advance pay with:
Delivery
Female
Age
Educated
Access to credit
Nonfarm business
Agricultural land
Grow crop
Crop acres
High crop decision making
Household size
Kids in school lunch program
Rural
Constant
Sigma
Observations
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Coefficients
-13.36
56.13***
-5.270
-0.208
-3.449
-14.00***
26.08***
-0.184
27.80***
-10.57**
11.23**

Clustered Robust SE
(10.42)
(2.669)
(5.812)
(0.160)
(4.844)
(4.831)
(4.880)
(0.502)
(6.829)
(4.456)
(5.031)

7.790***
-4.075
0.244*
5.713
-5.647
1.349
-1.180*
0.822
2.515
-0.587
-0.528
1.108
1.314
299.8***
39.30***
1,157

(2.958)
(4.736)
(0.144)
(4.784)
(3.659)
(3.897)
(0.613)
(4.961)
(2.353)
(3.811)
(0.477)
(0.835)
(3.978)
(11.04)
(2.759)
1,157

Table 4.13 presents the results of the delivery contract attribute interactions. The
results suggest that, ceteris paribus, a smallholder who opts for the delivery at harvest
option and the advance pay option will have higher minimum WTA for the beans contract
by GHȼ7.8, on average, compared to a smallholder who opts for delivery later and advance
pay.
The results further suggest that, female who opts for delivery at harvest will have a
higher minimum WTA of GHȼ15.1, on average, compared a female who opts for delivery
later. Additionally, a smallholder farmer who opts for delivery at harvest and has one
additional acre of agricultural land will have a GHȼ1.2 higher minimum WTA for the beans
contract, on average, compared to a smallholder with one additional acre of land but does
not opt for delivery at harvest.
Moreover, a farmer who grows legumes and opts for delivery at harvest will have a
GHȼ14.1 lower minimum WTA for the beans contract, ceteris paribus, compared to a
farmer who grows legumes but does not opt for delivery at harvest.
Ceteris paribus, a smallholder farmer who opts for delivery at harvest and has high
decision-making power concerning legume production will have a GHȼ17.2 higher
minimum WTA for the beans contract, compared to a smallholder farmer who has high
decision-making power concerning legume production but does not opts for delivery at
harvest.
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Table 4-13 Beans Contract with Delivery Interactions
VARIABLES
Delivery at harvest
Advance pay
Female
Age
Educated
Access to credit
Nonfarm business
Agricultural land
Grow crop
Crop acres
High crop decision making
Interacting delivery with:
Advance pay
Female
Age
Educated
Access to credit
Nonfarm business
Agricultural land
Grow crop
Crop acres
High crop decision making
Household size
Kids in school lunch program
Rural
Constant
Sigma
Observations

4.7

Coefficients
62.48***
-6.379**
-15.29**
0.123
2.401
-21.06***
29.86***
-1.374**
35.44***
-8.335
1.792

Clustered Robust SE
(11.08)
(2.996)
(7.266)
(0.203)
(6.310)
(6.993)
(6.442)
(0.660)
(9.614)
(6.491)
(6.810)

7.824***
15.08***
-0.400**
-5.865
8.004
-5.968
1.152**
-14.07*
-1.683
17.18***
-0.526
1.116
1.194
293.1***
38.81***
1,157

(2.956)
(5.694)
(0.168)
(5.239)
(5.699)
(5.081)
(0.569)
(7.215)
(4.571)
(5.258)
(0.476)
(0.833)
(3.977)
(13.97)
(2.792)
1,157

Summary and Conclusion
This chapter examines the use of farm-to-school contracts as a means to provide

access to credit for women farmers in rural and peri-urban areas. The study examines the
factors influencing male and female smallholder farmers’ minimum willingness to accept
(WTA) farm-to-school-lunch contracts for maize and cowpea beans. The minimum WTA
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simultaneously measures the decision to participate as well as the minimum price at which
the smallholder farmer accepts the contract. The study hypothesizes that

farmers’

minimum WTA is not only influenced by farmer and farm characteristics, but also
by the attributes of the contract. This is tested by examining farmers’ minimum willingness
to accept with hypothetical variations in the contract design. In particular the study uses a
Tobit model to examine whether an ‘advance pay’ option and the ‘time of delivery and
payment’ differentially influences minimum WTA for male and female smallholder
farmers.
The study hypothesized that the advance payment option would lower the minimum
WTA value of smallholder farmers. The results in the female specification indicate that,
ceteris paribus, having an advance pay option lowers minimum WTA for the maize
contract by GHȼ3 on average. This result is not observed for the beans contract.
The study further hypothesized that delivery at harvest, compared to later, would
lower the minimum WTA value of smallholder farmers. Contrary to the study’s hypothesis,
the results indicate respondents have a higher minimum WTA for maize contracts that
stipulate delivery harvest compared to delivery later. Similarly, the results suggest that,
rather than lower minimum WTA, ceteris paribus, the delivery at harvest compared to
delivery later, increases minimum WTA for the beans contract.
The coefficient on gender in the pooled model indicates that, ceteris paribus, on
average, females have a GHȼ4.5 higher minimum WTA for the maize contract, compared
to males. Again, this result is not observed for the beans contract.
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Concerning access to assets and ownership of assets, the results indicate that have
access to credit lowered minimum WTA in the pooled and female sub-sample by GHȼ7 on
average. Similarly, accesses to credit lowers minimum WTA for the beans contract; access
to credit reduced minimum WTA in the pooled and male specifications by GHȼ16.8 and
GHȼ18.5 respectively. Contrary to the study’s hypothesis, the results indicate that having
a non-farm business increased minimum WTA for the maize contract and the beans
contract.
The study further examines heterogeneity in the minimum WTA among smallholder
farmers. To examine the possible effect of gender differences with contracts attributes and
individual characteristics on minimum WTA, the female variable is interacted with
contract attributes and individual characteristics. The results indicate that, ceteris paribus,
a female with a non-farm business has a GHȼ11.1 lower minimum WTA for the maize
contract on average, compared to a male with a non-farm business. Similarly, a female who
owns a non-farm business has a lower minimum WTA of GHȼ16.4 for the beans contract,
compared to a male who owns a non-farm business, on average.
The study also analyzes the potential role of contract attributes with individual
characteristics on WTA. Access to, ownership of, and control over assets as well as
decision-making power may influence respondents’ WTA. The results suggest that, ceteris
paribus, a smallholder farmer who opts for the advance pay and delivery at harvest contract
attribute will have, on average, a higher minimum WTA for the maize contract by GHȼ
7.2, compared to a smallholder farmer who opts advance pay but not delivery at harvest.
Similarly, a smallholder farmer who opts for advance pay and opts for delivery at harvest
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has a higher minimum WTA for the beans contract of GHȼ7.8 on average, compared to a
smallholder who opts for delivery later and advance pay.
The results suggest that, ceteris paribus, a smallholder who opts for the delivery at
harvest option and has access to credit will have a higher minimum WTA for the maize
contract by GHȼ5.6, on average, compared to a smallholder farmer who opts for delivery
at harvest but has no access to credit. This result is not observed for the beans contract.
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATION
5.1

Summary
In recent decades, school-lunch programs have been introduced in developing

countries to increase access to primary education while simultaneously reducing hunger
and child malnutrition. The Ghana School Lunch Program is an example of a school-lunch
program implemented under a homegrown framework; such a framework requires that the
school lunch is administered using food that is locally grown by smallholder farmers. The
homegrown framework is designed to link caterers of school lunch programs with local
farmers; provide economic opportunities for local farmers; increase local agricultural
production; and stimulate economic development, while providing nutritious meals for
schoolchildren. However, studies have shown that the ‘buy local’ policy mandate has not
been achieved.
The broad objectives of the study is threefold: firstly, the study seeks to document
the missing link between school caterers who prepare and serve school lunches and local
smallholder farmers who cultivate farm plots in the communities; secondly it seeks to
examine a gendered approach to technology adoption and participation of smallholder
farmers in farm-to-school contracts; and thirdly, to make policy recommendations based
on the empirical evidence to facilitate the Ghana School Lunch Program. The data used for
the dissertation involves a series of focus group discussions and interviews with school
caterers and smallholder farmers in rural and peri-urban areas in Eastern and Northern
Ghana.
A brief background of the Ghana School Lunch Program is presented in Chapter 2.
Subsequently, the chapter documents the constraints that have undermined school caterer
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purchases from local farmers as stipulated by the ‘buy-local’ policy mandate of the lunch
program. The school caterer analysis revealed that the three main hurdles to purchasing
from local farmers are the time and frequency of remuneration, the amount of remuneration
to the school caterers, and storage facilities. The women farmer study suggests that the two
major constraints are land infertility and access to credit.
The study also identifies that the school lunch provided is not always nutritionally
balanced. One policy recommendation is to put measures in place for enhanced nutrition
for schoolchildren. Providing reliable food for schoolchildren is important, however,
providing adequate nutrition is as important as the total calories provided in the school
meals. The government may have to allocate more resources to ensure that children are not
only fed but also well nourished. These resources may be in the form of higher allocation
to school caterers, trainings on how to prepare balanced meals on a budget, or routine
monitoring of adherences to the recommended nutrition for schoolchildren. With more
resources allocated, the government would then be able to require a more nutritionally
enhanced lunch meal with recommended portions of protein, vegetables and fruits.
The rest of the dissertation builds on the land infertility and credit constraints of
women farmers. In recent years, there has been increasing evidence of differential adoption
rates of agricultural technology adoption by male and female smallholder farmers in subSaharan Africa. Governments, non-governmental organizations and international aid
agencies strive to combat poverty and improve the living standards of rural and peri-urban
households; however, some policies have not resulted in the expected outcomes. For
example, fertilizer subsidies targeted to the head of household are assumed to have an equal
effect on males and females living in the rural farm households, but in reality may not reach
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females in the households. Gender conscious policies may help get a step closer to
achieving goals of development agencies. Chapter 4 analyzes gender differences in the
adoption of multiple improved agricultural technologies among smallholder farmers in
Northern Ghana. It contributes to the literature on gender gaps in technology adoption
while taking into consideration, gendered access to productive resources as well as
gendered decision-making power in households.
The study investigates differential adoption rates and factors affecting adoption of
agricultural technology by male and female maize and legume farmers. Descriptive results
indicates that maize production is male-dominated in Northern Ghana while women
farmers predominantly cultivate legumes, such as cowpea beans. Among maize farmers,
herbicides and fertilizers are more commonly adopted, with a higher adoption of fertilizer
among males compared to female maize farmers. Among legume farmers, herbicides and
pesticides have the highest adoption rates. Female legume farmers have higher herbicide
adoption rates while male legume farmers have higher pesticide adoption rates.
The multivariate estimation results indicate no gender gaps among male and female
maize farmers for improved seed, herbicide and pesticide adoption, but finds a gender gap
for fertilizer adoption when covariates are not controlled. Access to and ownership of
productive assets such as phones, radios, and credit increases the likelihood of improved
seed adoption among maize farmers. Additionally, female maize farmers who have input
into most or all decisions concerning cash crop production are more likely to adopt
improved maize seeds. Male and female maize farmers with access to credit and education
are more likely to adopt fertilizer, while male and female farmers in Muslim households
are more likely to adopt herbicides. The study further finds that, maize farmers who have
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access to credit, who have one additional bicycle and who had input into most or all
decisions regarding cash crop farming in the past agricultural year are more likely to adopt
pesticides while farmers without education are less likely to adopt pesticides.
The multivariate estimation for technology adoption among legume farmers indicate
a gender gap for improved seed and pesticide adoption, but no gender gap for fertilizer and
herbicide adoption. The results further suggest male and female legume farmers who have
had access to credit in the past two years are more likely to adopt improved seed and
fertilizer, while female legume farmers with education and access to credit are more likely
to adopt fertilizer. Furthermore, legume farmers who own one additional television set are
more likely to adopt herbicides. The study also finds that legume farmers who have access
to financial resources and female legume farmers who have a say in what the use of income
generated from cash crop farming are more likely to adopt pesticides.
These results highlight the point that governments and non-governmental
organizations that want to encourage adoption of agricultural technology among rural and
peri-urban households must design and implement agricultural policies that recognizes
gender differences within heterogeneous families. Improving and ensuring equitable access
to productive resources that differ between men and women, particularly to credit,
education and radios may facilitate a higher uptake of agricultural technology by female
maize and legume farmers. Direct targeting of female farmers within rural and peri-urban
farm households to receive input subsidies could help close the gender technology gaps
observed within the various agricultural technologies.
Farmers may also be encouraged to adopt flexible combinations of improved
technology that best suit them and that would allow them to take advantage of agronomic
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and economic complementarities. Combining varying proportions of improved seed,
fertilizer, herbicide and pesticide to meet the small farm sizes of rural and peri-urban
farmers may be more cost effective and affordable than large bags of all technologies. Cash
constrained farmers may also be encouraged to bundle improved seed and fertilizer while
using family labor for weeding and controlling large farm pests.
Government can liaise with micro businesses in rural and peri-urban communities to
subsidize radio, phones, and other agricultural productive assets such as backpack sprayers
to women farmers. Additionally, government can liaise with agro-chemical sellers in rural
and peri-urban areas to subsidize and target women farmers with improved agricultural
inputs such as improved seeds, fertilizer, pesticides and herbicides. The agro-products
could also be marketed in smaller packages with the option for bundling different inputs.
A plethora of empirical studies has documented women farmers’ differential access
to credit in sub-Saharan Africa. The study in Chapter 5 examines the use of farm-to-school
contracts as a means to provide access to credit for women farmers in rural and peri-urban
areas. The study examines the factors influencing male and female smallholder farmers’
willingness to accept (WTA) farm-to-school-lunch contracts for maize and cowpea beans.
The WTA simultaneously measures the decision to participate as well as the minimum
price at which the smallholder farmer accepts the contract. The study hypothesizes that
farmers’ WTA is not only influenced by farmer and farm characteristics, but also by
the attributes of the contract. This is tested by examining farmers’ minimum willingness to
accept with hypothetical variations in the contract design. In particular the study uses a
Tobit model to examine whether an ‘advance pay’ option and the ‘time of delivery and
payment’ differentially influences WTA for male and female smallholder farmers.
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The pooled results for both the maize and beans contracts indicate no effect of
advance pay option on WTA. However, the results in the female specification indicate that,
ceteris paribus, having an advance pay option lowers minimum WTA for the maize
contract but not the beans contract.
Contrary to the study’s hypothesis, the results indicate respondents have a higher
minimum WTA for the maize and beans contracts that stipulate delivery harvest compared
to delivery later.
The pooled results indicate females have a higher minimum WTA for maize
contracts but finds no gender differences regarding minimum WTA for the beans contract.
Concerning access to assets and ownership of assets, the results indicate that have
access to credit lowered minimum WTA for the maize contract in the pooled and female
sub-sample; access to credit reduced minimum WTA for beans contracts in the pooled and
male specifications. Contrary to the study’s hypothesis, the results indicate that having a
non-farm business increased minimum WTA for the maize contract and the beans contract.
The study further examines heterogeneity in the minimum WTA among smallholder
farmers. To examine the possible effect of gender differences with contracts attributes and
individual characteristics on minimum WTA, the female variable is interacted with
contract attributes and individual characteristics. The results indicate that, ceteris paribus,
a female with a non-farm business has a lower minimum WTA for the maize and beans
contract on average, compared to a male with a non-farm business.
The study also analyzes the potential role of contract attributes with individual
characteristics on WTA. Access to, ownership of, and control over assets as well as
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decision-making power may influence respondents’ WTA. The results suggest that, ceteris
paribus, a smallholder farmer who opts for the advance pay and delivery at harvest contract
attribute will have, on average, a higher minimum WTA for the maize and beans contract,
compared to a smallholder farmer who opts advance pay but not delivery at harvest.
The results suggest that, ceteris paribus, a smallholder who opts for the delivery at
harvest option and has access to credit will have a higher minimum WTA for the maize
contract, compared to a smallholder farmer who opts for delivery at harvest but has no
access to credit. This result is not reflected in the beans contract.
The results suggest that if the government considers contractual arrangements
between school caterers and local farmers to facilitate the buy-local policy mandate, an
advance pay option to women farmers may yield lower premiums for contracted food
items.
The typical smallholder farm household tends to consume a sizeable part of their
production, due to the subsistence nature of farming in Northern Ghana. The farm
household cultivates both food crops (mainly for household consumption) and cash crops
to generate farm income. Although most local producers are net buyers of food, some are
net sellers of food seeking alternative marketing channels. The school lunch program could
provide a suitable alternative market to smallholder farmers in the local economies.
It is likely that if a household decided to market their produce to the school lunch
program, the household would see significant improvement in household food supply and
quality. These improvements would likely stem from the stable flow of income into the
household. The incomes could be used to diversify the diets of the household and increase
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their nutrition intake. Additionally, with a guaranteed market, farmer’s post-harvest losses
would be minimized and smallholder farmers could reap the full profit from their farm
business.
If the Homegrown Ghana School Lunch program works as intended, the
schoolchildren stand to benefit both directly and indirectly. Beyond the direct benefits of a
hot and nutritious lunch, which aids in student learning, attendance, performance and
retention, the students would also benefit indirectly through their parents. Most of the
parents are local farmers. Increased incomes from the school lunch program could
immediately translate into school uniforms, books and other educational material for the
schoolchildren. Female children may benefit more than they do now with regards to
increased educational opportunities. The female children often have to drop out of school
after primary education if the parents could not afford to pay school fees for higher
education. With increased incomes, the parents of female children would be able to
advance to educational levels beyond primary education.

5.2

Policy Recommendations
The study identified a number of constraints to the efficient functioning of the

Homegrown Ghana School Lunch Program. These constraints include i) the inability of the
government to make payments to school caterers in a timely manner, ii) low levels of
production and output, iii) lack of access to credit for smallholder farmers, iv) the inability
of farmers to sell their production on credit and v) lack of storage facilities.
One interesting point to note is that if the first constraint were to be miraculously
resolved, the other constraints to the efficient functioning of the school lunch program
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would not be binding. If the government were able to make timely payment to school
caterers, the constraint of low levels of production would not be binding. School caterers
would be able to make purchases from local farmers for school meals. The regular demand
from school caterers to prepare school meals would encourage local farmers to invest in
their farms and expand production to meet the increasing demand from schools, resulting
in increased production and output. Thus, regular payments to school caterers can help
eliminate the constraint of low production.
Similarly, the constraints of lack of access to credit for farmers and the inability of
farmers to sell their production on credit can be eliminated if the government were able to
make regular payments to school caterers. With regular payments, school caterers would
also be able to make immediate payments to local farmers for their produce. This would
have a twofold effect; first, it would enable farmers to sell produce to school caterers as
the caterers would not have to make purchases on credit and secondly, it would reduce the
need for farmers to have to seek credit facilities with formal financial institutions. The
regular purchases of food items from school caterers would provide a steady flow of
income for the local farmers as well guaranteed source of income for the farmers.
Furthermore, the constraint with regards to lack of storage space can also be resolved
with regular payment to school caterers by the government. With regular payments, school
caters can make weekly purchases of food items from local farmers. The caterers would
not require large storage facilities to store and preserve their weekly food items as
compared to some purchases currently made twice or three times each term.
Governments also face the basic economic problem of how to allocate scare
resources among alternative uses. The government may not be able to simultaneously
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address all the constraints that the study has identified to improve the efficient functioning
of the Ghana School Lunch Program. Practically, they might want to rank the constraints
in terms of priority and address them as such. However, seeing as all the identified
constraints could be resolved if the regular payment were tackled first, the optimal ranking
of the constraints in terms of priority ‘goes without saying’. Addressing the regular
payment of school caterers would likely resolve the other identified constraints and enable
a more efficient operating of the ‘buy-local’ policy for the school lunch program.

5.3

Future Research
One of the constraints the study identified is the inability/unwillingness of local

farmers to sell on credit. One direction for future research is to explore what it would take
to get local producers to sell their production on credit. Using the setting of a field
experiment, future research can ask farmers what would make them give out their farm
produce on credit. The alternatives for the choice experiment could include arranged
regular bi-weekly or monthly payments (similar to loan repayment schedules). A third
alternative could be ‘none’ as most farmers do not trust they will be paid or cannot afford
to have late payments especially if they need to reinvest into their small farm business.
A second area for future research is to examine the impact on smallholder farm
households when they supply food items to the school lunch program. A difference in
differences approach can be used to assess the differences in the households’ food supply
and quality using households that supply food items to the school lunch program as the
treatment group.
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In what way is buying from local farmers ‘better’ and in what way is buying from
the central market better? The Ghana School Lunch Program recommends caterers to make
80% of purchases directly from local farmers. School caterers currently make most
purchases from the central market. The interviews with the school caterers indicated that
although making purchases from local farmers could present a better value and could lower
transaction/search costs, the highly perishable nature of farm produce coupled with poor
storage facilities make purchases from the central market a more workable alternative. The
items purchased from the central market include canned tomatoes and fish, which
compromise freshness for storability. Moreover, some of the purchased ‘fresh’ food items
such as tomatoes and cowpea beans are imported from neighboring countries, defeating the
aim of the buy-local policy mandate. Future research can explore a longitudinal study of
school food purchases made directly from local farmers and from the central market,
concerning storage of food items, ease of purchase, nutritional content, value for money
and search/transactions costs.
Finally yet importantly, further research can examine whether local farmers are
trying to intensify in agriculture or diversify out of agriculture into other off-farm
businesses. A section of the survey asked the respondents what they would spend an extra
1000 cedis on. In terms of agricultural expenses, the general trend of responses indicate
that the 1000 cedis would be spent on land preparation prior to planting, on farm inputs
such as fertilizer and on rearing farm animals. In terms of non-agricultural expenses, the
general trend of expenses was on trading, on food, health and educational bills and for
general upkeep. Future research can broadly ask what respondents would spend a 1000
cedis on, without breaking it into agricultural and non-agricultural expenses, to get a better
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sense of whether farmers are looking to intensify into agriculture or diversify into off-farm
businesses.
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1. Women Caterer Interview Guide
Date/Location of Interview:
Name of Person Taking Notes:
Description of Person Participating in Interview (School food buyer, school
administrator, teacher, community member, etc):
Special Comments:
About the School
School Name/Location:
Grades/Classes at School:
Total Student Enrollment:
About the Food
1. What is a typical weekly lunch menu?
2. What determines the weekly menu? Which foods are served? (get specific amount
purchased during the past year)
Foodstuff
Usage (termly)

3. What is the source of these foods (local, Ghana, Africa, other international)?

About the Buyer
1. How did you become a caterer under the Ghana school feeding program?
2. What qualities did they look for in you to select you as a caterer under the
program?
3. When did you become a caterer for the Ghana school feeding program?
4. How long have you been a caterer for this school?
5. How are you paid for your job as a caterer for the school feeding program?
6. What other jobs do you do aside being a school food caterer?
7. What job(s) did you do prior to becoming a school food caterer?
8. Are you a member of this community?

About the Site
1. Where does the money for the school feeding come from?
2. Are there established procedures for purchasing food under the school feeding
program? Please explain
3. Who has control over food procurement under the program?
4. How often (frequently) are food supplies purchased? For what period are food
items procured (weekly, fortnightly, etc.)
5. Availability of storage on site? How much food are you able to store at a time in
this facility?
6. How is the cost for school meals determined?
7. With what regularity are funds released to the buyer?
8. What would you need to be able to buy and use more local foods in the school
feeding program?
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